Guatemala and Belize
165. Telegram 374 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: In its annual country analysis, the Embassy asserted that President Carlos Arana Osorio had successfully improved Guatemala’s political and economic stability, while selecting a successor, Minister of Defense General Kjell Laugerud García. If the country’s opposition parties could select a candidate representing a strong enough political threat to Arana’s MLN–PID alliance, the government might engage in political harassment, leading to increased levels of political violence.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GUAT. Confidential. Repeated to San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, USCINCSO, and Managua. In airgram A–8 from Guatemala City, January 12, the Embassy observed, “Laugerud enjoys the close friendship, confidence and admiration of President Arana which is why he got the nomination.” (Ibid., POL 6 GUAT)
166. Telegram 1408 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: During a conversation with Ambassador Bowdler, Foreign Minister Arenales indicated that he did not plan to discuss the Belize problem with British representatives during the OAS General Assembly and expressed the hope that the issue would remain dormant prior to the 1974 elections.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to London and Belize City. Telegram 1098 from Guatemala City was not found. In telegram 146 from Belize City, March 22, the Consulate had reported that the British Honduras House of Representatives had voted to change the colony’s name to Belize. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In its FY 74–75 CASP, sent as an attachment to airgram A–12 from Belize City, March 30, the Consulate characterized the basic U.S. interest as preventing disruptions that might result from British Honduras’s attainment of independence. (Ibid., Central Files 1970–73, POL–BR HOND–US) In a memorandum to Jova, December 7, 1972, Pezzullo warned that British failure to reach an agreement with the Guatemalans might cause a split in the OAS on the issue of British observer status. (Ibid., ARA/CEN Files, Lot 76D139, Chron Memorandum BH–1973) In telegram 63782 to American Republic posts, April 6, 1973, the Department reported that procedural arguments by Guatemala, Argentina, and Venezuela prevented the proposed British observer status from making it onto the OAS agenda. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
167. Telegram 2568 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: In a report on the violent outcome of a land dispute, the Embassy noted that although the incident was not politically motivated, it did have political implications. According to the Embassy, comments on the incident by Chief of Staff Colonel Efraín Ríos Montt reflected the Army’s uneasiness at having to deal with socioeconomic problems that civilian officials had failed to resolve.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Limited Official Use. Repeated to CINCSO, Managua, Panama, San José, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa.
168. Airgram A–24 From the Consulate General in Belize to the Department of State
Summary: During a meeting with Consulate officials, Governor Richard Posnett indicated that Belizean Premier George Price might take the issue of Belize’s independence to the United Nations to deter any potential Guatemalan aggression.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA/CEN Records Relating to Belize, 1972–1975, Lot 76D139, POL 3 United Nations, B–1973. Confidential. Repeated to USUN and Guatemala City. According to telegram 2885 from Guatemala City, June 14, British Consul John Weymes told Embassy officials that Premier Price had grown impatient over Guatemalan “foot dragging” and “the lack of any action whatsoever to find eventual solution to dispute.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
169. Telegram 3279 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: British Consul John Weymes told Embassy officials that he had lodged a protest with the Guatemalan Government following reports that President Arana had gone fishing in Belizean territorial waters, accompanied by Guatemalan patrol boats and armed guards. Ambassador Bowdler concluded that the Guatemalans were not seeking to deliberately provoke the Belizeans. He suggested discreetly approaching both governments and encouraging them to avoid a new crisis.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to London and Belize City. In telegram 2885 from Guatemala City, June 14, the Embassy commented, “We know Guatemalans are not looking for trouble—they want to keep Belize issue as quiet as possible during pre-electoral period.” (Ibid.) In telegram 143890 to Guatemala City, July 21, the Department indicated that during a July 20 meeting it had suggested to British Embassy officials that they raise the fishing incident during their meeting with Arenales. The British responded that they would pass. (Ibid.)
170. Telegram 153478 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala
Summary: During a meeting with members of the Office of Central American Affairs, British officials reported that a July 28 meeting with the Guatemalan Foreign Minister had gone well. Although Arenales demurred on negotiating prior to elections, the British indicated their hope that progress would occur prior to the United Nations General Assembly in November, noting that movement on the issue might forestall efforts by Premier Price to raise the issue at the UN.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Belize City. Drafted and approved by Lazar; cleared by Floyd in EUR. In telegram 3220 to Guatemala City, September 15, the U.S. Mission to the UN reported that the British believed a UN resolution supporting self-determination for Belize would fail, and “would only provide sterile confrontation in UN between Guatemalans and themselves.” (Ibid., ARA/CEN Files: Lot 76D139, POL 3 United Nations B–1973) In telegram 525 from Belize City, September 15, Wollam reported that on September 14 Posnett had encouraged Price to raise Belizean independence in the UN, and concluded that Posnett’s action appeared “to be part of British effort to extricate themselves from Belize.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
171. Telegram 4458 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that the Christian Democratic Party (DCG) had selected General Efraín Ríos Montt as its Presidential candidate. Characterizing Ríos Montt as left-of-center, the Embassy concluded that he would offer voters a clear alternative to the policies followed by the Arana administration and its candidate General Laugerud, but that neither candidate would threaten vital U.S. interests.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Managua, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Panama, and USCINCSO. According to telegram 185435 to Guatemala City, September 18, Clare and Pezzullo of ARA/CEN reported on a meeting with Ríos Montt, commenting that they “were struck by Ríos’s apparent political naivete” in making requests that “revealed a lack of political acumen.” (Ibid.)
172. Telegram 187069 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala
Summary: During a meeting to discuss the Belize issue, Director of the Office of Central American Affairs David Lazar asked British Embassy officials if they were aware that Governor Posnett had encouraged Premier Price to raise the issue of Belizean independence at the United Nations General Assembly.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to Belize City, London, Kingston, and USUN New York. Drafted by Pezzullo and approved by Bowdler. Telegram 525 from Belize City, September 15, is ibid. In telegram 537 from Belize City, September 20, 2150Z, the Consulate reported that Posnett told Wollam that his remarks on Belizean independence, which had come back to him through Washington, had been misunderstood, and that British policy still discouraged raising Belize’s independence at the UN. (Ibid.)
173. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: In a meeting with Embassy officers, Presidential candidate General Efraín Ríos Montt indicated he would not be controlled by the Christian Democrats, and that following a strong populist campaign, he would win the 1974 Presidential election.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 GUAT. Confidential. Drafted by Political Counselor William T. Pryce on October 19, and approved by Chargé John T. Dreyfuss. Sent as an enclosure to airgram A–213 from Guatemala City, October 23. The meeting was held during a luncheon at the Dreyfuss residence.
174. Airgram A–230 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy provided a guide to the March 1974 elections.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 GUAT. Confidential. Drafted by Raymond F. Burghardt, cleared by Francis C. MacDonald, and approved by William T. Pryce and all members of the Political Section. Signed by Chargé Dreyfuss. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors.
175. Telegram 333 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy noted that the Presidential campaign had become a two-way contest between the government’s candidate, General Laugerud, and Opposition Front candidate General Ríos Montt. Noting the danger of electoral irregularities if Laugerud failed to win sufficient votes, the Embassy concluded U.S. long-term interests would be best served by free and peaceful elections.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Managua, Panama City, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, CINCSO, and CINCLANT. In telegram 559 from Guatemala City, January 28, the Embassy reported that government leaders and politicians believed that Laugerud would win the elections and were talking “less about the possible need for a coup.” (Ibid.) On February 6, Clare prepared a draft contingency paper outlining U.S. responses should the Guatemalan Government employ blatant fraud, postponement, or a palace coup to thwart the electoral process. (Ibid., ARA/CEN Files, Guatemala 1974, Briefing Paper) Telegram 5699 from Guatemala City, November 30, 1973, is ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number].
176. Telegram 903 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: In a report on the electoral campaign, the Embassy noted that with the Presidential race growing even closer, it seemed evident the Guatemalan Government would resort to some fraud to ensure an election victory.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Managua, Panama, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, CINCSO, and CINCLANT. All brackets are in the original except “[have... elections]”, added for clarity and those indicating garbled text. Telegram 333 from Guatemala City, January 18, is published as Document 175. In telegram 960 from Guatemala City, February 19, the Embassy reported that Minister of Defense General Rubio had indicated that the army would respect the election’s outcome, and concluded that his remarks appeared to be designed to end rumors that, if elected, the military would not allow Ríos Montt to take power. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
177. Telegram 1261 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: Two days after the Presidential elections, the Embassy reported that the Guatemalan Government was releasing results in a fashion that suggested gross fraud.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to USCINCSO and CINCLAT, all ARA Posts, and USCINCSO for POLAD.
178. Telegram 1279 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: Assessing the situation in Guatemala in the wake of evidently fraudulent elections, Ambassador Meloy concluded that U.S. had little leverage over President Arana. He recommended that no action be taken, stating that a peaceful transfer of power to the winner of free elections was in the interest of both the U.S. and Guatemala.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. A draft “Options Paper,” prepared by Clare, March 6, noted that Embassy reporting suggested “that the GOG was initially taken aback by the size of Laugerud’s defeat at the polls and stalled until the morning of March 5 when President Arana tentatively decided it would be feasible to impose Laugerud by manipulating the vote count.” (Ibid., RG 59, ARA/CEN Files, Guatemala 1974, Briefing Paper) In telegram 44847 to Guatemala City, March 6, Kubisch indicated his agreement with Meloy’s recommendation, noting that it was “best to refrain from any action other than the private expression of our support for constitutional procedures when appropriate occasions arise to make this point. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 785, Country Files, Latin America, Guatemala, Vol. I)
179. Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Regional Staff Meeting
Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary Bowdler briefed Secretary Kissinger on Guatemala’s apparently fraudulent elections.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Lot 78D443, Box 3, Secretary’s Analytical Staff Meet-ings. Secret. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. According to an attached list, the following people attended the meeting: Kissinger, Sisco, Brown, Easum, Hartman, Lord, Springsteen, McCloskey, Buffum, Bowdler, Maw, Casey, and Hyland. In telegram 1453 from Guatemala City, March 14, the Embassy reported that on March 12 the Guatemalan Congress voted in favor of Laugerud’s Presidency, certifying the government’s official count and finalizing what the Embassy characterized as “Guatemala’s current electoral farce.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In telegram 1488 from Guatemala City, March 14, the Embassy recommended that, given the circumstances of Guatemala’s elections, no congratulatory message be sent to Laugerud until after he had received such messages from “at least several of the larger hemispheric governments and from several important extra-hemispheric governments.” (Ibid.)
180. Telegram 1468 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: During a March 12 victory speech and press conference, Laugerud called for national harmony and indicated that his government’s policy regarding Belize would be guided by the Guatemalan constitution, which identified Belize as Guatemalan territory.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to Managua, Mexico City, Panama City, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Belize City, and USCINCSO. In telegram 53697 to Guatemala City, the Department agreed with the Embassy’s assessment that Laugerud’s comments did not bode well for finding a solution to the Belize question. (Ibid.) An undated Bureau Position Paper, drafted after a March 7 meeting on the Belize CASP, noted that “our diplomatic involvement in the dispute should be limited to such discreet steps as will maximize the likelihood of a peaceful settlement and minimize the possibility of violence.” (Ibid., ARA/CEN Files, Lot 76D138, POL 10–3 CASP, B–1974, Pre-IG Mtg 3/7/74)
181. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Lewis) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler)
Summary: Noting the potential for difficulties in justifying Security Assistance to Guatemala in the FY 1975 budget given its apparently fraudulent elections and other issues of concern, Lewis informed Bowdler that, pending review, the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs planned to hold in abeyance proposed Foreign Military Sales to Guatemala.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800109–1962. Confidential. Drafted on March 26 by James L. Clunan in PM/SAS and cleared by James H. Michel in L/PM, Alexander Schnee in H, and Robert T. Grey in PM/SAS. Telegram 1453 from Guatemala City is ibid., [no film number].
182. Telegram 2197 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that Guatemala’s ongoing problem of government-authorized political violence could lead to a reduction in all levels of U.S. Government assistance.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Latin America, Box 785, Guatemala, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. All brackets are in the original except “[of]”, added for clarity. In telegram 68545 to Guatemala City, the Department requested an assessment of how the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Section 32, might affect the status of U.S. Foreign Assistance; specifically, the statement: “It is the sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country’s citizens for political purposes.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740079–0085, D740077–0232)
183. Intelligence Memorandum No. 0953/74
Summary: Characterizing Guatemala’s Presidential elections as a “warning sig-nal,” the CIA concluded that while some in the left-of-center opposition might merely grumble over their electoral loss, others might resort to violence, bringing on a new wave of government repression and extreme political violence.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 85–T00353R. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified.
184. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bowdler) to the Director of the Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Ladd)
Summary: While agreeing that events in Guatemala were troubling, Bowdler observed that congressional limitations on the disbursement of military assistance were not applicable and that the curtailment of planned military sales might undermine bilateral relations and weaken U.S. influence.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA/CEN Files, Lot 77D59, Guatemala 1974 Military Assistance (MILGP, MAP). Confidential. Drafted May 6 by Clare in ARA/CEN and cleared by LTC J. Williams in ARA/PLC and Lazar in ARA/CEN. The memorandum is an unsigned copy. Bowdler’s memorandum was in response to Document 181. In a May 6 memorandum to Williams, through Lazar, Clare noted that the U.S. Government sought to discourage “unrealistic and unnecessary arms purchases” by Guatemala, control the transfer of weapons designed for clandestine operations, and minimize Guatemala’s ability to invade Belize. (National Archives, RG 59, ARA/CEN Files, Lot 77D59, Guatemala 1974 Military Assistance (MILGP, MAP)) In telegram 2678 from Guatemala City to Belize, May 15, the Embassy noted that Laugerud would “be at least as ready as Arana has been to invade Belize, if it should move toward independence without reaching an accommodation with Guatemala.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D740119–0384)
185. Telegram 3060 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that despite indications the political situation had calmed in Guatemala, Laugerud’s administration would find itself hampered by discontent over electoral fraud and continuing economic and social problems. While noting that U.S. interests would be best served through government-implemented reforms, the Embassy conceded that it enjoyed only minimal influence over the situation in Guatemala.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to Managua, Panama City, San José, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa.
186. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: During a dinner meeting, Acting Principal Officer Robert S. Driscoll and David C. Walker of the British Embassy in Washington discussed U.S. policy on Belizean independence and the dispute between the British and Guatemalan Governments.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810026–0173. Confidential. Drafted by Driscoll. The meeting was held at Driscoll’s residence.
187. Telegram 3829 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy analyzed the situation in Guatemala at the outset of the Laugerud administration and concluded that although he might prove difficult on individual bilateral issues, the U.S. should encourage the new President in his efforts to implement social and economic reforms.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740192–0359. Secret. Repeated to San José, Managua, Panama City, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and Belize City. In telegram 3541, July 1, the Embassy reported that Laugerud had indicated that he anticipated no solution to the Belize problem during his term in office. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Latin America, Box 785, Guatemala, Vol. I)
188. Telegram 4939 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: During a September 9 meeting with Ambassador Meloy, President Laugerud expressed his concern that Prime Minister Price might be moving too hastily on Belizean independence, and warned that under such circumstances the Guatemalan military would feel obliged to attack Belize. Laugerud requested that the U.S. use its good offices to counsel restraint.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740253–1001. Confidential. Repeated to London, Mexico City, and Belize City. In telegram 4860 from Guatemala City, September 6, the Embassy reported that Foreign Minister Molina Orantes had expressed concern over Price’s “increasing activism” and had warned that a sudden move toward independence by Belize “would precipitate action on the part of the Guatemalan armed forces.” (Ibid., D740248–0746) In telegrams 505 and 506 from Belize City, September 11, the consulate reported that Price had indicated publicly that Belizean foreign policy rested on Belize’s independence, and that he had characterized Guate-mala as a “negative force” impeding Belizean independence. (Ibid., D740254–0249, D740254–0250) In telegram 202411 to Guatemala City, September 13, the Department expressed its surprise at the Guatemalan Government’s reaction to “electoral rhetoric” in Belize that included “intemperate remarks regarding independence.” (Ibid., D740258–0261)
189. Telegram 591 From the Consulate General in Belize City to the Department of State
Summary: The Consulate General reported on Prime Minister Price’s efforts to win support around the Caribbean for Belizean independence and British concerns that he might go too far and present Guatemala with a fait accompli for military intervention.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740284–0649. Confidential. Repeated to Georgetown, Guatemala City, Kingston, London, Mexico City, and USUN. Fraser-Orr’s memorandum of conversation was not found. Telegram 202411 to Guatemala City, September 13, is ibid., D740258–0261. Telegram 4860 from Guatemala City, September 6, is ibid., D740248–0746. Telegram 4939 from Guatemala City, September 11, is Document 188
190. Telegram 6697 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that a political split within the governing MLN Party and hostility by Vice President Mario Sandoval Alarcón threatened to undermine the stability of President Laugerud’s administration.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740358–0628. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Managua, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO for POLAD. In airgram A–211, November 29, the Embassy reported that Sandoval had purged Laugerud supporters from the MLN. (Ibid., P740133–0665) In airgram A–221 from Guatemala City, December 13, the Embassy observed that the split within the MLN was growing wider and speculated the conflict would become more heated in January 1975. (Ibid., P740138–1576) In airgram A–227 from Guatemala City, December 30, the Embassy indicated that Sandoval had characterized reports of friction between himself and Laugerud as “fabrications created by those who wished to create such a division.” (Ibid., P750003–0299)
191. Telegram 19 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy provided an assessment of the first 6 months of the President’s tenure, noting that despite the evident distrust between Laugerud and his Vice President, he continued to enjoy the military’s support. Commenting that anti-Communism was a basic ingredient in Laugerud’s policies, the Embassy also reported that he planned to use vigorous and brutal tactics in dealing with PGT and FAR rebels.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750003–0875. Confidential. Repeated to Managua, Panama City, San José, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, USCINCSO, and Belize City. In airgram A–6 from Guatemala City, January 14, the Em-bassy noted that Laugerud’s administration had “demonstrated its willingness to take harsh extralegal action to combat the terrorists.” (Ibid., P750013–0865) In telegram 18399 to Guatemala City, January 25, the Department commented, “We were struck and concerned by your assessment, and by press reaction which apparently arrived at similar conclusion, that Laugerud intends to be as vigorous and harsh as Arana in suppressing terrorist activity.” (Ibid., D750029–0116) Telegrams 6934 and 6939 from Guatemala City, both dated December 24, 1974, are ibid., D740373–1131 and D740374–0394.
192. Airgram A–26 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: In a report on the human rights situation in Guatemala, the Embassy concluded that despite the country’s long history of political violence, it did not believe the government had engaged in a pattern of gross human rights violations that would render it ineligible for U.S. foreign assistance.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P750038–1250. Confidential. Pouched to San José, Managua, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. The airgram responded to telegram 12320 to all diplomatic and certain consular posts, January 17 (ref. A), in which the Department requested human rights reports. (Ibid., D750020–0520) In telegram 14917 to all diplomatic and certain consular posts, January 22 (ref. B), the Department outlined which provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 were applicable for human rights reporting. (Ibid., D750025–0090) Airgram A–6 from Guatemala City, January 14 (ref. C), is ibid., P750013–0865. Telegram 6928 from Guatemala City, December 23 (ref. D), is ibid., D740373–0401. Telegram 4879 from Guatemala City, September 6 (ref. E), is ibid., D740248–0714. Airgram A–139 from Guatemala City, August 14 (ref. F), is ibid., P740089–0187. The Pryce-Obiols memorandum of conversation, July 18 (ref. G), was not found. Airgram A–123 from Guatemala City, July 12 (ref. H), is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P740079–0469. Telegram 2197 from Guatemala City, April 19 (ref. I), is Document 182. Airgram A–92 from Guatemala City, June 1973 (ref. J), was not found. In telegram 691 from Guatemala City (ref. K), February 5, the Embassy noted there was “no widespread Guatemalan concern public or private, over GOG’s method of handling internal security; in fact public concern could swing in opposite direction if terrorist activity should spread and government seem to be insufficiently energetic in suppressing it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750042–1048)
193. Telegram 1453 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State
Summary: The Foreign and Defense Ministers requested Ambassador Meloy’s assistance in securing the purchase of C–47 aircraft from the U.S. Air Force. Defense Minister Rubio assured the Ambassador that the aircraft would not be used against Belize.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750097–0228. Confidential; Limdis. In telegram 1450 from Guatemala City, March 19, the Embassy and MILGP recommended approving the aircraft sale. (Ibid., D750097–0169)
194. Memorandum From George F. Jones of the Political Section of the Embassy in Guatemala to the Ambassador to Guatemala (Meloy)
Summary: The Embassy’s Political Section analyzed Guatemalan motives for purchasing C–47 aircraft from the United States. While noting the existence of Guatemalan contingency planning for an invasion of Belize, the Political Section recommended approving the sale, inasmuch as it would not give Guatemala an excessive military capability, would allow the U.S. to continue to exercise influence since the Guatemalans could easily purchase aircraft from another source.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, 1975, P810026–0143. Secret. Drafted by Jones on April 2. Defense Attaché Col. Richard R. McTaggart, Col. C. Corbett of MILGRP, Wade E. Thomas of the Political Section, and DCM George R. Andrews contributed and cleared. Sent under cover of a letter from Meloy to David Lazar of ARA/CEN, April 4, not published. In telegram 2109 from Guatemala City, April 23, the Embassy reported that it had information that the Guatemalan Government had purchased “Arava” light transport aircraft from Israel. (Ibid., D750147–0357)