A Spoiling Operation: The 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, January 1–September 4, 1970


9. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: Korry conveyed his understanding of the political climate in Chile just prior to the 1970 Presidential election, noting that the election was shaping up to be a battle between the independent conservative candidate, Jorge Alessandri, and the Popular Unity candidate, Salvador Allende, with Alessandri in the lead. Korry focused on the role the issue of “violence” would play in the upcoming election.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USCINCSO, Asunción, Bogotá, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Guatemala, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City, Montevideo, Panama, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San Salvador, and Santo Domingo. Reference telegram 2210 from Santiago, June 12, is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 CHILE.


10. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: In this continuation of telegram 2714 (Document 9), Korry gave a detailed analysis of the three Chilean Presidential candidates—Radomiro Tomic, Jorge Alessandri, and Salvador Allende—and their platforms, and offered his insight into the ongoing Presidential campaign. Korry predicted that Alessandri would ultimately gain support at the expense of the other two candidates.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USCINSCO, Asunción, Bogotá, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Guatemala, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City, Montevideo, Panama, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San Salvador, and Santo Domingo.


11. National Intelligence Estimate

Summary: This estimate examined the overall record of Chilean President Eduardo Frei’s administration, key forces and parties in Chilean politics, and those candidates campaigning for the September 1970 election.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 79R01012A: Intelligence Publications Files (1950–1975), Box 393, Folder 1: (NIE 94–70) Outlook for Chile. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the CIA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA; concurred in by R.J. Smith (CIA), Ray Cline, Donald Bennett (DIA), and Noel Gayler (NSA). Charles Reichardt (Atomic Energy Commission) and William Cregar (FBI) abstained. The Conclusions and Sections IV and V are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 47.


12. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: Korry expressed that if Phase I—the 40 Committee’s program to channel covert funding to those forces opposing Allende in the 1970 election—continued to be effective there would be no need to implement Phase II of the program—inciting military intervention to prevent Allende’s Presidency—as Allende would not be elected.

Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 1, Chile Chronology 1970. Secret; Roger Channel. Reference telegram 130820 to Santiago, dated August 12, is Document 51 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973.


13. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: The attached study, prepared in response to NSSM 97, discussed the international and domestic implications if Salvador Allende won the upcoming September 1970 Presidential election. Perhaps most directly, the repudiation of the Chilean Government debt of $700 million to the U.S. Government was cited as one of the key threats to U.S. interests should Allende be elected. The study concluded that while Allende would be cautious initially, he would ultimately pursue socialistic economic policies and display a strong anti-United States animus.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–48, Senior Review Group, Chile (NSSM 97), 10/14/70. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary of State, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, Packard, Haig, Lynn, Kennedy, and Vaky. For the text of NSSM 97, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 46.


14. Annex to the Study Prepared in the Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs In Response to National Security Study Memorandum 97

Summary: This annex to the response to NSSM 97 (Document 13) presented a fourth option not contained in that study. It was premised on the assumption that an Allende government was a threat to the national security of the United States and therefore warranted the overthrow of Salvador Allende by the Chilean military. The annex included possible strategies to encourage the Chilean military to overthrow the government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–48, Senior Review Group, Chile (NSSM 97), 10/14/70. This paper, referred to as the covert annex to the response to NSSM 97, was attached to a copy of the response presented to Kissinger in preparation for a Senior Review Group meeting on October 14. For the minutes of the October 14 meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 150.


15. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Chile (Korry) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) and the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (Broe)

Summary: This message described a meeting between Chilean Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Patricio Silva and Korry in which the Chilean official repeatedly questioned Korry on the U.S. Government’s role in a number of incidents and whether the United States had the intention to intervene in Chilean affairs. Korry denied any U.S. involvement in the incidents.

Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 1, Chile Chronology 1970. Secret; Eyes Only.


16. Memorandum for the 40 Committee

Summary: This memorandum discussed options available to the U.S. Government to influence the outcome of the September 4 Chilean Presidential election and the subsequent October 24 election should none of the candidates achieve a clear majority. It outlined U.S. requirements, costs, and issues for taking no, limited, and broad covert action in the event that Allende or Alessandri were elected.

Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1970. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the bottom of the first page reads, “40 Committee meeting—8 Sept. 1970. Embassy to give assessment; recommendations to be made for 40 Committee consideration at 14 Sept. meeting.” For a description of the 40 Committee meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 92.


17. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: Korry reported on what to expect in the upcoming election.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 CHILE. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USCINCSO, Buenos Aires, Lima, Asunción, Bogotá, Brasilia, Caracas, Guatemala, La Paz, Mexico City, Montevideo, Panama, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San Salvador, and Santo Domingo. Reference telegram 3205 from Santiago, August 18, is ibid.