Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

328. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, January 15, 1981, 0618Z

197. Subj: (S) Demarche on GRN Support of Salvadoran Guerrillas. Ref A. State 9158² B. Managua 0112.³

1. Entire text

2. I met this evening for two hours with GRN/FSLN group composed of Sergio Ramirez, Humberto Ortega and Jaime Wheelock. I said I regretted we didn’t have a larger turnout despite our request that all members of the Junta and FSLN National Directorate attend. I was instructed to bring our message to all the leadership level because of the gravity of the issue and to insure that there was no misunderstanding in the mind of any key leader. Ortega said he and Wheelock would brief the full Directorate tomorrow and Sergio said he would do the same with the Junta; and they assured me that a full and accurate accounting of what transpired at this session would be passed on. Sergio took notes during the meeting.

3. I emphasized that the message I brought came from the highest levels in the USG. We had carefully analyzed all the evidence available to us and had come to the conclusion that an immediate demarche was necessary before any action was taken, I then translated the talking points in ref A verbatim. I stressed the urgency of their taking immediate action to halt all support of the Salvadoran rebels and to present me with a response that could be forwarded to the President by Saturday.⁴

4. Humberto Ortega began by reiterating the position he had stated in our last conversation (ref B). Jaime Wheelock repeated the same theme, i.e. that the GRN/FSLN had an official policy of not rpt not involving itself in support to Salvadoran guerrillas, even though they sympathize with their cause. Wheelock added that they couldn’t take any meaningful action unless they received more precise info.

5. I said our info indicates clearly that clandestine support operations are in process, which contradict their official policy. A simple reiteration of their public posture would not wash. We needed a commitment from them to stop. Unless that occurred very quickly, our assistance would be terminated and the repayment clause would be triggered. The effect on their economy and on our bilateral relationship would be severe. I said they should keep in mind that this demarche came from officials in the USG who designed our new relationship and have shown a willingness to go to great lengths to build a meaningful and cooperative relationship. The Govt of Nicaragua was being asked to preserve that relationship by desisting immediately from aiding the Salvadoran rebels and allowing the Cubans to use their territory for that purpose. And, while Cuba was playing in this area to further its political ambitions, Nicaragua would be the loser if our relationship deteriorated and if the violence in CA spread.

6. Sergio Ramirez then read from press cables which quoted Amb White’s statement (carried by AFP out of Salvador) that a group of armed Nicaraguans had attempted to interfere in the Salvadoran conflict.⁵ White allegedly told the press that two boatloads of invaders from Nicaragua had entered Salvador. Sergio complained that these were “inflamatory and irresponsible” charges without evidence to sustain them. He understood how Junta Pres Durate might make such a charge, but was hard pressed to understand why a US Amb would make such a public accusation. He asked if the press spokesman would comment on these remarks. I said I would report his concerns to Washington and would repeat any guidance they sent me. I had no info to draw upon to make a judgment of my own. I did regret that a public statement had been made at a time when we wanted them to focus on the very serious matter before us. The latter was a carefully studied position taken by the USG and required their urgent attention and early response.

7. All three then pressed for more details so they could take actions to interrupt any “operations going on behind our backs.” I said the nature of the info was such that that was not possible and suggested that they do their own internal review and inquire of their Cuban friends. I asked whether it were possible that compartmentalized covert operations could be taking place without the knowledge of some gov’t leaders. I got no response.

8. We then turned to clandestine radio stations and the fact that Radio Sandino was aping the same propaganda line as Radio Havana and Radio Liberaction. Ortega said they would be glad to shut down the clandestine operation station if they could locate it. I said I would attempt to get a more precise location. Quick action in closing down the station would be a positive action they could take. I brushed aside their arguments that Radio Sandino was not a gov’t station and insisted that they change the anti-GRN propaganda coming out of Radio Sandino “to show they they really are not inciting violence in El Salvador.” (I would appreciate info by immediate cable on the location of clandestine radio stations pinpointed by triangulation. I will pass that info on to the gov’t immediately to test its willingness to take some positive action.)⁶

9. I observed that they could help their position by desisting from making any more public statements which inflame an already tense situation in El Salvador and in CA in general. They took note. This led to a discussion of a possible political solution. More below.

10. When again pressed for specifics, I reiterated that the info we had came from many sources and provided the convincing evidence of Nicaraguan aid to the Salvadoran rebels. We must assume that high-level members of the gov’t were aware of what was going on and that they could, if they wanted to, take measures to stop the operations. Ramirez observed “as long as we are not given specifics, we are confronted with an enigma. You ask us to act but won’t provide specific info that permits us to act. Should it fail to act because we are unable to you would take actions which would all but destroy our relationship and would have devastating consequences for our country.” Then he added, “if you can’t reveal to us any details of these operations, when you suspend assistance and make it public, you won’t be able to prove your case, especially in Latin America. It will appear as if you took arbitrary action.” I replied, “the evidence would be terribly embarrassing to you.” But that could be avoided. We are advising them so we could avoid reaching the point of an aid cutoff. We recognized the serious consequences which could flow from their failure to take responsible action. He then said “it would be a political act which will undercut our economy. We won’t have the funds to make repayment, our credit standing will suffer, and the effects will be catastrophic.” Wheelock added that it will appear as “economic aggression by the US”, and Ortega added that “all Latin America will support us.” I said “you will also be revealed for having supported a guerrilla movement in a neighboring country which violates the principle of self-determination that ‛you hold dear,’ and would be indefensible in international terms. You are a gov’t. Despite your sympathy for the Salvadoran guerrillas, you have to be held accountable if you take actions to destablize another country. Your gov’t has been publicly hostile to the Salvadoran Junta, making any evidence presented that you were supporting the guerrillas very credible because your public posture is so slanted in their favor.” I reiterated again, however, that we were trying to rescue a relationship which was in serious jeopardy due to their actions.

12. I repeated several items more that we were asking them to cease clandestine operations with the Cubans to support the Salvadoran rebels. Once they did so and informed us, we would have means to verify that the operations had been aborted. They could take immediate actions on the radio stations, the tone and substance of their official statements, and they could begin to attempt to build a constructive relationship with Salvador rather than the negative and destructive one they were currently pursuing.

13. I said while we recognize that our assessment of events in Salvador differed, support for a guerrilla movement in that country was condemnable and destructive of our relations. They should seriously study, I suggested, how much a cooperative relationship with the USG meant to them in terms of their own self-interest. Wheelock said with some feeling that the GRN/FSLN felt a political solution in Salvador would best serve Nicaragua’s interests. “We realize the risks to our country,” he continued, “should the violence spread.” I said Ortega had made a similar statement the other day. I suggested that Nicaragua might take some initiatives in the direction of helping to solve the Salvadoran problem rather than exacerbating it. Peace in Central America, I added, required a solution of the highly-explosive Salvadoran issue. It had regional consequences. Nicaragua’s long-term interests were better served by building bridges with its Central American neighbors than involving itself in the adventures of the Cubans. Wheelock said they would be most willing to play role in seeking a solution. I said, “that’s a constructive start, but we must surmount the immediate problem first.”

14. We closed the session with the understanding that they would get back to me by Saturday with a position to be transmitted to the President. I asked them to cover the ground very carefully to ensure that all operations were terminated.

15. Comment: It’s hard at this point to know how much impact the session had on them. They rolled out their usual defensive arguments in the beginning, but soon appeared to recognize that they would not sell. They were visibly shaken by the prospect of an aid cutoff and a possible repayment of the loan. I gave them no reason to believe that anything but a repayment requirement would be triggered. They conceive of the calling of the loan as a first step in a rupture of our relations. That may very well be the way it would play out.

16. Ramirez has a point in his argument that if we can’t present them with clandestine info, how do we make a convincing public case when we terminate without revealing that same info. If there is any piece of info I could provide which would undercut their intention that they don’t know what to look for, I would appreciate being advised immediately.

17. In addition to the coordinates of the clandestine radio stations, I would appreciate any further info on the intercept station that we can provide to the GRN/RSLN.⁷

Pezzullo

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis.
2. In telegram 9158 to Managua, January 14, the Department instructed the Embassy to deliver a démarche to the GRN/FSLN group, which noted evidence of their support of Salvadoran guerrillas and warned that “immediate cessation of any support will be essential if your government is interested in preserving a constructive relationship with the U.S.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 8/80–1/81)
3. See Document 327.
4. January 17.
5. In telegram 187 from Managua, January 14, O’Donnell reported that at a luncheon hosted by the GRN Junta for the U.S. congressional delegation, he had requested for Pezzullo an urgent meeting with the GRN Junta upon Pezzullo’s return from Washington. O’Donnell also noted that White had confirmed by telephone press reports concerning his statement that the “Salvadoran Government has evidence that boats carrying 100 guerillas through Bay of Fonseca,” for landing in El Salvador, “came from Nicaragua.” O’Donnell concluded: “In effect, we jumped the gun on our planned demarche.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 8/80–1/81) In telegram 226 from Managua, January 15, Pezzullo asserted that the Salvadoran Government should be “urged” to substantiate White’s statement with “hard evidence,” and commented that the “intense public discussion of the charges and countercharges serves to distract the GRN’s attention from our private discussions and to cast doubt on the seriousness and reliability of our evidence.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 22, El Salvador: 1/13–15/81) Telegram 247 from Managua, January 16, included an informal translation of a diplomatic note from the GRN denying involvement in the disembarkation of guerrillas on the coast of El Salvador and protesting White’s statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810024–0052)
6. Telegram 11483 to Managua, January 16, declined Pezzullo’s request. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 57, Nicaragua: 8/80–1/8)
7. See footnote 6 above.