107. Telegram 226024 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil1
226024. Subject: Luncheon Meeting Between the Secretary and Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira, September 28.
Summary: The highlights of the conversation between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Silveira on September 28 were: The Secretary tentatively agreed to visit Brazil in late January; both stressed the need for better communication between our governments concerning the Cuba issue; Brazil tentatively planned to abstain on the Quito resolution vote, the US would vote against or would abstain; Silveira noted Brazil’s trade deficit with the US and stressed the importance of increased US investment in Brazil; the Foreign Minister warned that the US was “demoralizing” the human rights issue by politicizing it; Brazil continues to support Sapena Pastor for OAS Secretary General. End summary.
1. The Secretary invited Foreign Minister Silveira to lunch at the Department on September 28. Also present were Ambassador Araujo Castro and Minister Holanda Cavalcanti as well as Assistant Secretary Rogers, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bowdler, Einaudi and Ballantyne. The conversation was wide ranging. The following paragraphs describe the discussions of the principal topics.
2. Secretary’s visit to Brazil. It was tentatively agreed that the Secretary would visit Brazil in the second half of January. They mentioned as subjects for discussion at that time: Further bilateral consultations (referred to by Silveira as “our joint commission”), restructuring of the OAS and the incorporation of the meetings of Foreign Ministers into the OAS mechanism.
3. Cuba. Silveira expressed appreciation for the visit by Deputy Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman. The Secretary noted that it was most important for the two governments to keep in touch and not try to out-guess each other. Silveira said that he would never do this but that inasmuch as the US position on Cuba had appeared ambiguous, Brazil felt it had to formulate its position without the US. He insisted that the US should have taken a decisive position on the Cuba issue earlier. [Page 302] The Secretary explained that the US delayed forming its position not only to play for time but also because inasmuch as the US was a leader of the anti-Castro faction, a change of position by the USG would have greater influence than a change of position by other governments. If a change had to be made, it would be easier for the US to follow a majority rather than to try to form a majority. He stressed that the US wanted to stand by Brazil on this issue and that was why he sent Shlaudeman to meet with the GOB.
4. Silveira said he understood that the US had been discussing the Cuba issue with the Mexicans. The Secretary responded that we had had no substantive discussions with the Mexicans on the Cuba issue. We had not authorized the Mexicans to act as our mediator; Rabasa was not our spokesman in Latin America. The Secretary told Silveira to check anything the GOB heard from the Mexicans on this subject with the US before drawing conclusions. Silveira said that he had kept in touch with AmEmbassy Brasília concerning OAS Permanent Council action on Cuba but that the information which it provided was always 48 hours late. He suggested using Ambassador Araujo Castro as the channel of communication on the Cuba issue rather than AmEmbassy Brasília which, he said, was too slow. The Secretary replied that, if Ambassador Araujo Castro needed to see him, he will always receive him, but added that AmEmbassy Brasília should not be faulted for not being aware of policy which had not been formulated pending receipt of Brazilian views.
5. The Secretary said the US would prefer that the Quito meeting not take place at all and that the issue of Cuba sanctions not come up for another year. The status quo was acceptable. He said the US would not vote for the Quito resolution unless Brazil did. He added the US might vote against it even if Brazil should vote in favor of it. We would go no further than to abstain. He stressed that the US wanted to follow Brazil’s lead on this question. Silveira said that Brazil planned to abstain, but that if Cuba should attack Brazil, Brazil would vote against the resolution. Brazil, he said, would make a sound and rational evaluation of Cuban behavior before reaching a definitive decision.
6. The Secretary asked Silveira if it were possible to obtain some sort of assurances from Cuba. Silveira asked whether we weren’t doing something about this. The Secretary said we were not but that we would welcome messages of assurance from any source. The Secretary denied that Senators Javits and Pell were acting on behalf of the administration. When Silveira suggested that American private enterprise was somehow behind the visit of Senators Javits and Pell to Cuba, the Secretary replied that we knew nothing about any private enterprise involvement and stressed that our economic denial program would [Page 303] continue. He then asked Silveira what sort of assurances we should try to get. Silveira replied that it would be useful to get assurances that Cuba was not going to intervene in other countries. He added that this was of domestic significance in Brazil where there were groups strongly opposed to recognition of Cuba. The Secretary suggested that Peru (De la Flor) might serve as an intermediary to obtain such assurances. Silveira replied that he would look into the matter and get in touch with the Secretary the following week. (When Ambassador Bowdler met with Araujo Castro on other matters October 5, he asked whether Foreign Minister Silveira had any further thoughts on a possible Peruvian approach to Cuba. Araujo Castro said he had no further word but had the impression that Silveira came out of the meeting with President Ford on September 29 thinking that the President and the Secretary felt that Fidel Castro’s speech of September 28 had upset the efforts regarding assurances. He added, however, that this was just his impression and that Silveira had not explicitly spoken to him about this subject.)
7. Bilateral relations. The Foreign Minister said that bilateral relations could not be any better. He implied that the United States could now have confidence in Brazil’s ability to face international problems and accept international responsibilities. He had two specific complaints, however. First he complained that the US had not offered support to Brazil during the petroleum crisis. When asked what the US could have done, Silveira suggested that we could have assured that Brazil would have access to petroleum supplies. He said “you know our situation. If there were no petroleum problem, we’d have no development problem in Brazil.” His second complaint concerned trade. He said “in our trade balance with the United States last year Brazilian exports grew by only 10 percent while your exports to us increased 200 percent. This year we have done well to increase our exports to the United States by 15 percent while your exports to us are up 100 percent. I am not complaining about this. We do not seek to balance trade bilaterally. I want as much trade as possible between our countries. The problem is that we now have many important projects which oblige us to take options. If you don’t induce your investors to be interested, our decisions on these options won’t involve US investment and the consequences will be that we are going to move apart. For instance, our biggest aluminum project is now with the Japanese. Afterwards, there may be something with Kaiser and Alcoa as they are coming. But the Japanese project is enormous, 640,000 tons. If we take other options like this it’s going to influence our bilateral relations.” When the Secretary asked what the US could do, Silveira criticized remarks made by Assistant Secretary Rogers during his confirmation hearings to the effect that the increase in petroleum prices was going [Page 304] to cause Brazil “terrible” economic problems. Silveira’s apparent implication was that such remarks undercut international confidence in the Brazilian economy.
8. Middle East and petroleum. Silveira said that the only way to deal with the Arabs was to be just about the Middle Eastern conflict and added that Brazil could never be in favor of occupation of territories by force. He warned against mixing the energy crisis with the Israeli-Arab dispute. The Secretary agreed and stated that we had no intentions of linking the two problems. Silveira said that Brazil wanted to be informed of the results of meetings among the petroleum consuming nations. In discussing ways to convince the petroleum producers to lower their prices he suggested the possibility of some compromise on price with an arrangement for the consumers to pay the producers some time in the future. The Secretary assured Silveira that there would be no military intervention in the Middle East by the United States.
9. Human rights. The Foreign Minister warned that the US may be “demoralizing” human rights by making a political issue out of the subject.
10. Coffee. Silveira asked whether the US was in favor of a new coffee agreement or not. The Secretary said he would look into this matter. (See State 216227).
11. OAS Secretary General. Silveira confirmed that Brazil was strongly backing Paraguayan Foreign Minister Sapena Pastor who had 10 certain votes and needed just two more to be elected. He urged the US to support Sapena Pastor. When asked about Mexico’s proposal that the Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic be chosen the next Secretary General, Silveira said frankly that Mexico knew the Dominican could not win. He characterized the Mexican proposal as a blocking move.
12. Latin American economic bloc. The Foreign Minister was asked for his views on the proposal by Mexican President Echeverria for the formation of a Latin American economic bloc. Silveira described the proposal as unrealistic, explaining that economic problems were global not hemispheric. He characterized Echeverria as eager to be famous, hoping to become the next Secretary General of the United Nations.
13. Argentina. The Foreign Minister said that he thought Mrs.Perón’s position would be eroded by her lack of decisiveness. The Armed Forces although depressed and inefficient were, according to Silveira, Argentina’s only cohesive force, but Silveira refused to predict when the next major change in Argentine politics would occur.
14. Latin American meetings. Silveira was generally noncommittal as to whether Brazil would be represented at the Ayacucho meeting and the proposed meeting of Latin American Presidents in Caracas in July 1975.
[Page 305]15. Peru-Chile. Silveira told the Secretary that Brazil would not support either country’s occupying territory by force. He repeated his view that Brazil will have no automatic alignments.
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Summary: Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Silveira discussed bilateral issues, petroleum prices, Cuba, and regional policy.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740291–0954. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Watson; cleared by Ballantyne, Zimmermann, and Bowdler; approved by Eagleburger. Silveira was in Washington for bilateral discussions after attending the UN General Assembly in New York.
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