Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

322. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, October 22, 1976.

Allegations of U.S. Involvement in Cubana Airliner Crash

We have now pursued in detail with CIA (1) what we know about responsibility for the sabotage of the Cubana airliner and (2) how any actions by CIA, FBI, or Defense attachés might relate to the individuals or groups alleged to have responsibility. CIA has responded cooperatively to our queries, and we believe that what follows reflects the most complete information now available. We also sent Ambassador Vaky by special channel a draft of the operative parts of this memorandum and have incorporated his information. The FBI went over the draft and certified that the information relating to them is accurate.

As time passes we may, of course, become aware of new relationships among the people involved, but we have made every effort to assure that no U.S. relationship with the main actors as we now understand them will take us by surprise. We would add, however, that the increasing militance and greater coordination of Cuban exile terrorist groups evident over the past year could well become a disruptive element in hemispheric relations, affecting not only the U.S. relationship to Cuba, but our interactions with Venezuela and other countries with sizable exile communities. The possibility of direct cooperation between Cuban exile extremists and the security forces of Chile and/or other Latin countries whose human rights practices have been criticized could make exile groups even more difficult to control. We have therefore decided to ask INR to take a systematic look at the broader question of Cuban exile activities in Latin America and how they might affect the conduct of U.S. policy in the region.

Castro’s Allegations

In his speech of October 15, Fidel Castro made the following allegations concerning CIA involvement in the bombing and crash of a Cubana Airlines plane on October 6 off Barbados:

—“Well-informed Venezuelan sources” had communicated to the Cubans that Hernan Ricardo Lozano (one of the men arrested in Trinidad in connection with the bombing of the plane) was a CIA agent and had handled reports from the CIA many times (CIA states it has had no contact with Ricardo, but there was a limited contact with the FBI).

—Hernan Ricardo is an associate of Felix Martinez Suarez, who is reputed to be a CIA agent in Venezuela (CIA says Suarez was a media asset from 1961 to January 1974 when he was terminated after being exposed in the Venezuelan media).

—“The recruitment of citizens and the utilization of other countries’ territories to conduct such acts are methods characteristic of the CIA. At the beginning we were uncertain whether the CIA had directly organized the sabotage or had carefully prepared it through its covert organization formed by Cuban counterrevolutionaries. Now we decidedly believe the first assumption is correct. The CIA directly participated in the destruction of the Cubana aircraft in Barbados” (CIA says it had no association direct or indirect with the planning or perpetration of this act).

—The principal leaders of Cuban exile terrorist groups are closely linked through the CORU organization to CIA activities against Cuba (The CIA, of course has worked with a number of Cuban exiles over the years).

In his speech, Castro did not make any specific allegations concerning a USG relationship with Orlando Bosch, or Luis Posada (two Cuban exile activitists who were arrested by Venezuelan authorities in connection with the Cubana crash). However, the link with Bosch is implied since he is reported to be chief of CORU, the umbrella organization of Cuban exile terrorists.

The issue, therefore, is not whether CIA played a role in the bombing of the airliner. The issue is that CIA has had past and some recent contacts with a few of the individuals allegedly involved and these contacts will be susceptible to varying misconstructions by those who want to see the worst. Following is an examination of the relationship, if any, between CIA and those reported to have played a key role in the bombing. If this is more detail than you need, you may wish to skip to the judgments at the end of the memo (page 9).

Individuals Allegedly Involved

Hernan Ricardo Lozano

a. Involvement in the Crash: He was arrested in Trinidad on suspicion of having planted a bomb in the Cubana plane. Caracas radio announced on October 18 that he confessed to sabotaging the airliner. A CIA source [less than 1 line not declassified] reports that Ricardo may have been trained in the use of explosives and investigative techniques by Luis Posada. CIA information also reveals that Trinidadian officials have told the Venezuelans that they have a taped telephone conversation between Ricardo and Posada discussing their participation in the bombing.

Ricardo, a Venezuelan citizen, is a photographer employed by Posada in his industrial security firm in Caracas. A CIA source says that Ricardo is also a part-time employee of the Venezuelan Intelligence Service (DISIP). He reportedly gathered photographic material on groups and individuals of interest to DISIP and the Venezuelan Government. He was hired by DISIP when Posada was an official of that organization. The CIA source says that the Venezuelan Government is concerned and would be faced with serious problems if the nature of Ricardo’s activities for DISIP became public knowledge.

b. Relationship with U.S.: CIA states it has had no contact with Ricardo. The U.S. legal attaché in Caracas, Joseph Leo (who has no CIA connections), says that his first contact with Ricardo occurred in June 1975, when Ricardo asked for help in expediting visa applications for a DISIP official’s son. Some time later Leo learned that Ricardo was in the personal employ of Posada and apparently only an auxiliary member of DISIP. Ricardo also contacted Leo two times to furnish photographs and biographical data on members of the Cuban Embassy in Caracas. Apparently, the material came from DISIP files. During one visit, Ricardo attempted to solicit suggestions from the legal attaché on activities which might be directed against the Cuban Embassy by an anti-Castro group to which he belonged. Leo says he discouraged Ricardo, pointing out that the U.S. Government was attempting to prevent disruptive and terrorist activities by anti-Castro groups in the U.S., and Ricardo never repeated the suggestion. Leo was last approached by Ricardo on September 30, 1976 for help in obtaining a visa. Ricardo told Leo that he was on a magazine assignment to Jamaica and planned a stopover in Puerto Rico.

Freddy Lugo

a. Involvement in the Crash: Lugo was arrested in Trinidad with Ricardo on suspicion of having planted the bomb aboard the Cubana plane. A CIA source alleges that Lugo apparently was only peripherally involved in the bombing and is not considered to be one of the leading participants.

Lugo, a Venezuelan citizen, is also a photographer employed by Posada’s company. According to a CIA source, he also worked for DISIP under the same arrangements noted above for Ricardo.

b. Relationship with U.S.: CIA states that it has had no contact with Lugo. The name and phone number of U.S. legal attaché Leo were discovered in an address book which apparently was in Lugo’s possession when he was arrested in Trinidad. The address book may have been Ricardo’s. Leo says that he has had no contact with Lugo and speculates that his name and phone were furnished to Lugo by Posada and/or Ricardo.

Luis Posada Carriles

a. Involvement in Crash: Posada was arrested on October 14 in Venezuela along with Orlando Bosch and three others accused of conspiring to sabotage the plane. Posada, a Cuban exile who is now a Venezuelan citizen, is vehemently anti-Castro and is suspected to having been the main supporter of Bosch during the latter’s stay in Venezuela prior to being arrested in November 1974. Posada was formerly chief of the counterintelligence division of the Venezuelan Intelligence Service, DISIP.

b. Relationship with U.S.: A Venezuelan official, who declined to be identified, has been quoted in the New York Times (October 20) as saying that Posada had been given “technical training by the CIA.” The CIA has informed us that Posada was a member of the Bay of Pigs Brigade in 1961 and in this capacity received paramilitary training in Guatemala and also probably received at least rudimentary familiarization training in demolitions. From March 1963 to March 1964 Posada was in the U.S. Army at Fort Benning, finishing up as a second lieutenant and commanding officer of a weapons platoon (reportedly in a Ranger Battalion). During his U.S. military service Posada likely would have received demolitions training.

The CIA states that other than the training described above there is no information available that would indicate any “technical training” that Posada may have received, whether from the Agency or from any other organization.

CIA says that Posada subsequently became a paid informant. The relationship began in 1965 and was discontinued in July 1967, but contact was reestablished in October of the same year. [2 lines not declassified] Though he was not paid thereafter, CIA continued to have occasional contact with him until February 1976 when a formal written agreement of termination was signed.

According to CIA, contacts with Posada subsequent to February were at Posada’s own initiative and were for the purpose of volunteering information on exile extremist plans and to solicit aid for retention of his U.S. permanent resident alien status (which he once had but may have lost by his continued residence outside the U.S.) and for visa help (in connection with entering the U.S. while traveling on a Venezuelan passport rather than using permanent resident alien status). The latest contact between CIA representatives and Posada occurred in June 1976 when CIA declined to assist him on a visa matter.

Posada was the source for two CIA reports concerning planned operations by Bosch’s organization. The first, issued on February 19, 1976, concerned a plan to assassinate Salvador Allende’s nephew in Costa Rica. The second, based on information acquired on June 22, 1976, reported a plan to place a bomb on a Cubana Airline flight travelling between Panama and Havana on June 21.

CIA says it has had no relationship with Posada’s investigative agency or any other business venture he may have had in Caracas.

The U.S. Army attaché has also used a Posada business partner (Diego Arguello, also a Cuban exile) as an informant (though not as an agent). The attaché knew Arguello well, both socially and as an informant. Arguello’s wife is an American citizen. The attaché says he has never met Posada.

Our legal attaché (Joseph Leo) became acquainted with Posada during the latter’s employment by DISIP, and after his resignation, Posada continued to contact Leo on rare occasions, usually in order to obtain personal service in regard to visa requests for relatives and business associates, the last being Ricardo on October 1, 1976. Leo says he has seen Posada on about three occasions since 1973, most recently in June 1976 when Posada inquired if the FBI had interest in a Venezuelan named Carlos Bordoni who had hired two of his “operatives” as bodyguards (Bordoni, who has since had his Venezuelan citizenship revoked, is the subject of a U.S. extradition request). Leo states that nothing came of this request and no operational agreement was reached with Posada.

Orlando Bosch

a. Involvement in Crash: As noted above, Bosch was arrested in Venezuela for alleged involvement in the Cubana crash. Also as noted above, in late June Posada reported [less than 1 line not declassified] that an exile group headed by Bosch planned to bomb a Cubana flight between Panama and Havana. An FBI source has alleged that one attempt was made but the bomb did not detonate. A second try occurred in Jamaica on July 9, but the bomb exploded before the suitcase in which it was carried was put aboard the plane.

According to CIA sources, Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez is said to be sympathetic to Bosch and has permitted him to travel freely in the country and solicit funds with the understanding that Venezuela would not be used as a base of operations or place of refuge. Bosch reportedly promised not to engage in terrorist activity while in Venezuela and during an earlier visit received a token $500 contribution from Perez. Another CIA source reported that after Bosch’s arrival in Caracas in September he stated during a fund raising dinner, “Now that our organization has come out of the Letelier job looking good, we are going to try something else.” A few days later, Posada allegedly said, “We are going to hit a Cuban airliner” and “Orlando (Bosch) has the details.” This information was acquired by CIA after the crash occurred.

b. Relationship with U.S.: CIA says that it had contact with Bosch in Florida during the period March-November 1962, and in New York in late September-early October 1963. In the March-November period the agency had a relationship with the Evelio Duque exile group. Bosch was the general coordinator of this exile group, and carried out some support tasks for the group during this period.

Frank Castro

a. Involvement in Crash: Venezuelan officials reportedly believe that Castro (head of the FLNC terrorist organization, a component group in CORU), is deeply involved in the crash, though we have no details of his supposed involvement. Frank Castro was in Venezuela in late September 1976 and in mid-October was back in Miami. Frank Castro has admitted to FBI agents that he met with Bosch in Caracas on September 26 or 27, but denies any personal knowledge of the bombing of the Cubana plane.

b. Relationship with U.S.: CIA states it has had no contacts with Frank Castro, who is an American citizen with permanent residence in Santo Domingo. Legal attaché Leo says he has had no contact with Frank Castro.

Orlando Garcia and Ricardo Morales Navarrete

a. Involvement in Crash: Orlando Garcia is personally close to President Perez and is a Presidential advisor. According to CIA information, Garcia is the de facto deputy chief of DISIP. Morales is a division chief at DISIP. Both are Cuban exiles who are now Venezuelan citizens. A CIA source claims that Garcia was directed to protect and assist Bosch during his stay in Venezuela. Another CIA source reported that Garcia and Posada met Bosch upon his arrival and escorted him to his hotel. Both Garcia and Morales reportedly attended the fund-raising dinner during which Bosch allegedly made the remark about the “Letelier job,” and after the Cubana crash Garcia may have made an effort to get Bosch out of Venezuela. It is possible, therefore that Garcia and/or Morales may have known in advance about the operation which led to the bombing of the plane.

b. Relationship with U.S.: CIA states that it has had no contact with Ricardo Morales. [1½ lines not declassified] The legal attaché has also had frequent contact with both Garcia and Morales and has used them to acquire information regarding U.S. fugitives. From time to time they have passed him general information. Morales was a paid informant of the FBI in Florida for many years and was the principal U.S. Government witness in the trial of Orlando Bosch and others in Miami in 1968. Morales was also a paid informant of DEA in Miami, but has not acted in that capacity in Caracas.

Felix Martinez Suarez

a. Involvement in Crash: None, except by the alleged association with Ricardo, contained in Fidel Castro’s charges.

b. Relationship with U.S.: CIA says that Suarez was a CIA media asset from 1961 to January 1974 when he was terminated as a result of his exposure in the Venezuelan media.

Castro’s allegation regarding CORU: With regard to Castro’s charge on CIA links with CORU, an FBI report of September 17 states that “a confidential source abroad” claims to have been told by Roberto Carballo (leader of the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs, AVBC, one of the component organizations of CORU) that in July of this year Carballo and three other Cuban exiles had been approached by representatives of the CIA who informed them that CIA was dissatisfied with all the acts of sabotage being carried out at random and ordered them to disassociate themselves from Bosch and CORU. The source alleged that during the week of September 12–18 Carballo and three other Cuban exiles were in Washington to confer with representatives of the CIA on plans to be carried out by the action arm of the AVBC, for which financing was to come from CIA. The FBI report concludes with a request that the CIA advise if it has “active operational interest in AVBC as described above.”

CIA says that this report is false and the Agency has never had any involvement in the activities of CORU and the AVBC. According to CIA, a representative of a group of Cuban exiles did telephone into the Agency in September 1976 requesting contact for an unspecified reason, but the contact did not take place and the callers were discouraged from further attempts to telephone the Agency.

Possible Connections with the Letelier Assassination

As you know, the FBI is still actively investigating the bombing death of former Chilean Foreign Minister Letelier in Washington on September 21. Both Bosch and Posada have already been linked by the U.S. and Latin American press to the assassination. On October 20, the New York Times cited Venezuelan authorities as saying that a sketch of the Washington area where Letelier’s car was blown up was found by police in Posada’s residence. The respected El Nacional of Caracas reported on October 17 that anti-Castro Cubans arrested in Venezuela had identified two anti-Castro exile brothers named Novo as responsible for the Letelier killing. The Times article claims that Venezuelan and U.S. authorities said that the Cuban exiles were responsible for the Letelier killing.

This corresponds closely with information acquired by the FBI from a source who reported that Orlando Bosch had confided to intimates on September 23 that he believed two anti-Castro activists affiliated with CORU in New York (Guillermo Novo Sampol and Ignacio Novo Sampol) were responsible for killing Letelier. Bosch allegedly contended that the Novo brothers were the only anti-Castro activists still collaborating with the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), and that they had taken action against Letelier on behalf of DINA.

Other FBI and CIA reports indicate that various contacts have taken place between members of Cuban exile groups and the Chilean government. The most suggestive of these is an FBI report citing a source abroad (not Posada) who claimed that in February of this year a representative of Frank Castro’s FLNC went to Santiago where he was told that DINA was prepared to assist the FLNC in anti-Castro activities, but in exchange the FLNC was first requested to undertake a mission on behalf of DINA. The mission reportedly was to assassinate Luis Andres Pascal Allende, former Secretary General of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left, who was living in Costa Rica in exile. Frank Castro allegedly recruited three FLNC members in Miami for the operation, which apparently never came off. Perhaps coincidentally, Orlando Bosch was arrested in Costa Rica in February in connection with a reported assassination plot during your visit there at that time.

Venezuelan Government’s Reaction

The involvement of Garcia and other DISIP officials with Posada, Bosch and other CORU types poses very serious and delicate problems for President Carlos Andres Perez and his administration. The most immediate is to manage the publicity being generated in Venezuela and to avoid being implicated too directly in the terrorist activities of CORU. The government seems to be painfully aware of the fact that the CORU high command was in Venezuela during the planning and execution of the bombing. An FBI report indicates that DISIP will attempt to shift the blame on to other countries for supporting the terrorists by having Ricardo Morales (the DISIP official mentioned above) travel to Miami to raise questions through the news media there and to accuse the FBI and CIA of having agents within CORU. Ricardo’s mission reportedly would set the stage for the Venezuelan Government to subsequently demand a full investigation of FBI and CIA involvement in CORU hoping to place the primary responsibility on the U.S.

A reported decision to try to tie the opposition Social Christian Party (COPEI) to the Cuban exiles so that it will appear that the problem in Venezuela predates the present administration will probably not be very plausible:

—most DISIP officers do not believe COPEI played a role in anti-Castro activities;

—traditionally COPEI has taken a friendlier line toward Castro than Perez’s Democratic Action (AD) party; and

—a relatively large number of Cuban exiles in Venezuela hold positions of influence within the security services in the present administration.

In attempting to pin some of the rap on COPEI, Perez risks the consequences of creating a nasty domestic situation. COPEI could fight back by attempting to link the President himself directly with the exile extremists. In this kind of situation, Venezuela’s role could be magnified, negating to some degree the alleged efforts by Ricardo Morales and others to shift blame to the U.S.

What This Adds Up To

CIA has had past relationships with three of the people alleged to be involved in the Air Cubana crash, but any involvement that these persons may have had with the crash was without CIA’s knowledge. They had provided information to the Agency at various times in the past and requested assistance on visa requests and related matters.

CIA’s relationship with Posada, who more and more appears to be the person who planned the bombing, could possibly lead to some misinterpretation and embarrassment in that he provided unsolicited information on significant extremist planning, most recently in February and June of this year. On those occasions, he related details of an assassination threat against Salvador Allende’s nephew (an action CORU reportedly was attempting to undertake to gain DINA’s support) and of CORU’s planning to sabotage a Cuban plane in June.

Posada’s reasons for volunteering this kind of information after he had been terminated as a paid informant are unknown. He could have been trying to remain in CIA’s good graces, hoping to use the relationship on visa requests and such. However, it is at least possible he may have been probing to gauge CIA’s reaction to CORU’s efforts to harass the Cuban Government. In this context, we have considered the possibility that Posada could have misinterpreted the response to his approaches, but CIA assures us that this could not have been the case.

The bombing highlights the danger that the militant Cuban exile community poses for the U.S. Regardless of the circumstances, we can be made to appear to be somehow implicated for the reason that ultimately we often have to concede past associations with them. The problem is especially serious in the context of U.S.-Cuban relations. Fidel Castro from long memory automatically assumes that significant exile activity against him is either U.S.-directed or U.S.-condoned. His past experiences probably make it hard for him to imagine that people like Bosch and Posada operate independently of the U.S. Given Castro’s memories of past CIA operations and the limited information probably available to him concerning the bombing, it would have been very difficult for him to accept at face value U.S. denials of any involvement in the crash.

1. Summary: This memorandum reviewed past U.S Government relationships with those implicated in the bombing of the Cubana airliner and noted that those associations could “lead to some misinterpretation and embarrassment,” despite the fact that the United States had no advance knowledge of the attack.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860053–1560. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders, De Tarr, Louis Misback, and David Smith in INR on October 22. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. Page numbers in the text reference original pagination. For the Times article on Letelier’s killing, see: David Binder, “2 Nations Report Anti-Castro Exiles Here Have Plotted Many Terrorist Attacks,” New York Times, October 20, 1976, p. 3. The CIA reports, February 19 and June 22, and the FBI report, September 17, were not found.