1. Attached for your information is a paper entitled “Chilean Media under
a Marxist Regime” which describes the influence of the Popular Unity
(UP) coalition in Chilean media
prior to and following the inauguration of Salvador Allende as President of Chile.
2. This paper, which was requested by the Chairman of the Committee,
reflects the views of both our Station in Santiago and the local USIS office and the Embassy. The gist of
the report is that Popular Unity political and economic pressures and a
related decrease in advertising revenue are forcing a major portion of
Chilean mass communications media towards receivership and ultimate
UP control. However, note is taken
in conclusion that some newspapers and radio stations directly
associated with opposition political parties are continuing to wage an
aggressive anti-Communist campaign and merit encouragement and
support.
Attachment2
Washington, December 18, 1970.
SUBJECT
- Chilean Media Under a Marxist Regime
1. The Chilean media complex includes over 190 daily newspapers (12
in Santiago); approximately 140 radio stations (29 in Santiago); a
national, government-controlled TV network plus three university
owned and operated channels; and magazine, textbook, and other
publishing companies. This complex has been financed primarily by
commercial advertising, which has decreased dramatically since
Salvador
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Allende’s election as
President of Chile. Its ability to maintain any substantive freedom
of expression under the new Marxist government appears dubious.
2. The Popular Unity (UP) coalition
which backed Allende’s
successful bid for the Presidency controlled a substantial segment
of this media complex even before the popular elections of 4
September 1970. Much of this Marxist influence among media began in
the School of Journalism at the University of Chile, whose graduates
control the Colegio de Periodistas (Journalists’ Union). Another
source of Marxist leverage was their control of various key radio
unions, including the Radio Broadcasters’ Union (estimated 80%
controlled), Radio Journalists’ Union (estimated 90% controlled) and
the Radio Operators Union (estimated 80% controlled). Control of
these key unions enabled the UP to
exert pressure on vocal non-Marxists in the media field and to
create UP media workers’ committees
at the working level in media owned by the anti-Marxist right. Prior
to the election the UP Parties had
direct control over some outlets, such as the Socialist Party’s Ultima Hora and the Communist Party’s El Siglo, and UP supporters directed the programming of media such as
the University of Chile’s television Channel 9 and Radio IEM,
Catholic University’s Channel 13 in Santiago and Channel 4 in
Valparaiso, and State Technical University’s Radio UTE. The UP could also count on the assistance
of other ostensibly non-UP organs
such as Clarin, the largest mass circulation
daily. But the UP’s greatest
strength lay in the heavy concentration of UP supporters at the grass-roots level.
3. The UP electoral program included
a vaguely defined promise to turn all media outlets into workers
cooperatives. Immediately after the election, on 9 September,
Allende stated that
“ownership and direction of communications media should be turned
over to workers in the media.” Concurrently, the UP began a campaign to gain control of
key opposition media organs in order to “prevent right-wing
maneuvers to steal the elections.” Journalists and newscasters who
refused to support Allende
were threatened with assassination and other forms of physical
violence; UP leaders such as
Communist Deputy Jorge Inzunza delivered ultimatums to radio
stations demanding placement of station newsrooms under UP management and the assignment of
UP staff members as news and
political commentators; non-Marxist newspapers were told to choose
between supporting Allende
and being taken over by workers cooperatives. This bullying was
short-lived, however, and was less important than long-term
infiltration and growing UP
influence from the working level upwards. The emergence of a UP government was all that was needed
to permit leftist forces to consolidate influence and control over a
broad spectrum of Chilean media whose owners and management have
been all too willing to fall
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into line with the new government. Even El
Mercurio, Chile’s leading conservative newspaper which had
successfully resisted an attempted take-over by the
leftist-controlled Union of Journalists, modified its editorial
policy and ideological emphasis. By the time of Allende’s inauguration on 3
November the UP had extended or
consolidated its control over numerous key radio stations, including
the Radio Portales network which has the highest listenership in the
country. It also assumed control of the government-owned daily La Nacion and the government-owned national
television network on inauguration day.
4. The Allende government has
not spelled out its media policy in detail. Allende has not followed through
on his harsh campaign threats against the media which opposed him
and has announced his intention to take action only against those
media which follow a “seditious” line. The plan to turn media
outlets into workers cooperatives appears to have been shelved for
the time being in view of the complex financial and managerial
problems such a transformation would entail. PDC financiers have expanded their
media holdings since the election in an effort to counterbalance
UP domination of the media
field, particularly radio, which is the most effective mass medium
in Chile and is regarded by the UP
as the most effective tool available for transforming Chilean
society. Allende will
probably try to avoid repressive action which would tarnish his
“democratic image” at home and abroad.
5. Nevertheless the outlook for non-Marxist Chilean media is bleak. A
sizable portion of the industry could be wiped out if advertising
revenue falls below operating costs. All media are therefore
susceptible to pressures exerted by UP members holding patronage positions in the
ministries concerned with labor, taxation and social security, and
there are recent indications that such pressures are already being
brought to bear on newspapers under PDC control. For instance, government internal revenue
inspectors are pressuring Chilean businessmen not to advertise in
PDC media and the
Communist-controlled union at Zig-Zag, a PDC-controlled publishing company, went on strike from
6 November to 4 December in an apparent attempt to force Zig-Zag
into government receivership. These pressures, plus the voluntary
transformation of media content and stress which has been evident
for some time in many outlets which formerly opposed Allende, indicate that the UP is likely to be successful in
establishing control of the Chilean media complex without resorting
to drastic measures or openly repressive action.
Media organs clearly associated with opposition parties remain as
independent voices. Particularly noteworthy are PDC-run newspapers La Prensa and Pueblo Libre, both of
which are following strong anti-Communist lines and are enjoying a
steadily increasing circulation. Ultimas
Noticias of the El Mercurio chain appears to be pulling
away from
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the bland
political line of its parent paper, also as a result of the
influence of PDC journalists. Radio
Mineria, whose owner is PDC
oriented, is the strongest of the anti-Communist radio outlets,
while Radio Cooperativa, which supported Allesandri’s campaign, is
virtually apolitical but still carries one anti-Communist
commentator. All opposition outlets will clearly need encouragement
and support.
