Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

92. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 26, 1973, 10–11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary of State Kissinger
• Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mario Gibson Alves Barboza
• Brazilian Ambassador to United States Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro
• Brazilian Ambassador to United Nations Sergio A. Frazao
• William J. Jorden, NSC Staff (Latin American Affairs)

SUBJECT

• Conversation with Brazilian Foreign Minister

The Secretary welcomed the Brazilian Foreign Minister and his colleagues. The Minister congratulated the Secretary on his new assignment and wished him well in his new responsibilities. He said Brazil’s interest was in part selfish because “your success will be our success.”

The Secretary thanked the Minister and noted that Brazil is the only country in Latin America he has visited except Mexico. He said that beyond the importance of close personal relations between the leaders or our two countries, close relations between our two countries were absolutely essential to the state of Latin America. He said that he was very eager to establish the closest possible relations. He said he believed that until now our communications had been quite close, but he wanted to make sure they remained that way.

The Brazilian Minister noted that our contacts had always been exceedingly close and he too hoped that they would continue that way.

The Secretary said that he thought the Minister would like our new Ambassador (John Crimmins).

Gibson Barboza said that the Ambassador was a “good man” and that he and the Ambassador were friends. He noted that the new Ambassador was very knowledgeable about the situation in Brazil. He was looking forward, he said, to very close relations with him. He said he had already had several extensive talks with the Ambassador. As to the overall situation in U.S.-Brazil relations, he said that he saw “no real problems” at the moment.

At this point, Ambassador Araujo Castro started to say something, but the Secretary interrupted him to tell the Minister that his Ambassador “has not been scolding me lately.” He indicated that this was a pleasant change.

Turning back to the Minister, the Secretary said: “Let’s say this; if something gets bogged down between us, please get in touch with me directly and if it’s humanly possible we will get it done.” He noted that he continued in his position as Assistant to the President and that might help expedite action when it was needed.

Gibson Barboza thanked the Secretary very much. He said he would take advantage of the offer but only when it was absolutely necessary. Referring to overall relations, he noted that, of course, there was a difference in our roles in the world as a result of “our relative weight.”

The Secretary noted that that situation is changing. He said that in 25 years we would be close to equals.

The Brazilian Minister said that was possible, but that, of course, the whole world was changing. He admitted that it might be true that “we are a bit more ahead of some others.” The Secretary said he thought the situation was changing faster than that. He predicted that over the next 25 years Brazil would become a super power; he said that the country was on its way to being a major power today.

Gibson Barboza said that “as we see it” Brazil is called on to share more responsibility. He said his country was now planning a larger role in world affairs. He said there was an “expression called Latin America” but that there were tremendous variations and differences among the countries in the Hemisphere. He said that over the years it had been Brazil’s position to recognize those differences. He referred to the situation in Chile and underlined the necessity for the United States and Brazil to cooperate on this and many other matters.

The Secretary said that he supported Chile and Brazil’s position. He noted that we faced different domestic situations in dealing with such matters. He said it had become customary that when an anti-U.S. government was overthrown, we have to “apologize for it.” He noted that we had sent in emergency medical supplies and that we would be offering economic assistance. But, he said, we would try to keep our actions at a low key.

Ambassador Araujo Castro repeated the necessity for close cooperation.

The Secretary pointed out that “those who don’t like us” generally end up attacking not only us but our friends as well. For example, he pointed out that the Russians had been oppressing intellectuals for the past fifty years, but intellectuals in the United States never made an issue of this. They are doing so now because the Soviet Union is becoming more friendly with the United States Government.

The Secretary said that we understood that Brazil would be conducting its own policy. We recognize, he said, that you don’t want to do it through us or anyone else. We will occasionally mention problems to you, if you permit us to, but this will be done in a spirit of working together, not trying to tell Brazil what to do.

Gibson Barboza said he wanted to explain something. He referred to the Chilean request for helmets and flares, which we had conveyed to Brazil. You asked if you should tell the Chileans, he said, and we said “no.” It would have meant your acting through us, and we felt it was better for us to deal directly. We believe that that is better for you and for us. He pointed out that the Chileans have in fact come directly to them in the last few days with a request for the helmets and flares and Brazil had agreed to provide them.

The Secretary asked Jorden what the status of this was. Jorden told the Secretary that we had met the Chilean request and that the material had already been sent. He said it looked as though Chile would get a double order.

The Brazilians said that they would check from their end, and if the request had already been met they would not duplicate it.

The Secretary urged the Brazilian Foreign Minister not to let his colleagues get confused by what we had to testify to in public. The Minister said the Brazilians understood completely.

The Secretary said that he had told the Brazilian Ambassador several years ago that we would “like to do more in Latin America.” How can we get your views, he asked, on what we should do? I told the Ambassador four years ago, he said, and now we are ready to do it. He said he wanted the Brazilians’ advice and pointed out that we have not asked anybody else about this matter.

Gibson Barboza said he felt that efforts to develop some kind of overall policy toward Latin America had failed. He said the continent was very much diversified and any policy had to take those differences into consideration. We would, of course, appreciate an overall Latin American policy that was effective, he said.

The Secretary said he was thinking of sending someone he trusted—perhaps former Secretary of Commerce Peterson—to a few key countries in Latin America. He would then expect Peterson to make recommendations to him regarding new policy approaches.

The Brazilian Minister said he thought that would be all right. But it would be necessary to avoid simply “getting another report.” He thought it might be good especially if the mission kept a very low profile. He urged that it receive as little publicity as possible. Otherwise, he said, it would raise expectations too high.

The Secretary said he did not have in mind any “huge affair” like the Rockefeller mission of 1969. He was thinking of a very small group—Peterson and perhaps Assistant Secretary Kubisch and one or two others.

The Brazilian Minister said that this overall approach could never be a substitute for bilateral dealings.

The Secretary said he understood. He said that our relations with Brazil were most important and a quite separate matter. He pointed out, as an example of what he was thinking, that there was a question of our relations with Argentina. We would like to get Brazil’s views on the new government and our respective relations with it.

The Brazilian Minister pointed out that the Perón government was sending invitations to all countries to send special missions to attend the coming inauguration of the President.

The Secretary said that the Argentines seemed eager for him to go to Buenos Aires for this purpose. He said he didn’t think he could; but if the Brazilians considered it extraordinarily important, he would look at it again.

Gibson Barboza said that speaking personally, he was discarding the idea of his going himself.

The Secretary said that if Gibson Barboza didn’t go, then he would not go either. The Brazilian Minister said that this was something that he intended to talk with his President about before making a final decision.

Gibson Barboza noted that at the last inauguration of their President (Campora last May) Brazil had sent the President of its Congress. The Secretary said we had sent Secretary Rogers.

Gibson Barboza said he understood that our representative did not get to the ceremony in time because of a traffic jam.

The Secretary asked what Brazil’s estimate was should something happen to Perón. Would his wife succeed him?

The Brazilian Minister said that “in my opinion” Mrs.Perón would never succeed her husband. He said he considered that there were several possibilities: (1) another Peronist leader would take power; or (2) there would be an armed coup d’état. On the latter, he pointed out that the Argentine army right now was “bashful.” He noted that they had left power apologizing for their failures. He said we have seen in Argentina just the reverse of what we have in Brazil. “We started with Goulart”, he said, “and ended with the Army. In Argentina, they started with the Army and ended with a Goulart.”

The Brazilian Minister said he understood that Perón is a very sick man. He said we had to think of his not finishing his term of office.

The Secretary said we had information that Perón had a heart problem. Gibson Barboza noted that he also has cancer. He is a tired man. He can’t bear the full strain of the office.

The Secretary noted that the Argentines were eager to have an emissary see him in advance of the meeting next week with the Foreign Minister.

Gibson Barboza said Argentina’s problem was how to introduce and apply a very hostile economic policy. He said that they would have to freeze wages and other spending and take other belt-tightening measures.

The Secretary said that on matters like this we are prepared to have the closest consultations.

Gibson Barboza thanked the Secretary very much. He said that “since you are mentioning specific points” he wanted to raise the question of Cuba. He said he was convinced that Cuba was no longer a foreign policy problem but rather an internal problem for individual countries. He said Brazil felt that Cuba was certainly no threat to them. They bother us, he said, because they still support subversion and export revolution. But, he added, Cuba is basically an internal problem.

The Secretary asked whether this problem could be eased by our relaxing pressures along the lines of the Venezuela initiative.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that Venezuela had the problem of early Presidential elections. He said that all the candidates were seeking support from the left. He said that they seem to think that an opening to Cuba could bring them left wing support. He said that Cuba had urged Venezuela to try to bypass the Rio Treaty and use the OAS council for a decision.

The Secretary asked what Brazil’s view was.

Gibson Barboza said that he felt Venezuela was not going to press the matter as a result of the change in Chile. He said he thought that now they had ten votes instead of twelve and that “they were discouraged.”

The Secretary said that, on Cuba, our policy is: we are not planning any move on Cuba. There will be no “secret trips.” There will be no meetings. If we change our policy—which we are not planning to do—we will consult with you, he said. He said the President’s inclination was not to change our policy. But, he added, if you tell us we should, we will consider it.

The Brazilian Foreign Minister said that some governments in Latin America were afraid the United States was going to move. The Secretary asked how we could dispel that impression. Gibson Barboza said that “you should tell them.” He mentioned the governments of Colombia, Venezuela, Uruguay, and others.

The Secretary asked if Brazil would maintain its position. Gibson Barboza replied “absolutely.”

Ambassador Frazao raised the problem of Chile in the United Nations. He said that Cuba was pushing it very hard. He thought it important for the United States to let other governments know its position. The Secretary said that we would take “a very tough stand.” The Ambassador said he hoped the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs would come to the UN session to explain his government’s position.

The Secretary said we would be tough. We will not accept any condemnation of Chile. He said we needed Brazil’s support. Minister Gibson Barboza said we would have “unqualified support” from Brazil.

The Secretary pointed out the differences between the Cuban situation and China, which many people were trying to describe as similar. He pointed out that Cuba was a very small island, but it is in the Caribbean; China, he said, is very far away. But Cuba and what it does has an effect on Latin America. He said he could assure the Brazilians there would be no “spectacular initiative” on Cuba.

Gibson Barboza said his government sees no change in the Cuban situation. He said that they had no idea of changing policy. If Brazil ever did, he said, we would let you know first. He added that it was important that the United States tell others in the hemisphere where we stand on this matter. He said there were some who were not inclined to move toward Cuba, but who worried about being “surprised.” He said none of them wants to be in a position of recognizing Cuba after the United States.

The Secretary thought that perhaps he should send a message to all our Ambassadors in the Hemisphere restating our position on Cuba, but putting it in an overall description of our Latin American policy, not as an isolated matter.

Ambassador Frazao said that perhaps the Secretary should “do it here.” He said the position we take in the next few weeks would be important. The Secretary said that the United States would maintain the position taken by Ambassador Scali last week. We will take a strong stand against Cuba, he said.

The Foreign Minister referred to the OAS and pointed out that the position of the United States has been to wait and see what others do. That, he said, was the impression that Brazil and others had. He thought it was important for the United States to take a strong and clearer position.

Ambassador Frazao pointed out that in Latin American consultative bodies in the UN, Cuba had come in with the votes of the Central American governments. This had been a surprise.

The Secretary said we would watch this carefully. He pointed out that he had not always been able to follow such details (like the OAS debates) while in the White House.

Gibson Barboza referred to the Special Committee on Reform of the OAS Charter of the Rio Treaty. At the last meeting of the OAS, he said, we had to fight very hard to resist the trend toward weakening the Charter. He said that we had to stand by the principles of self-determination and non-intervention.

The Secretary said he was trying to think through this whole problem and the OAS. Before we can make up our minds, he said, we need your thoughts and ideas. How do we best make any changes that are necessary?

Gibson Barboza said we could consult closely on this either through Ambassador Araujo Castro here or through the U.S. Ambassador in Brasília. The Secretary said that we should consult very soon.

The Secretary then raised the initiative of the Mexican President to have some kind of a meeting of Western Hemisphere leaders in Mexico in an informal setting. Gibson Barboza said he thought this was “not a great idea.” The Secretary agreed that there were many problems associated with this subject. The Secretary mentioned the possibility of his making a trip to Brazil next year. The Foreign Minister said he would be most welcome.

(The Secretary turned to Jorden at this point and asked him to arrange for the State Department to prepare a working paper for him on the Rio Treaty and the OAS situation.) He told the Foreign Minister that after he had had a chance to study the details, they could talk further.

The Brazilians raised the matter of the meeting of leaders of the armies of the Western Hemisphere in Caracas some two weeks ago. Gibson Barboza noted that it was the first time in such meetings that political elements had been introduced. He said that there was a severe difference on ideological grounds. He said the central development was that the dangers of communism in Latin America had been replaced by imperialism and economic aggression as dangers. He said that Peru had led the way and had been supported by Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia and others. He noted that the U.S. Army representatives had taken a very low profile and had not worked to oppose this trend.

At this point the Secretary noted that he was already late for his next meeting and he asked to be excused.

Farewells were exchanged, and the Brazilian party left the office.

1. Summary: Kissinger and Gibson Barboza discussed regional issues and Brazil’s growing role in world affairs.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BRAZ–US. Secret; Exdis. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.