194. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group1


  • Chile


  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
  • John N. Irwin, II
  • John Crimmins
  • Samuel Eaton
  • Defense
  • Armistead I. Selden
  • Raymond G. Leddy
  • CIA
  • LTG Robert E. Cushman
  • William Broe
  • JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • B/Gen. Joseph Belser
  • USIA
  • Frank Shakespeare
  • NSC Staff
  • Arnold Nachmanoff
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Jeanne W. Davis


It was agreed that:

(a) activities at the NASA station in Chile should continue;

(b) a $10 million agricultural sector loan should be de-authorized;

(c) monthly reports on continuance or extension of AID loans and grants and on loan utilization will be made to the SRG Ad Hoc Group, rather than AID/Washington;

(d) the SRG Ad Hoc Group will receive prior notice of terminations of grants;

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(e) Option 4 on extension of the ship loan agreement will be reworded to provide a recall clause and to refer the question, if and when the Chileans raise it, to the SRG;

(f) The President’s reaction will be sought to the recommendation for approval of the IDB loans to Catholic and Austral Universities;

(g) the Eximbank will be advised to reduce guaranties and insurance for exports to Chile but not to stop them;

(h) State will draft a formulation for an approach to the Chileans on the expropriation action, before the proposed Constitutional amendment is approved, indicating our readiness to help in negotiations with the companies but warning them that, if no satisfactory solution is reached, there are certain steps that we will be required by law to take;2

(i) regarding our public position, we should respond to questions with the line that, for the next sixty days, the issue is in the constitutional process and we do not wish to prejudge the outcome; however, while we do not contest the right of a sovereign nation to expropriate property, we have the right under international law to ask for fair compensation.

Mr. Kissinger: Before we disband, I thought we might have a brief discussion of where we stand on various issues. We have six issues, and I suggest we consider first the four of these which appear relatively easy to dispose of.

First, the continuation of the NASA station in Chile. The Working Group has recommended that its routine activities continue. Does anyone disagree? Our basic policy calls for keeping our contacts with the military and the people. The NASA station doesn’t fit this perfectly, but do you all agree that it should be continued?

All agreed.

Mr. Kissinger: The second item concerns AID commitments to Chile.

NSDM 933 called for exploration of ways to terminate or delay existing commitments. I understand we have about $25 million in undisbursed loans, $2 million in grants and up to $10 million in PL480 humanitarian food programs. The Working Group has recommended that

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a $10 million agricultural sector loan, which has not yet been discussed with the Allende government, be de-authorized. Do you all agree?

All agreed.

Mr. Kissinger: They also recommend that the AID mission be instructed to delay draw-downs of existing loans and grants where feasible, although we would not invoke the legally available options for cancelling remaining balances since this would constitute a clear, overt political act. Does anyone disagree?

Mr. Irwin: To save time, I might say that we agree with all the recommendations.

Mr. Kissinger: You made them!

Mr. Crimmins: The Working Group made them with the full participation of all.

Mr. Selden: We would like to see Recommendations 3, 4, 6 and 7 recast to bring these matters back to the SRG Ad Hoc Group for decision rather than have the Ambassador or AID Mission Director making the decisions.

Mr. Crimmins: This would create a very complicated administrative situation, requiring the Ad Hoc Group to involve itself in great detail. The purpose of these recommendations was to break the administrative logjam created by the standstill following the last meeting.4

Mr. Kissinger: Recommendation 4 calls for an instruction to the AID Mission to terminate grants. Why would this need to be referred back to Washington? When the Ambassador wants to terminate an agreement, we should give him the authority. That is the direction in which we are going. If he does not do it fast enough, then it should be brought to the attention of the SRG, but why should we not give him the authority to terminate these grants?

Mr. Selden: It also gives him authority to continue grants.

Mr. Kissinger: Within the existing budget?

Mr. Irwin: Within the $2 million.

Mr. Crimmins: This would be true only within the outstanding balance of grants. It would not involve any new programs—it refers only to existing programs. It provides guidance to the Country Team to terminate grants selectively—to phase down but to continue some projects, mostly involving training in the US for some technicians.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Selden) What is wrong with that?

Mr. Selden: Nothing. But we believe the Ad Hoc Group should keep control of what’s going on.

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Mr. Kissinger: Could we do this by a monthly report on those programs which are continuing?

Mr. Crimmins: We have indicated in Recommendation 3 that AID/Washington will be given prior notice of major extensions and periodic reports on loan utilization.

Mr. Selden: But that’s not the SRG.

Mr. Kissinger: If we changed AID/Washington to the SRG Ad Hoc Group as recipient of these reports, would that take care of your concerns?

Mr. Selden: Yes, it would.

Mr. Kissinger: Does anyone have any problem with the PL480 humanitarian food program? It is the President’s intention to phase down our AID activities—to undertake nothing new and to use no administrative devices to keep things going, but to do this in such a way that Allende can’t claim we are exerting pressure on him. This will be tough to do.

Mr. Crimmins: These recommendations were cast with that in mind.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we agree that terminations do not need to come back to the Ad Hoc Group for approval?

Mr. Crimmins: The Ad Hoc Group will have prior notice, which will give them a chance to blow the whistle if they wish to.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Selden) Is that okay?

Mr. Selden: Okay.

Mr. Kissinger: A third issue is the extension of the ship loan agreement.

Mr. Selden: We have a fifth option on this which we would like to have considered. (Passed out new option at the table) It is a combination of Options 3 and 4.

Adm. Moorer: We would support this option.

Mr. Shakespeare: Isn’t the key to this question the attitude of the Navy. I understand they don’t want the submarine back.

Mr. Kissinger: I’m told it probably couldn’t make it back.

Mr. Shakespeare: Does their Navy want it? Would this be an additional contact with their Navy? If we should decide recall of the ship is not desirable, does this mean that when the agreement expires in 1971, we would just wink and let them keep it?

Adm. Moorer: The unilateral consideration of whether or not to recall the ship would be made on the basis of their attitude.

Mr. Kissinger: I have no strong personal views on this. (to Selden) I think your first point is spelled out in Option 4: do nothing unless they raise it; if they raise it, say we will study it. Why do we have to decide now whether to extend the agreement for three years or X years? We [Page 519] can look at it when it comes up, in the light of the circumstances. If the Chilean military remains a weight on the scale on the anti-Allende side, we would want to stay in contact with them.

Mr. Selden: That’s all right as long as it comes back to the Ad Hoc Group. We wouldn’t want to extend the agreement for three to five years without the recall clause.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Crimmins) Can you reword Option 4 to make these additional points?

Mr. Crimmins: We can specify extension only for a year with a recall clause.

Mr. Irwin: We might not want to extend it at all.

Mr. Kissinger: Or we might want to extend it for a longer period. We want to keep maximum contact with the Chilean Navy as long as it is a potential anti-Allende force. We should favor whatever favors it. There would be no problem in coming back to an automatic turn-down, if that were desirable. We could agree to delay a response “for further study.”

Mr. Irwin: Or refer it to the SRG.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes. Do you all agree?

All agreed.

Mr. Irwin: There would be a quasi-legal point in providing the ship without a continuance of the agreement, but I wouldn’t worry about it.

Mr. Kissinger: What is our legal position? Is it a serious problem?

Mr. Irwin: I don’t think so.

Mr. Crimmins: Some Congressmen might get a little restive about it, but I think we could sell it on the grounds that we are trying to maintain ties with the Chilean Navy.

Mr. Kissinger: On the matter of IDB loans, the Chileans have now agreed to put up their share for the university loans pending in the IDB.

Mr. Shakespeare: On both loans?

Mr. Crimmins: Yes.

Mr. Shakespeare: So we now have a formal request from them.

Mr. Crimmins: Yes, it will come before the Board of the Bank tomorrow. Our Executive Director believes he can hold off a decision until the 14th, but the pressure will increase at the January 7 Board meeting.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) What do you recommend?

Mr. Irwin: That we go ahead on the 7th to make the loan to the two universities.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Moorer) What about you?

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Adm. Moorer: I defer to Mr. Irwin.

Mr. Shakespeare: I agree we should do it. Loans to the universities are the wrong issue to make a case on. I have reservations on Catholic University—it operates the most pro-left, pro-Castro television station in Latin America. We operate on the wrong assumption that all Catholics are anti-Communist, which is just not true in Latin America. However, our Ambassador says that the Frei forces have made a major effort to move into Catholic University and that there was a shift to the right in a recent student election. Also, it is usually true that opposition to Communist governments is formulated more in the universities than elsewhere. The other university is even safer. I think the amount is small and that this is the wrong issue for us to make a case on.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Cushman) Do you agree with the Ambassador’s assessment of the influence of Frei’s forces?

Gen. Cushman: We agree with the Ambassador’s assessment, but the Frei forces aren’t forces. He has no control of even his own junta.

Mr. Kissinger: Has he lost out to left-wing control?

Mr. Crimmins: Not clearly. There is considerable waffling.

Mr. Kissinger: Will this action by the IDB be taken as a go-ahead by other lending institutions?

Gen. Cushman: The University of Chile may come in for a loan, and they are really bad news.

Mr. Shakespeare: They didn’t link these loans to anything for the University of Chile.

Mr. Irwin: These were pending loans. Anything else would be a new request.

Mr. Nachmanoff: Other international agencies will see a positive vote as an indication that we are willing to go ahead in some degree.

Mr. Shakespeare: Could we make it known informally, possibly by a leak, that these are special university loans and are not to be considered precedental?

Mr. Crimmins: There will be no problem in the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. Selden: If we go ahead with this, it should be with the full knowledge that Catholic University is heavily Communist and that the Rector has supported Castro publicly. If we can separate the loans, I would prefer one and not the other.

Mr. Crimmins: We couldn’t make the case for separation.

Mr. Selden: Why not?

Mr. Crimmins: There would be no reason other than an overtly political one for making such a distinction. We are trying to avoid any overtly political act which would play into Allende’s hands.

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Mr. Selden: How would we distinguish between these universities and the University of Chile?

Mr. Crimmins: That would be a new loan request, and we have all sorts of stalling devices available.

Mr. Selden: But we would eventually have to make a decision. Aren’t we creating a precedent for a favorable decision?

Mr. Kissinger: At some point we will undoubtedly have to turn down some loan, but that will be a political decision.

Mr. Shakespeare: We should choose our own ground for making that kind of decision. Also, by the time such a loan request might be made, we will know more about the situation.

Mr. Irwin: These two loans have been pending for a long time.

Mr. Kissinger: How much is involved?

Mr. Shakespeare: $12 million.

Gen. Cushman: I might add that the Rector is completely ineffective.

Mr. Selden: I still have some reservations about this.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) You need a decision by January 7 although it could wait until January 14 if necessary. I wonder whether we shouldn’t run this by the President.

Mr. Shakespeare: Is there another Board meeting in February?

Mr. Crimmins: Yes, but this would create a difficult situation for Ortiz Mena.

Mr. Shakespeare: What does Korry think about it?

Mr. Kissinger: He seems to have a blank spot on the PDC. He exaggerates their prospects.

Mr. Shakespeare: There is the danger that this would create a favorable attitude toward other loans. But this $7 million to Catholic University and $5 million to Austral University do nothing to help the Chilean economy or governmental structure.

Gen. Cushman: Also, there is some doubt that the Allende government can put up the escudos.

Mr. Crimmins: He has pledged them.

Mr. Kissinger: Might this affect IDB replenishment?

Mr. Irwin: We would have to tell both House and Senate subcommittees.

Mr. Kissinger: I will run this by the President to get a sense of his feeling, and then I will talk to you (Messrs Irwin and Crimmins).

Mr. Shakespeare: Our Ambassador says the Rector of Catholic University has tried to establish closer relations with Notre Dame. [Page 522] Would it be a good idea to get a private reaction from Father Hesburgh?

Mr. Irwin: We could be criticized in the Congress for these loans.

Mr. Kissinger: It has the advantage of giving us some protection if we have to crack down later. I will run this by the President. If he reacts negatively, we may still want to recommend it. We won’t make any decisions without further discussion here.

One major issue is the question of guidance to the Eximbank on its position on guaranties and insurance for exports to Chile. We have three options, to which the Kissinger Law seems to apply—the middle option seems to be the most reasonable. I understand the Working Group agreed that we should advise the Bank to reduce guaranties but not to stop them. What does this mean? How would they go about reducing them?

Mr. Crimmins: They would act only on selected ones.

Mr. Kissinger: Would they tend toward the hard or soft side?

Mr. Irwin: They would do nothing new and let the others fade. They would take no specific action to stop them.

Mr. Kissinger: Are all agreed on this course?

All agreed.

Mr. Irwin: The Eximbank has $400 million in exposure now.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we turn to the expropriation issue. As you know, Allende has now sent to the Congress a Constitutional amendment for nationalization of US copper enterprises. We have four choices: (1a) suspend assistance immediately, but without formally invoking the Hickenlooper amendment, with (1b) which would formally invoke Hickenlooper; (2) and (3) would refrain from applying Hickenlooper until the six-month period runs out, with the difference being that under (3) the US would take an active role in the negotiations with the Chilean Government and the companies; and (4) which would involve an active USG involvement but would avoid application of Hickenlooper as long as there were plausible grounds for delay.

Mr. Crimmins: Option 2 is essentially passive—we would just wait out the six months.

Mr. Kissinger: But we would let the companies negotiate if they want to.

Mr. Crimmins: Yes, but we wouldn’t encourage them one way or another. Option 3 would involve us directly in the negotiations during the six months period while maintaining the present level of economic restrictions against Chile.

Mr. Kissinger: Would the Constitutional amendment amount to expropriation?

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Mr. Crimmins: It is a very hard position. There is an outside chance that the companies might be able to negotiate something. Kennecott has asked us not to preempt any position they might wish to take by references to Hickenlooper. The Kennecott Board is meeting today to analyze the situation and get an idea of the options open to them. Some things are not clear, e.g., it talks about compensation in money but doesn’t say whether in dollars or escudos. The terms are very hard, though.

Mr. Kissinger: Amounting to expropriation?

Mr. Irwin: If they are carried out. It is not expropriation yet.

Mr. Kissinger: In October we thought about the desirability of telling them the consequences of certain actions, but we decided against it.5 This might be a good opportunity to warn them in a low-key way.

Mr. Irwin: It would be possible to do so in a low-key way that didn’t tie us down, or in a way that would require us to act at the end of the six-month period. If we decided to invoke Hickenlooper and were called before the OAS, we would be worse off politically if we had given them no warning than if we had.

Mr. Kissinger: Are there arguments against this?

Mr. Crimmins: In the situation with Peru, we did present them with a note when the expropriation process began. This led to an exchange of notes which we regretted later. We can get ourselves involved in a very convoluted process.

Mr. Kissinger: Why did we regret it?

Mr. Crimmins: It gave the Peruvian Government an opportunity to come back to us with a propaganda position. They raised the question of our right to become involved with the IPC which was in fact a Canadian company. It might be a risk worth taking, however.

Mr. Kissinger: We have two choices: to do nothing or to do something, either threatening them with Hickenlooper or indicating that we expect compensation. We should make it clear that we would do something but maintain some flexibility as to what it might be.

Mr. Crimmins: The nature of any communication to the Chileans along this line would depend on what option the SRG chooses. If we chose Option 3, one technique would be a low-key oral discussion with a view to encouraging the Chilean Government to listen to any company proposals. If we chose an earlier option, we might want to change [Page 524] the content and tenor of the communication to verge on the threatening.

Mr. Irwin: The economy of Chile will be basically affected by the climate for private investment, and that is gone now. That takes away a lot of points of possible support for Allende. Another factor is the state of the copper enterprises. If Allende succeeds in copper, what we do won’t hurt him. If he fails, then the economic situation will be so adverse that we won’t affect it greatly by taking the actions we are thinking about.

Mr. Shakespeare: Why might he not be able to make the mines go successfully?

Mr. Irwin: Capital, technical assistance, bureaucratic problems.

Mr. Shakespeare: Is marketing a factor?

Mr. Irwin: Marketing would be less difficult.

Mr. Crimmins: I personally think they can make it go. We buy very little copper from Chile. However, 50 percent of Europe’s copper comes from Chile and they couldn’t cooperate in any boycott.

Gen. Cushman: Chile has 30 percent of world copper exports.

Mr. Kissinger: Instead of arguing on the nature of his regime, Allende is getting us into a fight on economic questions, where he is strong and we are weak.

Mr. Shakespeare: Any extractive industry makes a very poor issue on which to fight.

Mr. Irwin: This is more a political issue—economically it won’t make much difference. One copper company has already asked us not to step in at this time.

Mr. Kissinger: Businessmen don’t understand politics.

Mr. Crimmins: ITT has been adjusting to political factors since 1966 and has come out all right.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t say we should get involved in the negotiations. I think there is a good case for not doing so and for applying Hickenlooper when it is due.

Mr. Irwin: We may find ourselves in a situation where we don’t have a choice.

Mr. Kissinger: In Peru, we had an interest in keeping the regime from moving further to the left.

Mr. Shakespeare: If we go with Hickenlooper, we will need to build up in all of Latin America the idea that the issue is not the right of a country to expropriate property—the issue is that of fair compensation.

Mr. Irwin: I agree, but that will be very difficult. Hickenlooper is an emotional name. It would be better to take action on a policy basis [Page 525] rather than on the basis of the Hickenlooper Amendment. You have a difficult psychological situation in Latin America.

Mr. Selden: Possibly we should look at Option 2, where we would not invoke Hickenlooper until the six-month period ran out.

Mr. Irwin: I don’t feel strongly about this. If we had to decide today, I would go to Option 3. But it may develop that the best thing to do would be to do nothing. Why do we have to make a flat decision now?

Mr. Kissinger: When else will we make it?

Mr. Selden: We could begin to do some things in a non-overt way.

Mr. Kissinger: The first decision we have to make is whether or not we warn Chile.

Mr. Shakespeare: Is it possible to be tough without saying anything about Hickenlooper? Could we stall on some things and take some other actions? Could we threaten in more subtle ways than with Hickenlooper?

Mr. Kissinger: We have two choices: to threaten them with Hickenlooper or say that we will apply the sanctions available to us.

Mr. Crimmins: If we take this decision now, we should recognize that the fat is in the fire and we will have a confrontation now.

Mr. Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Crimmins: The Chileans will react very strongly to the warning/threatening approach.

Mr. Kissinger: If we don’t do it now, we would expect a confrontation in six months.

Mr. Crimmins: Yes, but under Option 3 and parts of Option 2 we would have prepared the ground for confrontation by demonstrating that we had been reasonable and had tried to work out something. We would be on the best possible grounds.

Mr. Kissinger: Why not tell them now that we will be reasonable for six months. In October we were told there might be some misapprehension on their part, but it was the White House that wouldn’t go along. We should remove any misapprehension.

Mr. Irwin: We can’t assume that they know our laws. We should give them some warning, but I would play it on the soft side; make it clear to them, but be careful about the words we use.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t object to a formulation that would say we are prepared to negotiate but point out that, if no solution is found within six months, we will be required under our laws to do certain things.

Mr. Irwin: Should we wait until they take over a particular company?

Mr. Kissinger: Do they have to pass implementing legislation?

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Mr. Crimmins: This is in the form of a Constitutional amendment which has to be approved by the Congress. It can be done in 60 days but it can be strung out. The prospect for significant changes in the language, however, are slim, and on some points non-existent.

Mr. Kissinger: Then what is there to negotiate?

Mr. Crimmins: Even if the Constitutional amendment is passed as written, there are some uncertainties in the language. For example, it mentions payments in kind. Kennecott might be interested if repayment were in some form of copper.

Mr. Kissinger: Why not let the companies do the negotiating? We could point out what the consequences would be.

Mr. Crimmins: I personally find this congenial. We might include in any communication to the government the suggestion that the government listen to the companies.

Mr. Kissinger: I hate to have the US Government a party to the negotiations if we can avoid it.

Mr. Irwin: I agree. Of course, there might be some things the US could do during the six months that would be helpful. Possibly something along the lines of Options 2 or 3.

Mr. Kissinger: I am charged once a week to prevent the SRG from sliding off the basic line, which is a pretty tough stance toward the Chilean Government without provoking a confrontation. We do not want to go in the direction of Peru.

Mr. Selden: Have we any precedent for suspending aid while negotiating with a country on compensation for expropriation? What about Peru and Prado; did we suspend aid?

Mr. Crimmins: We have done it for very short periods in various situations, but never for more than a month.

Mr. Kissinger: In Peru we delayed three months because we didn’t want to take on all of Latin America on the question of expropriation on a weak case. We would not be willing to do this in Chile unless we received some indication that the regime is moving in the other direction. However, they have taken no single act that is inconsistent with movement, with all deliberate speed, toward a Marxist/Leninist state.

Mr. Shakespeare: But Hickenlooper is the worst ground we can use.

Mr. Kissinger: Our policy is not to make a fight because they will take us on only on their terms and on their issues. They won’t fight us until they have destroyed all possible opposition. Our one card is their reluctance to have a confrontation. I’m not crazy about invoking Hickenlooper, and we can’t decide now on whether or not to do so. This will have to go to the NSC. (to Mr. Irwin) Will you draft something for an approach to the Chileans? It should be a moderate stance, indicating [Page 527] our readiness to help in the negotiations with the companies, but warning them that if no satisfactory solution is reached, there are certain legal requirements which we expect to apply. They should be left under no misapprehension. Depending on their response, we could then decide whether or not we want to apply sanctions. Do you all agree?

All agreed.

Mr. Shakespeare: I would appreciate some advice. If we go down this route, we shouldn’t wait to start building the case that the issue is fair compensation, not expropriation. We should make it clear that it is not the right of a nation to control an extractive industry which is in question, but the right to take over without fair compensation.

Mr. Crimmins: Timing is important, particularly in determining when the six-month period starts to run. The amendment has not yet been addressed by the Congress; it may be another two months. It would be unwise to prejudge the situation until it is actually in process.

Mr. Shakespeare: I agree.

Mr. Kissinger: When should we warn them? Before the amendment is passed or after?

Adm. Moorer: Do we assume it will be passed?

Mr. Crimmins: We should not assume it will be passed as written; there may be a little flexibility. For example, it calls for the establishment of a special tribunal, actually a kangaroo court, composed of the Chief Justice and four political appointees. There might be some adjustment in things like this, but it would not be central to the main problem. We should not be optimistic about making any significant inroads in the process, but we shouldn’t prejudge the outcome. When the time starts to run, we should undertake the campaign that you (Shakespeare) describe. We did it in the Peru case. But we shouldn’t exaggerate its importance, since the issue of compensation is not a big seller in Latin America.

Mr. Selden: If we limit ourselves to Option 3, I suggest we revise the next to last sentence to read “We would be prepared to relax or intensify these restrictions, etc.”

Mr. Kissinger: Should we warn them now or after the law passes?

Mr. Crimmins: Now.

Mr. Irwin: I agree.

Mr. Selden: So do I.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) Let us have your formula and we will circulate it for consideration by this group.

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We have the CIA paper on the implications of Chilean propaganda and support for guerrilla activities.6 You do not need any action on this?

Gen. Cushman: It is purely for information.

Adm. Moorer: We also have an information paper but the Secretary of Defense hasn’t yet responded to it, so we will distribute it for information only. (Original of paper given to Mr. Nachmanoff. Distributed to SRG members for information on December 24.)

Mr. Shakespeare: How should we play the announcement of the expropriation? Many of these Latin American countries have weak internal communications systems and use our material. What should we do with the announcement? Do you want some commentary?

Mr. Crimmins: I think we respond to questions with the line that the legislative process is just beginning, that we do not wish to prejudge the outcome, and that we will not comment until the situation becomes clearer.

Mr. Kissinger: We can say that we don’t contest the right of a sovereign state to expropriate but we have the right of a sovereign state to ask for compensation.

Mr. Crimmins: We might say “under international law”. That puts it in more neutral terms rather than in terms of the U.S. Government.

Mr. Shakespeare: Here is a place where we can operate on a two-track system. We haven’t done it before, but we can be a shade tougher over VOA without doing anything formal. We can get across some signals on fair compensation, citing the attitude of the American people or the position of the American press. We can use some pretty tough stuff without associating it with the US Government.

Mr. Kissinger: Not yet. But it might help to say that we don’t contest the right to expropriate property but we have the right under international law to ask for fair compensation. We can say that, for the next 60 days, this issue is in the constitutional process.

Mr. Irwin: Our best sources would be Latin American sources. Can we get some articles in Latin American papers discussing the issue objectively? USIA could then pick these up in their commentary.

Mr. Shakespeare: That’s a good idea—we could quote Latin American press sources.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–50, SRG Meeting, Chile, 12/23/70. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Nachmanoff and Kennedy. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Kissinger “OK’ed” these minutes on the attached December 28 transmittal memorandum from Davis. For the text of the options papers discussed, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–16, Documents on Chile, 1969–1973, Documents 41 and 42.
  2. On December 21, Allende announced that he would submit legislation for a constitutional amendment to nationalize the U.S. interests in the Chilean copper industry. The legislation would modify Chilean property rights and authorize the government to expropriate mines. Allende emphasized that foreign companies would receive compensation. (“Allende Asks Law To Seize Copper,” New York Times, December 22, 1970, p. 7)
  3. Document 175.
  4. See Document 187.
  5. See Document 169.
  6. See Document 191.