Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

495. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 15, 1981

SUBJECT

• Friday Morning Breakfast: Central America (U)²

The attached is self-explanatory. You can either read it as a memo to you, or give it to the President before the breakfast. If we decide to support lethal assistance to El Salvador, we will need to make a clear Presidential statement indicating reasons, and we will need to consult with the Congress as well. In itself, that will make a busy weekend, particularly since I understand there is a lot of opposition to this in the State Department (from Derian and Atwood). The bottom line of the memo is that we should send a Jetstar on Saturday to pick up Pezzullo and White and bring them back to Washington for an NSC meeting on Sunday. I don’t think we can sidestep either decision; I believe we should face them even in the limited time available. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I and forward it to the President. (U)³

Tab I

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter ⁴

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Friday Morning Breakfast: Central America (U)

There are two urgent issues, which you will be required to address before the inauguration either because of the urgency of supporting a friendly government against a serious Communist insurgency (El Salvador) or because of legal requirements (a determination on aid to Nicaragua).

1. Lethal assistance to El Salvador. Although our reports of the military situation in El Salvador are hardly comprehensive, it appears that the armed forces have seriously depleted its reserves of ammunition, while at the same time, the guerrillas have received continuous and extensive resupplies. Moreover, the guerrillas are attacking the government all over the country, and because of the lack of lift capability, the balance could very well tip in favor of the guerrillas quickly. We have not supplied lethal equipment to El Salvador since 1977, and while the government has received some military supplies since then, it is weak and very much in need of help from the US. (S)

There are some who have opposed US military aid totally. This position is unrealistic, given the strong support the guerrillas are receiving. For me, I have long felt that we ought to use the military aid as an inducement to get the government to stop the repression, implement the reforms, and pursue the investigations on the nuns. The Junta has taken positive steps in the last month in each of these areas, and Duarte is pleading for military aid now. We cannot and should not ignore him. Your Administration should leave office with a clear statement of our policy to El Salvador—that we are providing lethal assistance because the government has taken positive steps in the three areas of our concern, and it is besieged by Communist guerrilla forces, armed, trained and supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist governments.⁵ (S)

2. Nicaragua. In his demarche to the Nicaraguan leadership, Pezzullo informed them that the reports of Nicaraguan involvement in El Salvador may cause us to cancel the aid.⁶ Everyone realized that this would mean a total collapse of the relationship between our two countries, and it would also mean the radicalization of the Nicaraguan revolution. The middle class would be driven out, and we would have thousands more refugees. The Nicaraguans denied they were helping the guerrillas and asked for proof. They said that if we did not provide proof, Latin America would believe them rather than us. I do not agree with this entirely, but I believe that unless our proof is definitive, and can stand solidly in the court of international public opinion, we will look very foolish indeed. We have struggled for the last 18 months, against considerable resistance in the United States to fashion an enlightened relationship with the Sandinistas. If we throw this all out on the last day of your Administration without exhibiting clear evidence, we will look as if we were either spooked by Reagan or fooled by the CIA. I believe that either the CIA should permit us to use definitive evidence publicly, or you should indicate that they do not have such evidence, and pass this issue to the Reagan Administration. (S)

The decision to terminate aid to Nicaragua is an extremely significant one because it will definitely lead, in my opinion, to the expulsion of the middle class, the Communization of Nicaragua, and could very well precipitate a major international war in Central America. I suggest we bring Ambassadors Pezzullo and White back for an NSC meeting on Sunday afternoon to make these decisions. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled File, Box 130, El Salvador: 1/81. Secret. Sent for action.
2. January 16.
3. Brzezinski neither approved nor disapproved of this recommendation. However, Pastor wrote at the bottom of the page: “ZB read and used at Friday morning breakfast, Jan. 16, 1981 where President made decision to go ahead with most lethal and to make specific demands to GON on no support for insurgency.” Brzezinski’s January 16 memorandum for the record described that day’s foreign affairs breakfast meeting: “El Salvador: Go ahead with the basic lethal supply list provided by DOD but omitting the 7.62 mm ammunition (since White reports the present stocks are adequate for 4–6 weeks) and limiting the helicopters to six, with Brown to work out the question of the crews with the El Salvador Government but with the USG not providing any Americans for them. Nicaragua: ZB to request CIA to provide a list of specific steps the Nicaraguans can be requested to take in order to turn off aid flow to the rebels; State to go with a demarche to the Nicaraguans to that effect later on Friday; DOD to deploy AWACs to monitor flights from Nicaragua to El Salvador and from Cuba to Nicaragua.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 93, Foreign Affairs Breakfast, 1977–1981)
4. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski did not initial the memorandum.
5. See Document 459.
6. See Document 328.