Two Tracks: U.S. Intervention in the Confirmation of the Chilean President, September 5–November 4, 1970


18. Intelligence Memorandum

Summary: This CIA memorandum contained a post-election forecast of an Allende government which suggested that Allende would move cautiously and gradually toward establishment of a Marxist state and would not threaten U.S. vital interests. The Allende Presidency would, however, create economic and psychological losses for U.S. policy in Latin America.

Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1970. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Directorate for Plans.


19. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Summary: This memorandum recounted the operational details of U.S. covert actions in Chile in response to instructions from President Nixon given in a meeting on September 15. These actions included funding for El Mercurio, the conservative Chilean paper, communications with the Argentine military to uncover additional Chilean vulnerabilities, and investigations into possible coups brewing within the Chilean military.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 777, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Regarding the September 15 meeting with President Nixon, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 93.


20. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Chile (Korry) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: This message described brief meetings between Korry and top Chilean officials at a recent night at the opera. During the intermission Korry had a short encounter with Frei. The German and Italian Ambassadors to Chile later noted that Frei seemed particularly pessimistic concerning the current political situation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 777, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Progress Report #1, September 18, is Document 103, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973.


21. Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts

Summary: This telegram transmitted the background briefing by U.S. “administration officials” (Kissinger) to journalists in Chicago outlining the Chilean election law pertaining to those elections with no clear majority and the overall ramifications of the recent Chilean election in which Marxist candidate Salvador Allende earned less than one and a half percent more than his opponent Jorge Alessandri.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated immediate to the Consulates in Belize, Curacao, Nassau, and Paramaribo, USCINCSO, and the Embassies in Bonn, Canberra, London, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo, Rome, The Hague, and Wellington. Although the backgrounder is not attributed, in his memoirs, Kissinger described delivering the backgrounder himself to a group of Midwest editors and broadcasters in Chicago on September 16. (White House Years, pp. 672–673)


22. Message From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Chile

Summary: The CIA requested that Korry let his actions in Chile be guided by the instructions he received from the Department of State.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Chile– ITTCIA 1963–1977, Lot 81D121, Chile Papers, Church Committee, August 12, 1975. Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. The original is a copy with bracketed excision to protect cryptonyms and code names. The original, signed, and un-redacted version of this message is in Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, Job 80–00012A. The message from Under Secretary of State Johnson under reference in paragraph 2A is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 113.


23. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Chile (Korry) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Meyer) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: This backchannel message described conversations between Korry and Chilean Minister of Economy Carlos Figueroa and Minister of Defense Sergio Ossa. They discussed opposition within the outgoing Frei administration to the incoming Allende administration, as well as the role of the military in the transition, and Frei’s position toward his successor.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The message was transmitted from Broe to Haig.


24. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: In this telegram, Korry discussed the post-election political climate in Chile. He focused his analysis on Chilean President Eduardo Frei and Minister of Defense Sergio Ossa, and centered his discussion of the military’s role in politics on General Viaux.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 CHILE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to USCINCSO, Asunción, Bogotá, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Guatemala, Kingston, La Paz, Lima, Managua, Mexico City, Montevideo, Panama, Port au Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San Jose, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, and Tegucigalpa. The message is Part I of two parts. The second part was sent as telegram 3828 from Santiago, September 22. (Ibid.)


25. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Chile (Korry) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: Korry reported on the political transition and post-election economic deterioration in Chile.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 777, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.


26. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Chile (Korry) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Chief of Station in Santiago ([name not declassified])

Summary: Korry reported on his discussions with Minister of Defense Sergio Ossa concerning the upcoming transition from Eduardo Frei to Salvador Allende and the surrounding political intrigue. The conversation centered on the role that the deteriorating Chilean economy would play in shaping Allende’s Presidency and a possible military intervention to prevent Allende from taking power.

Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Although the message is dated September 26, it was not transmitted to the White House Situation Room until September 28. As it refers to events occurring on the evening of September 26 as “last night,” it may have been sent on September 27 and misdated. The Chief of Station was in Washington for consultations.


27. Research Study Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Summary: This study examined what problems would result from Allende’s Presidency and whether a Communist take-over of the Chilean Government was possible.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 CHILE. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. The study was produced in the Office of General and Strategic Research on September 30.


28. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter)

Summary: This memorandum examined the effect a Marxist government in Chile would have on the security interests of the United States. It highlighted potential intensification of Latin American political unrest, the threat raised by a possible Cuba-Chile Communist connection and growing nationalism in Latin America, and the concern that the Soviets could gain a military and ideological foothold in the Western Hemisphere.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Staff Secretary, Convenience Files, Box 8, “Chile.” Secret; Sensitive.


29. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

Summary: In this telegram Korry discussed the hemispheric and European reaction to the new Allende regime. In the short term, nations in both Latin America and Europe would not react either positively or negatively unless Allende made significant efforts to alter the system in place. Given the cautious approach Marxist administrations tended to utilize initially in national politics, Korry predicted that Chile would have to be closely monitored in the long term to keep Allende’s more virulent anti-United States, anti-capitalist biases under control.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.


30. Memorandum From the National Security Council Staff Secretary (Davis) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard), the Under Secretary of State (Irwin), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer), and Director of Central Intelligence Helms

Summary: The attached options paper was prepared in the Department of State, in conjunction with the Department of Defense and the CIA, for the October 28 Senior Review Group meeting. The paper presented information on those domestic, international, and economic factors influencing Chilean politics and presented options for U.S. policy: maintain a restrained position toward Chile, or risk giving Allende a rallying point to unite the Chilean people.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–48, Senior Review Group, Chile (NSSM 97), 10/17/70–10/29/70. Secret. The paper was distributed to the members of the Senior Review Group by Davis. The memorandum was initially sent to Davis and Vaky from Armistead I. Selden, Jr., the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. A covert annex to the options paper is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 166. The SRG meeting was held October 29. The minutes are ibid., Document 169.


31. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable

Summary: This cable, titled “Offer of Salvador Allende, Chilean President-Elect, To Assist and Train Latin American Revolutionary Organizations,” reported on a clandestine meeting between Chilean President Salvador Allende and members of the Chilean National Liberation Army and the Brazilian National Liberating Action during which Allende told leaders of both organizations that Chile would become a center for the assistance and training of Latin American revolutionary organizations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 774, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. II. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. A copy was sent to Alexis U. Johnson, David Packard, Thomas Moorer, John Mitchell, William Rogers, John Irwin II , Charles Meyer, Melvin Laird, and Raymond Leddy, and to the Embassies in Santiago, La Paz, and Rio de Janiero. At the top of the page, Kissinger wrote, “David [Halperin], Give summary to Pres. HK.” Also written at the top in an unknown hand is “Allende reportedly has told reps of Latin American revolutionary movements that Chile will aid armed struggle movements.”A copy of this cable was sent to President Nixon under cover of a November 6 memorandum from Kissinger. The memorandum is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 174.


32. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Summary: This note, titled “USSR-Chile: Soviets Still Play Allende in Low Key,” examined Moscow’s friendly but aloof response to the election of Allende and argued that the Soviet Union was likely to increase efforts to reach out to Chile, especially in the event of an economic crisis.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 CHILE. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of USSR and Eastern Europe Affairs.


33. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Summary: The attached paper, a revision of Document 30, outlined the objectives and policy options that the U.S. Government might take in its relations with the Allende government and argued that the United States should maintain a restrained and deliberate attitude toward Chile.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–48, Senior Review Group, Chile (NSSM 97), 10/17/70–10/29/70. Secret; Sensitive. The paper was prepared in the Department of State in collaboration with the Department of Defense and the CIA. The paper with a revised first page was distributed to the members of the NSC on November 3 for the November 6 meeting. The memorandum of conversation of the NSC meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 173.


34. Analytical Summary by Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff

Summary: This analytical summary of the options paper prepared for the November 6 NSC meeting (Document 33) examined the U.S. assumptions and objectives presented and provided a detailed evaluation of the various strategies introduced in the paper.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–29, NSC Meeting, Chile, 11/6/70. Secret; Sensitive.


35. Briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Helms

Summary: In this briefing prepared for the November 6 NSC meeting, Helms argued that although there had been some opposition to his incipient government before Allende’s November 4 inauguration, once he took power there was “virtually no significant opposition.” Helms maintained that Allende’s regime would be a hard-line leftist regime.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–29, NSC Meeting, Chile, 11/6/70. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.