Cuba
301. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford
Summary: Kissinger recommended that U.S. regulations imposing punitive measures on third countries that engaged in trade with Cuba be modified or repealed in light of the resolution passed at the San José meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers in July.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, 1974–1977, Country Files, Box 2, Cuba—Economic, Social—Sanctions 3. Confidential. Ford initialed the memorandum and approved its recommendation. No attachments were found, but the documents described as attachments include a February 25 memorandum from Ingersoll to Ford and an August 12 memorandum from Kissinger to Ford. (Ibid., Cuba—Economic, Social—Sanctions 2; and ibid., Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–1977, Box 3, Cuba 2) In telegram 3187/USDel 50 from San José, July 30, published as Document 33, the Embassy reported on the OAS Foreign Ministers’ lifting of mandatory regional sanctions on Cuba. In an August 21 statement, the Department announced modifications to its Cuba denial policy, noting that in the future licenses would be granted for “transactions between U.S. subsidiaries and Cuba for trade in foreign-made goods when those subsidiaries are operating in countries where local law or policy favors trade with Cuba.” (Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1975, p. 404)
302. Telegram 201916/Tosec 100134 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Alexandria
Summary: Eagleburger transmitted to Kissinger the text of a protest against Cuban efforts to promote Puerto Rican independence that was to be delivered to a Cuban Government contact in New York.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0926. Secret; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Eagleburger. In telegram 201436/Tosec 100079, August 23, to Kissinger, who was then in Alexandria, Egypt, the Department recommended that he authorize an exploration of possible retaliatory measures against Cuba in response to its effort to raise the question of Puerto Rican independence in the United Nations. (Ibid., D750292–0174) In telegram Secto 10062, August 23, Kissinger, who had travelled from Egypt to Damascus, Syria, responded by instructing Eagleburger “to send the Cubans a tough note via your channel on their actions re the Puerto Rico resolution.” (Ibid., P850011–1634, N750003–0394) In telegram 201478/Tosec 100085, August 23, Eagleburger informed Kissinger that he would make the requested approach on Monday, August 25. (Ibid., N750003–0396)
303. National Security Decision Memorandum 305
Summary: This memorandum informed administration officials of a Presidential decision to terminate U.S. restrictions on third countries that traded with Cuba.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSDM and NSSM, 1974–1977, Box 1, NSDM 305—Termination of U.S. Restrictions on Third Country Trade with Cuba. Confidential. Copies sent to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee.
304. National Intelligence Estimate 85–1–75
Summary: This estimate examined Cuba’s changing international role, concluding that Castro would be willing to make concessions on some issues in talks with the United States but would not jeopardize broader foreign policy objectives in order to resolve bilateral problems.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 499, Folder 6. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the FBI, who abstained. A July 23 memorandum prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, concluded that Castro desired to negotiate an improvement in relations but did not want to appear anxious for reconciliation. (Ibid., Office of Current Intelligence Files, Job 79T00865A, Box 26, Folder 17) Defense Intelligence Notice 2951–75, November 14, concluded that Cuban interest in a rapprochement was waning, as indicated by recent statements by Cuban officials and by Cuban involvement in Angola. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Decimal Subject Files, 330–78–0058, 092 Cuba 14 Nov 1975) Telegram 1527 from Luanda, October 10, reported the landing of Cuban troops in Angola to support the MPLA. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750352–1190)
305. Telegram 295722/Tosec 240257 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Paris
Summary: Sisco transmitted a proposed statement to the Cuban Government that would highlight the seriousness with which the U.S. Government viewed Cuban involvement in Angola.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850012–2147. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Sisco and cleared by Rogers, Schaufele, Ortiz, and Barbian. Kissinger was in Paris attending the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, December 15–17. In telegram Secto 24102, December 16, Kissinger told Sisco and Ingersoll that he was “disturbed by the apparent tinges of panic evident in the tone” of telegrams on Angola, and he instructed them to take no action until after he had discussed the situation with Ford on December 18. (Ibid., P840083–0668) That discussion is recorded in a memorandum of conversation published as Document 153 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa. Cuban involvement in the Angolan conflict was not discussed. In telegram Tosec 240270, December 16, Ingersoll and Sisco assured Kissinger “that the Angola business is in fact being pursued by all those principally concerned in the Department in a calm, sober, dignified, rational and professional manner.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850012–2140) In a November 24 speech in Detroit, Kissinger had stated with reference to Cuban involvement in Angola that “a policy of conciliation [with Cuba] will not survive . . . armed intervention in the affairs of other nations.” (Department of State Bulletin, December 15, 1975, p. 844)
306. Telegram 303698/Tosec 250038 From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Ocho Rios
Summary: In talking points prepared for a meeting with Cuban officials, the Department expressed its willingness to consider allowing family visits to Cuba but added that Cuban intervention in Angola made normalization of relations impossible.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N750006–0699. Secret; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. Drafted by Rogers and approved by Eagleburger. Kissinger was vacationing in Jamaica. Kirby Jones, who carried a message from Castro to the U.S. Government in November 1975, was the former press secretary for the Presidential campaign of George McGovern and an advocate of improved U.S.-Cuban relations. In telegram Secto 25007 from Ocho Rios, December 30, Kissinger, approved the talking points with slight changes to paragraph 10; he struck the word “limited” from the phrase, “limited plan for family visits,” and revised the final sentence to read: “But Cuba’s dispatch of combat troops to take part in an internal conflict between Africans in Angola is a fundamental obstacle to any far-reaching effort to resolve the basic issues between us at this time.” (Ibid., N750006–0711) Ford had stated in a December 20 press conference that he had ended efforts to improve relations with Cuba in light of Cuban interference in Puerto Rico and Angola. (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 784) Rogers held an inconclusive meeting with García at Washington National Airport on January 12, 1976. (Ibid.)
307. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Rogers reported on a February 7 meeting between Eagleburger and a Cuban official in which the possibility of allowing U.S. residents to make visits to family members in Cuba was discussed.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860112–0119. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by Rogers. Sent through Eagleburger who wrote, “I agree,” next to the first paragraph. The meeting between Eagleburger and García took place in New York. (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pp. 784–785)
308. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Summary: The memorandum commented on the increasingly assertive and global foreign policy being pursued by Castro and predicted that a significant Cuban military force would remain in Angola indefinitely.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence Files, Job 85T00353R, Box 1, Folder 25. Confidential. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. In a March 2 memorandum to Luers, Gleysteen noted that CCA was generally in agreement with this paper’s conclusion that Cuba was likely to seek to expand its presence and influence in southern Africa, but in a handwritten notation, Luers recorded his view that the paper overstated the extent to which Cuban intervention in Angola had added to Castro’s prestige in the Third World. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820134–2096)
309. Telegram 61342 From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts.
Summary: The Department transmitted an analysis of Cuban involvement in Angola that had been prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760096–0470. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Eyes Only. Sent to all European diplomatic posts, all American Republic diplomatic posts, the Liaison Office in China, and the Embassies in Japan, Egypt, Guinea, South Africa, Tanzania, Zaire, Nigeria, Mozambique, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Gabon. Drafted by David Smith; cleared by Godfrey Summ in INR/RAR, Gary Chafin in ARA, Raymond Ewing in EUR, Jeffrey Cunningham in EA, Ann Griffin in NEA, and Theodore Ford in AF; and approved by Kirk. An earlier chronology of the Cuban buildup in Angola is in telegram 43033 to Stockholm, Addis Ababa, Copenhagen, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Helsinki, Kinshasa, Maputo, Lusaka, Moscow, Oslo, Pretoria, Reykjavik, the Mission to NATO, and the Mission to the UN, February 23. (Ibid., D760070–0874)
310. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Kissinger and Ford discussed possible action against Cuba if Cuban forces expanded their activities overseas.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 18, March 15, 1976—Ford, Kissinger. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to a March 13 memorandum of a conversation with Saudi Petroleum Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani, referred to in this document, Kissinger stated that the “next time Cuba attempts something like Angola, they will get into massive trouble. The War Powers Act gives us 60 days to do something and I think we could take care of Cuba in that period.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820117–1608) According to a February 26 memorandum of conversation, Kissinger told Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that he firmly believed “that the Cubans have to be taught a lesson.” (Ibid., P860112–0876)
311. Transcript of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting
Summary: The Washington Special Actions Group made preparations to draft a study on possible measures that could be taken against Cuba.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Institutional Files, Box 20, WSAG Meeting—Cuba and Lebanon—March 24, 1976, 2. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. Under a March 23 covering memorandum to Kissinger, Rogers transmitted a paper on deterring Cuban intervention in southern Africa that had been prepared for use by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll at this WSAG meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840014–0842) According to the minutes of an April 7 National Security Council meeting, Ford asked about the status of contingency plans on Cuba, and Kissinger informed him that they were being revised. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Meeting File, 1974–1977, Box 2, NSC Meeting—April 7, 1976) According to an April 21 memorandum of conversation, Kissinger told Ford that the “contingency plans aren’t doing well” and that “no one but you and I are in favor of cracking the Cubans; Ford authorized Kissinger to order the interagency group to produce the contingency plans whether they favored action against Cuba or not. (Ibid., Memoranda of Conversation, Box 19, April 21, 1976—Ford, Kissinger)
312. Memorandum From the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs (Gleysteen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers)
Summary: In the wake of an attack on a Cuban fishing boat, Gleysteen proposed that the U.S. Government issue a warning to exile groups that might be planning further attacks.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820131–1674. Confidential; Urgent. Drafted by Holladay and cleared by Gantz and Dixon. Rogers initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached but not printed are a draft warning to Cuban exiles and the text of a May 12, 1970, Department statement reminding residents of laws prohibiting the use of U.S. territory as a base for “military expeditions against foreign country.” (Ibid., P820131–1676 and P820131–1677) In a note to the Department, April 9, the Cuban Foreign Ministry protested an attack in international waters upon the Cuban fishing boat Ferro 119, presumably by Cuban exiles based in U.S. territory. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, 1974–1977, Country Files, Box 2, Cuba—Political, Military 3) In an April 16 message to the Cuban Foreign Ministry, the Department condemned illegal attacks upon innocent persons while rejecting the allegation that statements by U.S. officials encouraged such attacks. (Ibid., Box 2, Cuba—Cubana Airlines Overflights 1)
313. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford
Summary: This memorandum reported on signs that Cuban involvement in Angola was hindering Cuban efforts to gain acceptance in Europe and Latin America and forcing Castro back into a position of dependence upon the Soviet Union.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–1977, Country Files, Box 3, Cuba 5. Confidential. Sent for information. Ford initialed the memorandum, and a notation reads: “The President has seen.” In an April 13 memorandum, Low presented this information and analysis to Scowcroft, who instructed Low to prepare a memorandum to Ford on the subject. (Ibid.)
314. Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Summary: A study of possible U.S. reactions to further Cuban intervention overseas, prepared as a follow-up to the WSAG meeting of April 22.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 79M00467A, Box 9, Folder 11. Secret; Nodis. Attached to a memorandum from Davis of the NSC to Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Bush, and JCS Chairman Brown. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors.
315. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Robinson to Attorney General Levi
Summary: Robinson asked the Attorney General to issue a statement condemning recent acts of violence carried out by Cuban exiles based in Miami.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820131–1685. Secret. Drafted by Holladay and Gleysteen and cleared by Gantz and Hurwitz. A draft of this letter was sent to Robinson under a May 21 covering memorandum from Ryan. (Ibid., P820131–1687) In a June 10 letter to Robinson, Assistant Attorney General Richard Thornburgh replied that he did not believe a statement by the Attorney General condemning exile terrorism would be appropriate in view of pending legal cases against defendants facing charges in connection with recent bombings in Miami. (Ibid., P820131–1682) For the 1973 memorandum of understanding between the United States and Cuba, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 142.
316. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Bush to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Bush provided information indicating Castro considered Ford and Kissinger to be reasonable men and that the Cuban leader was concerned Ronald Reagan might be elected President.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 79M00467A, Box 9, Folder 11. Secret; Sensitive. William Wells signed for Bush. A copy was sent to Scowcroft. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. Four attached intelligence reports are not published.
317. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff
Summary: Low transmitted an updated draft of a National Security Council study outlining measures that might be taken to punish Cuba for its involvement in Angola.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Institutional Files, Box 25, Miscellaneous Meeting Materials—Cuba 7. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten note reads: “Brent [Scowcroft]: This is about all that is left of Cuban contingency study; do we circulate it?” Next to this, a note reads: “No circulation.” The draft was returned to Low and Brownell under an undated note from Hyland that stated, “This is now OBE, kept it dormant for now.” (Ibid., Box 110, Folder 3) For the U.S.-Cuba Hijacking Agreement, see Document 271.
318. Message From the Department of State to the Swiss Embassy in Havana
Summary: The U.S. Government offered to return two stolen boats to Cuba but rejected the Cuban Government’s assertion that those who had stolen the vessels in order to reach the United States should be punished under the terms of the 1973 U.S.-Cuban agreement on hijacking.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff Files, 1974–1977, Country Files, Box 2, Cuba—Hijacking. No classification marking. Drafted by Willis and F. Abbot in L/ARA and Holladay; cleared by Brownell, Lazar, Luers, Gleysteen, and Dixon; and approved by Shlaudeman. In an August 2 message, H–4378, to the Department, the Cuban Foreign Ministry cited four cases in which Cubans stole boats in order to reach the United States, and it noted that a failure to punish the individuals responsible for the thefts might be interpreted by the Cuban Government as a U.S. denunciation of the 1973 hijacking agreement. (Ibid.) For the 1973 memorandum of understanding, see Document 271.
319. Memorandum for the Record
Summary: This memorandum recorded State Department and Central Intelligence Agency officials’ discussion of the bombing of the Cuban airliner that crashed off of the coast of Barbados.
Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings, 1975–1976. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by De Tarr. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors or that remains classified. Telegram 2616 from Port of Spain, October 8, reported that the two persons detained in connection with the Cuban bombing were Venezuelan nationals José Vázquez García (an alias for Hernán Ricardo Lizano) and Freddy Lugo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760378–1121)
320. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Shlaudeman informed Kissinger of suspicions in the Caribbean that the CIA had played a part in the bombing of the Cuban airliner that crashed off of Barbados on October 6, and he transmitted a draft of a letter to be sent to the Foreign Ministers of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760162–2674. Secret. Drafted by Heavner. Referrong to the attached proposed letter to the three Foreign Ministers, Kissinger wrote at the top of the memorandum “Except that I don’t call [Guyanese Foreign Minister Frederick] Wills by his 1st name.” Attached but not published is a draft telegram containing the text of the letters. (Ibid., P760162–2676) A revised version was sent as telegram 254013, October 14, to Georgetown, Port of Spain, Bridgetown, and the U.S. Mission to the UN. (Ibid., D760385–0543) Telegrams 1893 and 1904 from Bridgetown, October 6 and 7, reported on the Cubana crash. (Ibid., D760377–0597 and D760378–1272)
321. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Shlaudeman outlined a strategy designed to counter false allegations against the United States in connection with the Cubana bombing and to minimize the potentially negative impact of the incident on U.S. relations with the countries involved.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–1516. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Luers on October 22 and cleared by Willis and in substance by Karkashian in S/CCT. Kissinger initialed approval of recommendation 1 on October 26, and a handwritten note next to it reads, “Cable sent 10/26.” Kissinger initialed approval of recommendation 2 on October 26. Kissinger initialed disapproval of recommendation 3 the same day and added the notation, “Too defensive.” A separate notation in a different hand reads, “Bob Funseth [of S/PRS] is not satisfied with the proposed statement—too long and some things we shouldn’t be volunteering, especially in the present political climate.” Kissinger did not initial approval or disapproval of recommendation 4 and wrote, “Let’s 1st do 3.” Attached but not printed are: a draft telegram to Bridgetown (Tab 1), an October 26 letter from Kissinger to Levi (Tab 2), a draft press release on Castro’s October 15 denunciation of the 1973 hijacking agreement (Tab 3), and a draft reply to the October 15 Cuban note denouncing the hijacking agreement, the final version of which is published as Document 325. For the agreement, see Document 271.
322. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: This memorandum reviewed past U.S Government relationships with those implicated in the bombing of the Cubana airliner and noted that those associations could “lead to some misinterpretation and embarrassment,” despite the fact that the United States had no advance knowledge of the attack.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860053–1560. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders, De Tarr, Louis Misback, and David Smith in INR on October 22. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. Page numbers in the text reference original pagination. For the Times article on Letelier’s killing, see: David Binder, “2 Nations Report Anti-Castro Exiles Here Have Plotted Many Terrorist Attacks,” New York Times, October 20, 1976, p. 3. The CIA reports, February 19 and June 22, and the FBI report, September 17, were not found.
323. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger
Summary: Shlaudeman recommended steps to shift attention away from allegations of U.S. complicity in the Cubana bombing and to stimulate cooperative efforts against terrorism in the Caribbean.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840037–0747. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Luers and Gleysteen on October 29. A notation on the memorandum reads: “Cables approved with changes, 10/30.” Attached but not published are a draft message to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister (Tab 1), a draft message to the Foreign Ministers of Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados (Tab 2), a translation of an October 29 letter from Escovar to Kissinger (Tab 3), telegram 12610 of October 28 from Caracas on Vaky’s conversation with Pérez on the Cubana crash (Tab 4), telegram 266529 of October 28 to Caracas (Tab 5), and telegram 254013 of October 14 to Georgetown, Port of Spain, and USUN (Tab 6).
324. Memorandum From David Lazar of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Hyland)
Summary: This memorandum recommended approval of the pending Cuban request for overflight rights in connection with the establishment of commercial air service between Havana and Montreal.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–1977, Country Files, Box 4, Cuba 8. Confidential. Sent for action. Hyland initialed the memorandum and wrote, “OK.” Lazar wrote, “Passed orally to Shlaudeman, 11/9, C. Gleysteen, 11/10.” Next to the second paragraph Hyland wrote: “This is a different issue.” Hyland initialed approval of the memorandum’s recommendations but struck out the portion of the first recommendation that stipulated approval of regularly scheduled air service, approving only two special one-time flights and wrote “No” in the margin.
325. Message From the Department of State to the Swiss Embassy in Havana
Summary: The U.S. Government expressed concern over the Cuban Government’s October 15 denunciation of the 1973 agreement between the two countries on hijacking.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840037–0211. No classification marking. Attached to a November 19 covering memorandum to Kissinger, in which Shlaudeman reported that Cuban Foreign Minister Roa had said in accepting the note that the “U.S. attitude was slightly different from your [Kissinger’s] earlier statements about the Cubana crash,” a statement that Shlaudeman interpreted as a possible “contrivance to signal to the next administration Cuban interest in dialogue with the U.S.” (Ibid., P840037–0209) For the 1973 hijacking agreement, see Document 271. Message H–4442 was not found.
326. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford
Summary: This memorandum recommended Presidential approval of the Cuban request for overflight rights for regularly scheduled commercial air service.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–1977, Country Files, Box 4, Cuba 9. Confidential. Sent for action. A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Ford initialed his approval. Attached but not published is a translation of a September 9 Cuban Foreign Ministry note to the Department of State which reiterated a March 17 request for overflight rights (Tab A). Also attached but not published is an October 12 memorandum from Lazar to Scowcroft reviewing the background of the Cuban request (Tab B).
327. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America [name not declassified] to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Knoche)
Summary: This memorandum reviewed U.S. policy toward Cuba and described the kinds of information that would be needed by analysts and decision makers to guide future policy decisions on Cuba.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 79M00467A, Box 9, Folder 12. Secret. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified.