496. Memorandum From Robert
Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
Washington, January 16, 1981
SUBJECT
- Mini-SCC on the Question of
Nicaraguan Aid to Insurgency in El Salvador (S)
The attached is a summary of the mini-SCC. At Tab A is the CIA’s
original response to your tasker; David and I thought it was completely
[Page 1311] inadequate, and I
recommend that you do not forward it to the President.2 Instead, David worked up the outline of a
stiffer demarche to the Nicaraguans, which clearly places the burden of
proof on them. In addition, we developed several other steps, as a part
of a strategy for dealing with the problem of the Presidential
determination and its consequences. Undoubtedly, the strategy will
extend beyond January 20th, but I think it makes much more sense to
transmit this strategy to Reagan
than to inform him to make a Presidential determination. (S)
I am working on a press statement, and will show it to you Saturday
morning3 for your
clearance. I believe it should be issued from the White House as a clear
statement of what the President has been trying to do in El Salvador.
(S)
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memo attached at Tab I. Do not forward Tab A.4
Tab I
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter
5
Washington, undated
SUBJECT
- Mini-SCC on the Question of
Nicaraguan Aid to Insurgency in El Salvador—January 16, 1981
(S)
David Aaron and Bob Pastor chaired a mini-SCC on Friday to discuss the steps the
US should take regarding Nicaragua’s support for the insurgency in
El Salvador. Since aid to Nicaragua is currently suspended, the
group felt that it is not legally required for you to issue a
determination ending aid, and there are many good reasons—the [Page 1312] possible threat to
U.S. personnel, further
evidence—why we should not move precipitately. (State, however, will
confirm the validity of this interpretation with its lawyers.)
(S)
The mini-SCC decided to recommend a
6-part strategy aimed at the following objectives: to encourage the
Nicaraguans to terminate assistance for the Salvadorean insurgency;
to minimize the possible threat to U.S. citizens in Nicaragua; to minimize the possibility
that hard-line Marxists would consolidate power in Nicaragua,
forcing the middle-class to flee; and to scrupulously implement the
law on aid to Nicaragua. (S)
To further these objectives, the mini-SCC recommends that we take the following steps:
(1) Ambassador Pezzullo will
be instructed to make a stiffer, more specific demarche, indicating
that we know that Radio Liberacion is broadcasting within the
vicinity of Managua, that Nicaragua is being used by Cuba as a
transshipment point for the infiltration of men and equipment by
air, land, and sea to Nicaragua, and that Radio Sandino is carrying out a
systematic and hostile campaign against the Government of El
Salvador. The demarche will ask the Nicaraguans to take steps to
stop these activities, and would indicate that they have the burden
to prove that they have taken these steps. We will indicate that we
have the capability of verifying their actions, without being
specific, and if the Nicaraguans do not take such steps, the U.S. will be forced to terminate aid
and demand repayment. (S)
(2) The Defense Department will ensure that an AWACS will be dispatched to the area
as early as possible; they are trying to do it by Saturday night.
(S)
(3) Ambassador Pezzullo will
be asked to submit a plan to the State Department on steps that he
would take to reduce the number of Embassy personnel and inform
U.S. citizens in Nicaragua of
our concern about possible Nicaraguan support for the insurgency and
about its likely impact on US-Nicaraguan relations. (S)
(4) Ambassador Pezzullo will
be instructed to inform leaders of the private sector, the Church,
and non-radical military leaders in a way which will encourage these
leaders to put pressure on the Nicaraguan leaders to stop these
activities. (S)
(5) The Intelligence Community was tasked to establish a coordinating
mechanism in San Salvador and in Washington under the chairmanship
of a designated official from the State Department to collect and
coordinate all intelligence information on external support of the
Salvadorean guerrillas, compile these reports into a good
presentation, and either act on the intelligence or provide the
reports to the Salvadorean Government for public dissemination.
(S)
[Page 1313]
(6) As we develop this information, we should begin consulting with
friendly governments with the purpose of developing a common
approach and perhaps to begin preparing a case of the OAS. (S)
State and NSC are preparing a press
statement which will be released on Monday, describing the reasons
for your decision to send lethal military aid to El Salvador.
(S)
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the six steps described above.6
Tab A
Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency
7
Washington, January 16, 1981
Demarche to the Government of
Nicaragua Concerning Aid to the Salvadoran
Revolutionaries
Following is a series of demands which could be made on the
government of Nicaragua regarding aid to the Salvadoran
revolutionaries.
I. [1 line not declassified] Compliance would
reflect some Government of Nicaragua cooperation, but would not have
a major impact on the armaments flow.
A. Halt broadcasts by the revolutionary radio station Radio
Liberacion. This station is clearly located within Nicaragua, within
an 18 nautical-mile radius of Managua.
B. Tone down domestic radio broadcasts and statements by officials in
support of the Salvadoran insurgency.
C. Halt actions by mass organizations—such as the selling of war
bonds—in support of the Salvadoran revolution.
II. The second set of demands involves acceptance by the Nicaraguans
of international teams to investigate possible Sandinista aid to the
revolutionaries. The presence of teams would be a strong deterrent
to Sandinista support activities, although we would expect the
government to reject such proposals as an infringement on its
sovereignty.
[Page 1314]
A. Allow international inspection of flights through Managua’s
Sandino International
Airport.
B. Accept OAS investigation of the
landing of revolutionaries in El Salvador at Playa Coco for possible
international involvement. This could include inspection of the
northern Nicaragua coastal region.
C. Allow the temporary posting of international observers in the
Nicaraguan coastal region facing El Salvador.
