Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

327. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, January 10, 1981, 2031Z

112. Subject: (S) Demarche to GRN. Ref: A. State 6357,² B. Managua 103,³ C. Managua 095,⁴ D. 80 Managua 5859.⁵

1. (S-Entire text).

2. I met with Junta member Sergio Ramirez and FSLN Directorate member Humberto Ortega this morning per instructions in ref A. I began by reviewing the position the USG had assumed at the outset of the GRN administration, offering support for the reconstruction of the country. This policy was based on undertakings made by the Junta before it took office to establish a pluralistic system, respectful of human rights and dedicated to constructing a new Nicaraguan state which would satisfy the desires of the Nicaraguan people. The administration has been generous in its assistance and has expended considerable energy and political capital convincing the U.S. Congress to support an assistance effort which is the largest in Latin America and one of the largest in the world. Sadly, the GRN’s promises have not been met. The private secor is traumautized and isolated, political parties have been restricted as has the press, and human rights are not being protected. 6,000 or more prisoners are being held, the court system evidences little regard for due process, and the general attitude of the government appears to be hardening.

3. I contined that we had emphasized on many occasions that their pledge to follow an international policy of non-intervention had to be substantiated in deeds, given the turbulent period through which Central America is currently passing. The President, after exhaustive review by the U.S. Government, had determined in September that the GRN was not involved in aiding and abetting terrorism.⁶ That determination was made despite some evidence that support was being lent to the Salvadoran rebels, but it was not of a conclusive nature. Subsequent to that determination, considerably more evidence has come to our attention which raises serious doubts on the credibility of the GRN/FSLN commitment that it would not offer direct support to the Salvadoran rebels. We have been aware for some time that the Cuban Government is deeply involved in supporting subversive movements throughout Central America and that it has upped its involvement in Salvador as the political situation there has deteriorated. The large number of Cubans in Nicaragua, the closeness of the relationship between the two countries and, most recently, evidence of coordination of support for Salvadoran rebels raises the question of whether the GRN is allowing itself to be used to serve Cuban interests. If so, that would alter the nature of our relationship. I ended by saying I was going to Washington for consultations on these matters and had been asked to bring our concerns to their attention and seek their reactions.

4. Humberto Ortega was the principal spokesman. He focused on support to the Salvadoran rebels. He said their experience taught the FSLN that it took a tremendous amount of time, money and logistical support to organize a widespread guerrilla operation. The Salvadoran guerrillas, who aided the FSLN somewhat during its campaign, have always had more finances available to them (at least a 100 million) and are able to purchase supplies from many sources. He said, as did Borge (ref C), that most of the arms the FSLN acquired came from the United States. He assumed that that was true in the Salvadoran situation as well. He said it would be “simplistic” to believe that arms coming through Nicaragua, which doesn’t have a contiguous border with Salvador could be of importance in that struggle. All Central American countries have permeable borders, he observed. The FSLN military had its hands full preventing infiltration by counterrevolutionary elements from Honduras. “Even though we know Honduran military officers sympathize with ex-Guardia insurgents and may even be supporting them, we recognize that neither the Honduran military nor any other military force in Central America is capable of controling the flow of people and arms across its borders; and that certainly includes Nicaragua,” he added.

5. I interrupted to say that it was not the quantity of arms going into Salvador which was under question, but whether the GRN/FSLN was clandestinely supporting the Salvadoran rebels and willingly allowing its territory to be used for transit of arms northward. Ortega said that “our principal concern is our Honduran, not the Salvadoran, since “we consider ourselves under attack from the north and have lost 100 people in the last several months in armed confrontations along our border with Honduras.” He added the GRN has not given priority to the Salvadoran border and said he was unaware of any operation supported by the government or individuals in the government. He would be willing to investigate if we could provide more specific details. Some elements in Nicaragua clearly sympathize wih the revolutionary left in Salvador and want to help but the GRN/FSLN had resisted getting involved. He said he would provide me with the details on a company-sized group of volunteers who were broken up by the FSLN [garble] they wanted to fight in El Salvador. He admitted that low-level FSLN members most probably were fighting for or helping supply the Salvadoran rebels, but was categoric in stating that these actions did not have leadership sanction and were broke up when encountered.

6. At this point Ramirez questioned whether the information we had was exaggerated. He said he recognized the enlightened policy taken by the USG in supporting reconstruction and in building a new relationship with Nicaragua. The USG should be mindful of the attempts the GRN has made to build the basis of a strong relationship. He said the GRN has met its promise to assume the debt of the Somoza government and has reached an agreement with the banking community on a repayment schedule. The GRN has also been very sensitive to the large U.S. investors and is in the process of working out a longterm arrangement to insure that Standard Fruit continues operations here. Negotiations with ASARCO are progressing satisfactorily, and hopefully will result in early agreement. And even though the GRN could agree that its rhetoric has been excessive, it has taken major steps to control it recently and believes the tone of our relationship has improved. The fact that we can discuss the most sensitive subjects as frankly and openly as we do is testimony to the GRN’s desire to have good relations with the United States.

7. Returning to the support to the Salvadoran guerrillas, Ramirez asked a series of probing questions: “are you saying that the Cubans are using our territory . . . Are you saying that we are cooperating with the Cubans . . . or are you saying that members of this government are involved?”

8. I said we recognized that the high decibel level of anti-American propaganda had been lowered in recent months. We thought that was beneficial. And we were fully aware that the GRN is interested in maintaining a positive image in the international financial and business communities. I commended them for inviting the Council of the Americas to help them draft a new investment code. This was on the positive side of the ledger and would not be lost to U.S. policymakers as they review the substance of our relationship on the question of the specifics, of support for Salvador. I said I would not get into that now. On the Cuban issue, we were dealing with both a real and an image problem. The real problem involved Cuban designs in Central America, which were well documented; and Cuba’s close association with the Soviet Union, which has forced it to send its troops abroad and to engage in military activities in Africa, the Middle East and even as far away as Afghanistan. Cuba plays on a world stage, and whether true or not, the mere presence of so many Cubans in Nicaragua, especially in the sensitive areas as intelligence, police and the military, leaves the impression that the GRN is allowing itself to be used by the Cubans for Castro’ s purposes.

9. Humberto Ortega interjected at that point to ask how many Cubans I thought were working with the EPS. I said probably about two hundred. He smiled and said much less and then admitted to between 50 and 100, but hastened to add that “there are many other Latins—Argentinians, Mexicans, Peruvians, etc, who are also helping.” He claimed that there are “more Americans than Cubans” helping the EPS.

10. Ortega said that he believed there is an unfortunate misreading by the United States of the revolutionary movements in Central America and degrees of Cuban and Nicaraguan influence over those movements. He observed that the Cuban reality differs markedly from that of Nicaragua, due to differences in the personalities, the historic settings and USG reaction. Cuba’s attitude toward the US is markedly different from that of Nicaragua, in large part due to the way US policy played out in each country. The Nicaraguan model, which permits “political pluralism, a mixed economy and freedom and favors a close working relationship with the United States,” has more impact on revolutionary movements than does the Cuban model. He said “I hope you have been aware of the substance change in the posture of the Salvadoran left, which has evolved from a very extremist position to one which is more pragmatic and moderate. That change came about because they have drawn upon our revolutionary experience,” he boosted. I remarked that unfortunately the distinction he sees or tries to project between the Nicaraguan position and the Cuban position is very often lost because Nicaragua is overshadowed by Cuba. His recent statements in Havana at the anniversary of the Cuban Communist Party had left the impression that Nicaragua supported fully the very hardline position Castro has been driven into. Castro admitted openly that he supported the Afghan invasion and that he also supports a hardline position on Poland. Ortega said “we do not agree with Cuba on those issues,” adding that “we defined our position in these areas by not defining our position.” He repeated that he thought the distinction was lost on most. I agreed, adding that Nicaragua had to take responsibility for clarifying its own international image.

11. Ramirez acknowledged that Nicaragua’s international image had been hurt because of failure to be precise in articulating their non-alignment. He said they were considering two important ambassadorial changes in February. A new Ambassador would be sent to Washington “who should be more acceptable to the Reagan administration”, and an entire new team will go to the United Nations. (Note: These constitute important changes. See (ref D), in which I said their international image had been damaged in large measure by the inability of their UN Mission to develop an “independent” position from the Cubans.)

12. Tom O’Donnel asked Ortega if he saw a possible solution in El Salvador. Without hesitation he responded that a “political solution was needed; that the revolutionary forces and the moderates in the government would have to sit down to negotiate an agreement which eliminated the repressive rightist elements from the military and agreed upon a program of government. He said the FDR leaders had been prepared to initiate such negotiations when they were brutally murdered by the Salvadoran right. He understood the US would not oppose such negotiations. He referred to reports that the Salvadoran guerrillas were about to launch the “final offensive,” but reiterated that only a “political” arrangement would resolve the current impasse. He strongly implied the FSLN is pushing the FDR towards a political accommodation.

13. Both Humberto and Ramirez were very interested in my consultations in Washington and asked that I meet with them upon my return. I said I would do so. Ramirez in particular was concerned about what could be expected from the Reagan administration and referred to the television program “The Castro Connection” with specific reference to Reagan’s comment that he would not rule out sending troops to El Salvador. I emphasized that they follow the advice I had given them months ago, that the best way to enjoy good relations with the Reagan administration was to develop a constructive and solid relationship with the United States. Unfortunately just the opposite has occurred. The political and economic climate in the country has deteriorated, the government has become more, rather than less, rigid, the increased strife in Salvador and the threat of a major confrontation in the area, coupled with increased evidence of Nicaraguan Government support for the rebels, are led in the wrong direction. Ortega attempted to put the best face on the situation. He said one positive aspect is that we could discuss sensitive issues as freely as we do. He added surprisingly that he was “sorry” he had not taken advantage of the military offer to visit the United States last year and was hopeful the invitation could be renewed.

14. Comment: There is no question that we got their attention after three straight-from-the-shoulder demarches on the issue of our relations and, specifically, their support to the Salvadoran left. Ramirez was as nervous as a cat during the entire discussion. He does not have a poker face. His stomach doesn’t permit it. Gas attacks drive him from the room repeatedly. Ortega is a much cooler cat. If anyone is dealing directly with the Cubans, it is Ortega. The special operations unit of the military, which is under his command would be the one involved in any covert operations with the Cubans. Not once during the conversation did his face reveal evidence that they were collaborating in a clandestine way with the Cubans.

15. After these three extended conversations, it is clear to me that the leaders here are very concerned about the current status of our relations and aware that opportunities were lost to strengthen bilateral ties. The new administration has an opportunity to play on these fears and influence in a positive sense the course of events here and in the CA region. The influence the FSLN has over the Salvadoran left may not be as great as Ortega would have us believe, but it is considerable. His suggestion that a “political solution” is the best way out in El Salvador presents an option in which the FSLN could perhaps be led to play a useful diplomatic role.

Pezzullo

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. Also sent Priority to San Salvador.
2. In telegram 6357 to Managua, January 9, the Department instructed Pezzullo to deliver a démarche to the GRN on its “failure to halt arms trafficking to El Salvador, certain continuing human rights concerns and the harsh treatment of the private sector and independent political parties,” and, at Pezzullo’s discretion, “concern about the growing Cuban influence in Nicaragua.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
3. In telegram 103 from Managua, January 9, Pezzullo reported on his meeting with Ramirez, during which Pezzullo raised “increasing evidence of GRN/FSLN support for Salvadoran guerrillas.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810041–0687)
4. In telegram 95 from Managua, January 9, Pezzullo reported on his conversation with Borge: “I told Borge that there was increasing evidence that Nicaraguan territory was being used to aid the guerrillas in Salvador with support from the FSLN.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810013–0039)
5. Pezzullo reported in telegram 5859 from Managua, December 6, 1980, on his December 5 meeting with the five members of the Nicaraguan Junta, during which he described how “GRN failures to fulfill its commitments to pluralism and an open society” had fomented the “current political crisis” in Nicaragua and undermined relations with the United States. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800583–0285)
6. See footnote 6, Document 316.