Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

324. Memorandum From David Lazar of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Hyland)¹

Washington, November 9, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Additional Cuban Overflight Request

The Cubans have submitted a request through the FAA for two overflights to Montreal and back using Britannia aircraft. The first would be on November 11–12. The second would be on November 16–17. We have approved a number of similar requests in the past, including several this year.

You presently have my memorandum of October 12 (and previous) setting out the Cuban request for three scheduled overflights a week. Like that request, the present request for the two one-time overflights would come under the provisions of the International Air Services Transit Agreement.

The two overflight requests (the earlier one and the present one) may, of course, be handled separately or together. Handling them separately would be somewhat simplified in this case since, as stated, this latest request came through the FAA rather than, as it should have, through diplomatic channels. If we were to wish to take action on the second request without acting on the first, we could thus go back through the FAA channels although we would, in doing so, remind the Cubans that the diplomatic channel is the appropriate one.

An obvious complication is the question of whether affirmative action on either or both of these requests, plus the ITT matter (2432) to which we are committed, will be read by the Cubans as a signal that we are prepared to put behind us a number of matters of current concern (Angola, Puerto Rico meddling, accusations of U.S. involvement in the Cubana crash) and proceed toward, if not down, the path to normalization. I think, in fact, that a danger of such a misreading of our intentions does exist but that continued non-action on these requests is not the way to handle it. I am convinced of that because, according to State, we are bound under the International Air Services Transit Agreement to grant the requested overflights on a basis of reciprocity and because I think it does not behoove the United States Government to be in deliberate violation of international law, particularly in our dealings with the Bloc countries. The whole thrust of our foreign policy, it seems to me, has run in the opposite direction.

The “false signal” dilemma, it seems to me, can be handled in another way. State is proposing, and I concur, that simultaneously with the delivery of a note approving their overflight requests, another note would be delivered. This second note, responding to Cuba’s latest note denouncing the anti-hijacking agreement, would make quite clear our attitude about the Cuban adventuring in Africa, meddling in our internal affairs in Puerto Rico, or slandering us internationally, e.g., by accusing us of such things as complicity in the Cubana sabotage.

Because of the time involved in drafting the notes, it is further proposed that approval of the request for the November 11–12 overflight (only) be handled through the FAA. The November 16–17 flight and the earlier request for three weekly overflights will be handled, as outlined above, by diplomatic note.

Recommendation:

That you authorize State to accede to the Cuban requests for overflights, both on a regularly scheduled three-times-a-week basis and for the two special one-time flights in November and that we designate the usual non-sensitive air corridor.

And that State be instructed to get the message back to Cuba, through diplomatic channels, that our compliance with an international agreement in these cases should in no way be taken to represent a lessening of our concern over their behavior in Angola, in Puerto Rico, or in the Cubana case.

1. Summary: This memorandum recommended approval of the pending Cuban request for overflight rights in connection with the establishment of commercial air service between Havana and Montreal.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–1977, Country Files, Box 4, Cuba 8. Confidential. Sent for action. Hyland initialed the memorandum and wrote, “OK.” Lazar wrote, “Passed orally to Shlaudeman, 11/9, C. Gleysteen, 11/10.” Next to the second paragraph Hyland wrote: “This is a different issue.” Hyland initialed approval of the memorandum’s recommendations but struck out the portion of the first recommendation that stipulated approval of regularly scheduled air service, approving only two special one-time flights and wrote “No” in the margin.