Cool and Correct: The U.S. Response to the Allende Administration, November 5, 1970–December 31, 1972
36. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: In this telegram, Korry discussed the situation in Chile since Allende’s inauguration and Chilean military’s need for matériel and tried to predict how Chile’s economy would fare under Allende. The real threat to Chile, according to Korry, was that the pace of change outstripped the degree of Communist control.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 CHILE. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
37. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Chile (Korry) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Korry provided a detailed summary of U.S.-Chilean relations from January 1970 to September 1970.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 778, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Korry File, 1971. Top Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. The message was sent with a November 8 backchannel message from Korry to Kissinger that reads as follows: “I have sent summary that you requested. It is of course selective but it does include all messages I received from Washington pertinent to subject. I do not have, of course, any written material on any Senior Group or 40 Committee Washington meetings. Frankly I had hoped that this Presidential requirement would no longer be needed. I respect those who may have disagreed with my style or my opinions but to whom I also am greatly indebted.” (Ibid.) The message was elicited by a November 7 backchannel message from Kissinger to Korry that reads, “As follow-up to your conversation with the President and me, President has requested through this channel your history of events leading up to present situation in Chile. Résumé should cover early pre-election period and include copies of pertinent exchanges to and from Santiago as discussed with the President and me.” (Ibid., Box 423, Backchannel, Europe, Mideast, Latin America, 1970)
38. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Nixon
Summary: Helms offered a post-mortem on the Chilean election and suggested that even with the risks inherent with greater U.S. involvement, the outcome might have been more favorable.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II. Secret.
39. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Summary: This memorandum, titled “Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970,” examined the degree of success achieved by the various covert actions taken to prevent Allende’s ascent to the Chilean Presidency between the Presidential election in September and November 3.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. III. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum is attached to an undated memorandum from Helms to Kissinger, in which Helms suggested “that it does have some current relevancy in terms of the kind of operational milieu Chile really is. For that reason, you may wish to pass it on to the President.” A December 2 covering memorandum from Haig to Kissinger recommended that it be filed.
40. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Summary: Kissinger summarized the differences between the Department of State and CIA approaches to the situation in Chile prior to the election.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. On a blank sheet separating the memorandum from Tab A, Nixon wrote: “K (1) A very sad record—(2) State obviously blocked any meaningful positive move—(3) But the 40 Committee should have overruled State or have brought it to my attention (4) Let’s watch the next one more closely!” Tab B is published as Document 38.
41. Memorandum for the 40 Committee
Summary: The paper attached to this memorandum, titled “Chilean Media Under a Marxist Regime,” outlined the various types of media in Chile and the corresponding political connections of each. Although there were a number of opposition media outlets in Chile after Allende took power, the CIA report was pessimistic that the Allende regime would continue to allow an independent media to flourish.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only.
42. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Summary: This memorandum, titled “Chilean Facilitation of Subversive Activities in Latin America,” assessed the ability of Allende to aid insurgents or revolutionaries in South America.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only. The memorandum was submitted under cover of a memorandum from Cushman to Kissinger containing Cushman’s stamped signature and Broe’s signature.
43. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile (Crimmins) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: This memorandum transmitted the paper titled “Options for the United States in the Event of Expropriation of U.S. Business Interests by Chile,” for consideration by the Senior Review Group. The paper stressed that the chances for expropriation of the mining and metal processing industries were high and outlined various strategies the United States could employ in the event.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H–50, SRG Meeting, Chile 12/23/70. Secret; Nodis. Enclosures 2 through 6 are attached but not published. These papers were distributed to the members of the Senior Review Group on December 21. The SRG meeting was held December 23. The minutes are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 194.
44. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: In the first of four related telegrams titled “The Evident Becomes Obvious,” Korry discussed the changes instituted by the early Allende administration, noting that the administration had attained every initial goal of its program to make Chile a socialist state using non-violent, democratic means. Moreover, the early successes enjoyed by the administration had earned the support of the military, the Church, the bourgeoisie, and the international community.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2–2 CHILE. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asunción, Bogotá, Bonn, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Guatemala, Kingston, La Paz, Lima, London, Madrid, Managua, Melbourne, Mexico City, Montevideo, Ottawa, Panama, Paris, Port au Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, San José, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO. Parts II, III, and IV are Documents 45–47.
45. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: In this second of four related telegrams titled “The Evident Becomes Obvious,” Korry reported on the media and financial counterattack of anti-Communist opponents of Allende. Specifically, Korry noted that the conservative Chilean paper, El Mercurio, had ended its truce with the administration and was engaged in a final battle with Allende. As a result of its political attacks, advertisers had stopped investing in the newspaper and the paper was having difficulties paying its employees.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2–2 CHILE. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asunción, Bogotá, Bonn, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Guatemala, Kingston, La Paz, Lima, London, Madrid, Managua, Melbourne, Mexico City, Montevideo, Ottawa, Panama, Paris, Port au Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, San José, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO. Reference telegram 43 from Santiago, January 5, Part I of the series, is Document 44.
46. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: In this third of four related telegrams titled “The Evident Becomes Obvious,” Korry discussed the nationalization plans of the Allende regime and the attitudes of the other Chilean political parties toward the expropriation of foreign property.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2–2 CHILE. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asunción, Bogotá, Bonn, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Guatemala, Kingston, La Paz, Lima, London, Madrid, Managua, Melbourne, Mexico City, Montevideo, Ottawa, Panama, Paris, Port au Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, San José, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO. Reference telegrams 43 and 46, Parts I and II, are Documents 44 and 45.
47. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: In this fourth of four related telegrams titled “The Evident Becomes Obvious,” Korry described Allende’s use of populist reforms to build support amongst the majority of the Chilean people and the ways in which Allende was trying to control the media and consolidate power in Chile. The Ambassador concluded by highlighting the UP coalition’s desire to remain unified.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2–2 Chile. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asunción, Bogotá, Bonn, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Guatemala, Kingston, La Paz, Lima, London, Madrid, Managua, Melbourne, Mexico City, Montevideo, Ottawa, Panama, Paris, Port au Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, San José, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO. Reference telegrams 43, 46, and 52, Parts I–III, are Documents 44–46.
48. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Chile (Korry) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: In this message, Korry reported on the criticism of the Allende administration by U.S. businessmen in Chile and discussed the implications that the reports of his departure from his ambassadorship had had on U.S.-Chilean relations.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 423, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, 1971. Secret; Exclusively Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the first page by Haig reads, “Arnie, in envelope.” Underneath Haig’s notation, “Xerox copy sent—n.m.” is written in an unknown hand.
49. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: In this telegram, Korry reported on discussions with different officials in the UP government, some of whom wanted a quick nationalization of major foreign companies and others who supported a slower, more pragmatic approach to “Chileanizing” the foreign sector of the economy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO 15–2 CHILE. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Panama.
50. Intelligence Memorandum
Summary: This memorandum provided an overview of the Chilean economy and discussed the impending conflicts between the Allende government and the United States over nationalization of U.S. businesses. In addition, it presented a number of potential United States responses and outlined the advantages and disadvantages of each.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. IV. Secret; Sensitive; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad. A notation on the first page indicates the memorandum was prepared in the Office of Economic Research, Central Intelligence Agency, and coordinated within CIA. The memorandum was received at the White House on February 12. A notation on the cover page indicates it was seen by the President.
51. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: This telegram outlined the emerging Chilean nationalization policy and set forth options for U.S. companies to pursue in the light of recent moves to expropriate property. The closing paragraph provided a grim picture of Allende’s ongoing efforts to reshape Chilean society.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO 15–2 CHILE. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Rome for Ambassador Martin. Reference telegram 24218 to Santiago, February 12, is ibid.
52. Paper Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile
Summary: This paper reviewed some possible policy options for the United States regarding its reaction to Chile’s expropriation policies. The alternatives ranged from a passive stance to different variations of a more active, interventionist stance.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO-COPPER CHILE. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Fisher. Crimmins forwarded this paper to Selden, Leddy, McAlister, Shaefer, Nachmanoff, Broe, Amerson, and Eaton under cover of a February 13 memorandum. (Ibid.) The paper was prepared for the upcoming Senor Review Group meeting on February 17. The minutes of that meeting are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 206.
53. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: This telegram reported on a meeting Korry had with Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier at which the two men discussed Chile’s emerging nationalization policy and the power Allende would have over the process. At the close of the telegram, Korry made an assessment of the impact nationalization would have on U.S. companies.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO 15–2 CHILE. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Nachmanoff sent this cable to Kissinger in preparation for the February 17 SRG meeting. In the attached February 17 covering note, he advised that Kissinger take particular note of paragraphs 1 and 3. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–52, SRG Meeting, Chile, 2/17/71)
54. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense
Summary: In view of the request by the Chilean military for a credit of $7 million to purchase military hardware on March 6, 1970, the Department of Defense prepared this paper for the SRG to review the advantages and disadvantages of different policy alternatives regarding foreign military sales to Chile.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–52, SRG Meeting, Chile 2/17/71. Secret.
55. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense
Summary: This paper recommended that the Senior Review Group approve sending tanks to Chile that it had already purchased.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–52, SRG Meeting, Chile 2/17/71. Secret; Noforn.
56. Memorandum for the 40 Committee
Summary: This progress report summarized actions taken in Chile since January 1971 when the 40 Committee authorized $1,240,000 to support Chilean opposition parties.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the first page indicates the memorandum was approved by telephone by the 40 Committee on March 22.
57. Joint Intelligence Memorandum
Summary: This memorandum offered an assessment of political trends in Chile.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. IV. Top Secret; [handling restriction not declassified] Sensitive; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only; Controlled Dissem.
58. Memorandum for the 40 Committee
Summary: This memorandum provided a progress report on actions taken in preparation for the April 4 elections in Chile.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The March 15 reference memorandum is Document 56.
59. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Nixon and Kissinger discussed the recent elections in Chile.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 245–6. Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon and Kissinger met in the Executive Office Building from 10:06 to 10:35 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
60. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: In this telegram, Korry recounted Allende’s public declaration to maintain good relations with the United States and his desire to enter into realistic negotiations with U.S. copper companies concerning compensation for expropriation. Korry offered an optimistic view of the prospects for negotiations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO 15–2 CHILE. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.
61. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: In his conversation with Rogers and Meyer, Almeyda stressed the importance of maintaining good relations with the United States. Rogers reiterated the point, noting that the United States did not expect its friends to always agree with it.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHILE–US. Confidential. Drafted by Barnes; approved in S. This conversation took place in the Secretary’s suite at the Gran Hotel Costa Rica in San José where he was attending the OAS General Assembly meeting.
62. Memorandum for the 40 Committee
Summary: This memorandum provided a post-April 4 status report which argued that, despite the fact that the UP coalition gained nearly 50 percent of the vote in the April elections, the opposition regained confidence in itself.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation at the bottom of the first page reads, “Group discussion 26 May 71.”
63. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Nixon and Kissinger discussed how to handle Korry.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 487–7. Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon and Kissinger met in the Oval Office from 11:56 a.m. to 12:19 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
64. Memorandum for the 40 Committee
Summary: This memorandum informed the 40 Committee of support for the Christian Democratic Party’s request for financial support to aid in the continuation of the newspaper [text not declassified].
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation at the bottom of the first page indicates that the information paper was distributed to the 40 Committee principals on April 28.
65. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: In this telegram, Korry reported that Allende was not adequately attending to the details of state and concluded that, despite the President’s considerable political abilities, Allende’s behavior would hurt Chile in the long run.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 CHILE. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.