44. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
43. Subj: The Evident Becomes Obvious (Part I of IV).
1. President Allende moved to Valparaiso today in another innovation aimed at advertising Popular Unity’s proximity to the people (including, I assume, those filling all those bikinis on the beaches of the Pacific). The President and his associates have earned their two months bask in the sun. They have attained every initial goal of their program to make Chile a socialist state:
A. They have consolidated their power in Chile with astonishing ease.
B. They are implementing most of their electoral program without engendering serious resistance.
C. They have maintained their coalition without meaningful disruptions.
D. They have gained the undiluted loyalty of the armed forces, the blessing of the Church, the compliance of the bourgeoisie, and the legitimacy of the international community.
2. The revolution launched by Allende will not be slowed or diverted by the summer transfer of the seat of govt to Chile’s second city. As that most astute of Chilean politicians, Communist Party head Corvalan told a pre-Christmas interviewer from Rome’s L’Unita: “The situation is certainly not yet irreversible; it is up to us to make it so.” Corvalan explained that all the U.P. basic programs would be put into the hopper as fast as possible (“within one month”). The pace had to be forced, he said, so that Chile would be irrevocably placed on the path to socialism. “Were we to limit ourselves to a redistribution of income and to reducing inflation and unemployment, we would fall into a reformist policy,” said Corvalan. “The process must proceed toward the trans [Page 240] formation of the present economic and social system and the reforms must be such, in depth and in relation with each other, as to place the country on the path leading to socialism.” Socialism by Corvalan’s definition is not the Scandinavian or Israeli model; it is the Eastern European.
3. Despite the surface calm, the import of Corvalan’s end and Allende’s means are just beginning to be understood by growing numbers of affected Chileans. As a perceptive American recently said: “When we lack the will to see things as they really are, there is nothing so mystifying as the obvious.” What is starting to occur here is that the obvious has become so overpoweringly evident that it is finally creating some will to see reality. Of the many personal evidences that I have received the past few days, perhaps the most striking was that of Felipe Herrera (protect) who has steadfastly insisted, like Galo Plaza and most other Latin “names” that “it can’t happen here”. Herrera likened the Chilean Govt to a runaway horse, out of control and racing ever faster. He lamented that Allende appeared to be drunk with power, deaf to all advice. Thus Herrera has concluded that he will proceed with a long European vacation after leaving the IDB and not return here before mid-June.
4. Ex-President Frei said the Chilean situation is evolving so fast and so irreversibly that he wonders whether he can leave the country after the municipal elections, as he has planned, because he might not have any political base when he returns. Benjamin Matte, the head of the once powerful National Society of Agriculture who thought he could buy time and tolerance by offering to cooperate fully with Allende and by having negotiated new agriculture deals with Cuba, is planning to announce his resignation shortly for having been so totally misled. Scores of businessmen, scrambling to keep their heads above water, are despondently reconsidering their decisions to try to hold out in Chile and are once again seriously contemplating emigration. Tomicistas whose confidence in Chilean traditions persuaded them to vote for Allende in the October congressional vote for the Presidency are coming voluntarily to us to offer their mea culpas; an increasing number of Radical and Nacional politicos are in the same frame of mind; and even some “extreme” Socialists are making known their annoyance and disquiet over the Communist ascendancy within the govt.
5. The speed and skill with which Allende is realizing the Chilean revolution has thus far robbed his natural opposition of any field where they could give battle. Until now, he has not used any of the classical recipes for imposing socialism. There have been no firing squads, no arbitrary arrests, no obvious censorship, no barriers to free travel, no anti-religious excesses (on the contrary he insisted on attending a Te Deum following his inauguration). As I wrote the night of election (Santiago [Page 241] 3499 Paras 10 et seq), Chile is the only country that I knew where a govt could follow traditional procedures and utilize democratic institutions to install within a normal Presidential term an irrevocable Marxist-Leninist model. A significant sector of informed Chilean opinion is now beginning to comprehend the methods and to perceive the goal. The purpose of this series of cables is to detail some illustrative examples of this unique procedure. To report some of the political and social consequences that it is fomenting, and to offer some comments. (End Part I)
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Summary: In the first of four related telegrams titled “The Evident Becomes Obvious,” Korry discussed the changes instituted by the early Allende administration, noting that the administration had attained every initial goal of its program to make Chile a socialist state using non-violent, democratic means. Moreover, the early successes enjoyed by the administration had earned the support of the military, the Church, the bourgeoisie, and the international community.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2–2 CHILE. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Asunción, Bogotá, Bonn, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Guatemala, Kingston, La Paz, Lima, London, Madrid, Managua, Melbourne, Mexico City, Montevideo, Ottawa, Panama, Paris, Port au Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, San José, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO. Parts II, III, and IV are Documents 45–47.
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