Cool and Correct: The U.S. Response to the Allende Administration, November 5, 1970–December 31, 1972
66. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: In this telegram, Korry reported that in his meeting with Allende the President was cordial and stressed that he wanted to maintain ties with the United States. For his part, Korry emphasized to Allende that the United States had not tried to squeeze Chile economically.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHILE–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Reference telegram 2353 from Santiago, May 4, is ibid., INCO 15–2 CHILE.
67. Memorandum for the 40 Committee
Summary: This memorandum stated that without a quick infusion of funds, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) would be much weakened and vulnerable and recommended approval of the funds. The memorandum promised a proposal to the 40 Committee for long-term support to the Chilean opposition.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation at the bottom of the first page indicates that the 40 Committee approved the immediate passage of funds on May 20. Another notation at the bottom of the first page states that the Committee approved an additional transfer of funds on May 26 and wanted a report on why the National Party did not ask for more funds.
68. Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Nachmanoff briefed Kissinger on the need for a quick infusion of funds to the PDC to pay its short-term debts and recommended that he approve the funds.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Tab A is Document 67; Tab B is attached but not published. Haig initialed approval of both recommendations for Kissinger on May 20.
69. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: Korry reported that negotiations between Chile and the Kennecott and Anaconda copper companies were not proceeding well. He then discussed the increasing pace of the socialization of the Chilean economy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO 15–2 CHILE. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.
70. Paper Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile
Summary: This paper outlined the advantages and disadvantages of the Export-Import Bank providing funding for the Chilean national airline to purchase Boeing aircraft and presented options for the SRG’s consideration.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–56, SRG Meeting, Chile 6/3/71. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Fisher and Girdler.
71. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: In this telegram, Korry recommended that the Export-Import Bank approve the financing of Chile’s purchase of Boeing aircraft without reservation. He stressed that the Bank proceed without attaching the condition that the Chilean Government not use those planes to travel the Cuba–Europe route.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–56, SRG Meeting, Chile 6/3/71. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
72. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense
Summary: This paper detailed the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. assistance to Chile to purchase military equipment and presented options for the SRG’s consideration. The paper included a section on how such assistance would affect U.S. relations with other South American nations.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–56, SRG Meeting, Chile 6/3/71. Secret.
73. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group
Summary: At this Senior Review Group meeting, participants discussed the possibility of extending credit for the purchase of Boeing aircraft, future restrictions on Export-Import Bank credits to Chile, and the possible sale of U.S. military equipment to Chile.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–56, SRG Meeting, Chile 6/3/71. Secret; Nodis. This meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. All brackets are in the original. The summary of conclusions is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 233.
74. Paper Prepared for the Senior Review Group
Summary: This paper outlined the Export–Import Bank’s position on the Chilean request for a loan to purchase Boeing aircraft. Discussion focused on the Bank’s position that credit would not be extended unless the Chilean Government formally agreed to provide compensation to those U.S. companies affected by the recent nationalization programs, provided a detailed statement of where the loan would be applied in the larger Chilean economy, and offered a more substantive analysis of the overall status of its economy.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–56, SRG Meeting, Chile 6/3/71. Secret; Nodis. The paper bears no drafting information.
75. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury Connally, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Nixon, Connally, and Kissinger discussed the policy of financial loans to Chile.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 517–20. Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon, Connally, and Kissinger met in the Oval Office from 2:05 to 2:38 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
76. Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: This memorandum forwarded for Kissinger’s signature a memorandum to the Senior Review Group and Secretary of the Treasury Connally informing them of the President’s decision to approve the FMS ceiling for Chile (see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 235) and to defer a decision on the Export-Import Bank loan for Boeing aircraft. Nachmanoff commented that postponing the Boeing decision would damage U.S.-Chilean relations and noted that the copper companies would, most likely, not approve of it either.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–56, SRG Meeting, Chile 6/3/71. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Tabs I and II are attached but not published.
77. Intelligence Memorandum
Summary: This memorandum dissected Allende’s economic policies for FY 1971 and concluded that Allende’s populist and socialist policies had vastly altered the national economy, that he would most likely be able to maintain his redistributive policies for the remainder of the year, but that he would eventually be forced to take unpopular measures.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 775, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. V. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A notation on the first page indicates that the memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. This report is an attachment to Document 246 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973.
78. Special National Intelligence Estimate
Summary: This estimate included a detailed analysis of Allende’s administration and highlighted the popularity of his initial economic redistribution programs and the overall effects of nationalization. Following a thorough discussion of Allende’s positions, the estimate concluded that Allende would continue his socialistic economic policies, that his leadership had been astute, and that the military appeared to be reluctant to enter into politics to depose him.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Registry of NIEs and SNIEs. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and in the NSA. Concurred in by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained.
79. Draft Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: During this conversation, U.S. officials and businessmen from the Anaconda Company discussed different means of negotiating with the Chileans over the amount of compensation that they would receive for their nationalized properties. The representatives from Anaconda expressed concern over the potentially damaging effects nationalization could have on U.S. investments in Latin America and proposed that the U.S. Government require just compensation.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 775, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. V. Confidential. Drafted on August 13 by Harkins. The meeting took place in the Under Secretary’s office.
80. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: Korry concluded that Allende was attempting, through domestic and international means, to consolidate socialism in Chile and suggested that Chile would not be accommodating to the United States in developing compensation arrangements for expropriated U.S.-owned properties.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 776, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. VI. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bogotá, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City, Quito, and USCINCSO. The telegram was sent in two parts; part II is not published. A stamped notation on the first page signed by Haig indicates that the telegram was sent to San Clemente.
81. Paper Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile
Summary: This paper outlined a strategy to avoid a confrontation with Chile on compensation for U.S. investments and argued that if the U.S. Government could signal a relaxation of restrictions on aid, that would reduce the risk of confrontation.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–220, NSDM 93. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Fisher and Gird-ler. It was sent by Meyer to Kissinger under cover of a September 8 transmittal memorandum.
82. Memorandum for the 40 Committee
Summary: This memorandum outlined the pressing situation facing the “bulwark against the regime of President Salvador Allende,” the newspaper El Mercurio, and requested funds to support the paper.
Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 1, Chile, 40 Committee Action After September 1970. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the first page reads, “On 9 Sept 1971 the 40 Committee referred the proposal to HA. [HA approved 700,000 on 15 Sept. 71.] See 9 Sept. minute.” The memorandum for the record of the September 9 40 Committee meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 258.
83. Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: This memorandum for Kissinger outlined the attached CIA assessment of the dissent in Chile, particularly amongst the large landholders. The CIA concluded that the discontent was not channeled in any organized way against the government and that the military would not unite against Allende barring some blatant unconstitutional act or institutional threat to Chile itself.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 776, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum.
84. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: This telegram recounted Korry’s unsuccessful attempt to negotiate an informal agreement with Allende on compensation for the expropriation of copper mines owned by U.S. interests.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO 15–2 CHILE. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Lima, Caracas, Rome, Bonn, Paris, Brussels, London, Mexico, and Moscow. Reference telegrams 4975, September 27, and 5020, September 29, are ibid. Telegram 4987 from Santiago, September 27, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 260.
85. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury Connally, the White House Chief of Staff (Haldeman), and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Summary: Nixon, Connally, and Kissinger discussed Allende’s refusal to pay companies for expropriated property.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation 584–3. Sensitive But Unclassified. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met first with John Connally, George P. Shultz, Paul W. McCracken, and Herbert Stein in the Oval Office at 10:06 a.m.; Haldeman entered the Oval Office at 11. The conversation transcribed here, which the editors transcribed specifically for this volume, began after Shultz, McCracken, and Stein left at 11:59 a.m. and continued until Kissinger left at 12:38 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
86. Intelligence Memorandum
Summary: This CIA assessment of Chile’s economy noted that while Allende had achieved many of his socialist goals, the nation itself faced food and other consumer goods shortages.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 776, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. VI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency in the Office of Economic Research and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence. Attached to an October 15 memorandum from Hewitt to Kissinger summarizing the main points of the paper. Hewitt’s memorandum to Kissinger is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 268.
87. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Summary: This paper discussed the waning popularity of the UP and suggested Allende would use the issue of compensation for the expropriation of the U.S. copper companies to bolster his support among the Chilean people.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 CHILE. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Jorgenson.
88. Memorandum for the 40 Committee
Summary: This memorandum proposed additional funds for the three political parties opposed to the Unidad Popular (UP) coalition of Allende.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the bottom of the page reads, “5 Nov. 1971Approved.” The memorandum is attached to a November 3 memorandum from Nachmanoff to Kissinger summarizing the proposal. For Nachmanoff’s memorandum and the memorandum for the record of the November 5 40 Committee meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Documents 270 and 271.
89. Airgram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State
Summary: This airgram summarized the Chilean Constitutional Reform Law for the nationalization of the major copper mines, providing a detailed analysis of the terms of the original bill, its subsequent congressional modifications, and the President’s determination of the “excess profits” provision. It concluded that Allende’s government had consciously applied a particularly harsh interpretation of the law to U.S. companies.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–COPPER CHILE. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Kessler on October 19. Sent with the notation to pass to OPIC.
90. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable
Summary: This cable reported that Allende was going to personally handle the negotiations over compensation to the U.S.-owned copper companies.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 776, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. VI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.
91. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Summary: This memorandum outlined the state of the compensation controversy for expropriated U.S. businesses, the current political situation in Chile, and the ways in which other Latin American nations viewed the U.S.-Chilean relations. It argued that U.S. attempts to ensure adequate compensation for nationalized properties would strengthen Allende’s position in Chile and throughout the rest of Latin America and concluded that no military coup appeared imminent.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 776, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. VI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The memorandum was prepared in the Office of National Estimates. Nachmanoff sent it to Kissinger under cover of a November 16 memorandum, which is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973, Document 273.
92. Paper Prepared for the Senior Review Group by the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Chile
Summary: This paper reviewed U.S. objectives in Chile as the protection of U.S. interests, collection of compensation, and improvement of Chilean opposition forces, while avoiding providing the Allende government with reason for rallying domestic and international support. It then outlined and analyzed the various economic policy options the United States could employ in its attempts to attain those objectives.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot 73D115, ARA/LA-Meyer, Subj. 70–71, Kissinger Memoranda. Drafted by Fisher, Karkashian, and Girdler. Secret; Nodis. Meyer sent this paper to the Senior Review Group. Annexes A and B are attached but not published.
93. Memorandum for the 40 Committee
Summary: This memorandum requested funds to further strengthen the Chilean opposition by supporting two candidates in the January 1972 special election for two vacant congressional seats.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1971–72. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A notation on the first page reads, “Telephonically approved by the 40 Committee on 15 December 1971.”
94. Memorandum of Conversations
Summary: Chilean Senator Pedro Ibáñez of the National Party informed NSC Staff members Nachmanoff and Hewitt about President Salvador Allende’s strategy of attempting to squelch the opposition media in Chile. The NSC officials told Ibáñez to keep the U.S. Ambassador in Chile apprised of Allende’s strategy.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files, Chile, 1971–72. Secret. The meetings took place in Room 380 of the Old Executive Office Building. The memorandum was sent to Kennedy by Hewitt under cover of a January 4 memorandum.
95. Attachments to a Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Debt Renegotiation (Weintraub) to the Senior Review Group
Summary: These attachments to a January 12, 1972, memorandum from Weintraub to the Senior Review Group provided analysis and background of the Chilean request for bilateral talks to reschedule Chile’s external debt and outlined the status of the Chilean economy, U.S. objectives for the talks, and the proposed conduct of the negotiations.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 776, Country Files, Latin America, Chile, Vol. VII. Secret and Confidential. Weintraub’s memorandum (Document 286, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXI, Chile, 1969–1973) and attachments were sent through Meyer and distributed to Kissinger, Irwin, Connally, Nutter, Moorer, and Helms. Only Annexes A and B are published; Annexes C through G were not found.