Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

317. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, June 29, 1976.

MEMORANDUM FOR

• Morton Abramowitz
• Admiral Samuel H. Packer
• William H. Luers
• Clifton R. Strathern

Attached is the Cuba paper.

We would like your comments on this draft. When we redo it, I would be inclined to include a paragraph suggesting that the action items be applied one at a time in order of their increasing public relations seriousness. In this way they would be perceived as part of a gradual escalation of pressure following on those measures already taken—as described in the paper. I would list the actions in the following order:

1. Step up overflight,

2. deny ITT equipment,

3. initiate USIA Con Cuba,

4. reactivate Key West,

5. confine UN diplomats to 25 miles,

6. continue denial of overflight,

7. initiate psychological warfare.

Attachment

Draft Inter-Agency Memorandum

Undated.

SUBJECT

• Interim Measures on Cuba

The Cuban Contingencies paper sets forth possible courses of action if Cuba decides to embark on military intervention in another foreign country. Meanwhile Castro has announced publicly that Cuba has begun to withdraw its forces from Angola. He has tried to convey the message that he does not plan further interventions, but the language he has used is vague. We have no confirmation that there has been in fact a net reduction in the Cuban expeditionary force in Angola. There is considerable evidence that Cuba is bogged down in Angola and ambiguity about ultimate Cuban intentions there.

Apart from public statements by high officials the U.S. has registered in various minor ways its irritation with Cuba for its intervention. These include a tightening up of restrictions on Cuban travel to the U.S., a slowdown in the implementation of the August 21, 1975 decision to terminate third-country sanctions on trade with Cuba, delay in granting permission for overflights to Montreal, and diplomatic activity to undercut Cuba in international organizations and its credit rating with western lenders. Whether or not all of these actions have been perceived by Castro is difficult to determine. On the other hand we have had several indications that Castro has taken seriously the public warnings by the President and Secretary of State against further military adventures.

To underline the cost of the Angolan venture to Cuba and to demonstrate further our opposition to it there are a number of actions we could take right away to annoy Castro. They are not of such a level of importance, however, to have an affect on the rate of Cuban withdrawal from Angola. The dynamics of such withdrawal lie primarily in the Angolan internal situation and secondarily in African and other non-aligned perceptions of Cuba’s international role and in the Soviet-Cuban relationship.

Actions taken to harass and punish Cuba could be rationalized publicly as mirroring the deterioration of U.S.-Cuban bilateral relations and the suspension of efforts to improve them. Some of them also could be defended as precautionary measures against possible further Cuban military adventures or as improving our capability for monitoring the Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

The following measures could be adopted:

1. Reconfine the Cuban UN diplomats to a radius of 25 miles from the center of New York City. On February 14, 1975 we expanded the radius Cuban UN diplomats can travel from 25 to 250 miles. This was done as a gesture to demonstrate our interest in opening a dialogue with Cuba, a gesture the Cubans told Senators Javits and Pell they would appreciate.

Advantages:

—would be a clearcut symbol of the deterioration of U.S.-Cuban bilateral relations;

—would be understood in the U.S. as the withdrawal of a gesture made to Cuba when we were interested in starting a dialogue;

—would cut down Cuban lobbying activities on Capitol Hill and university campuses; and,

—would hamper Cuban intelligence gathering.

Disadvantages:

—might be regarded as ill-timed, coming after Cuba has claimed it is withdrawing forces from Angola and not while it was building up those forces;

—would be interpreted as petty; and,

—could provoke criticism that we are exploiting our position as host to the UN Headquarters for national ends.

2. Reactivate USIA “Con Cuba” broadcasts from Florida. During the 60s this program was specially programmed for Cuban audiences and beamed directly at Cuba. It was the only individual country program and as such suffered in quality compared to the broader general Spanish language program. In 1974 USIA considered that its general Spanish language broadcasts sufficiently covered our specific information objectives in Cuba and as a result cancelled the Cuban program on cost-effective grounds.

Advantages:

—would be interpreted by Castro as evidence that the U.S. was returning to a policy of hostility;

—would provide an additional channel for funneling information into Cuba about the diplomatic and other costs of the Angolan venture; and,

—would please the anti-Castro Cuban exiles who thought the termination of the broadcasts in 1974 was a gesture towards Castro although actually it was for cost-effective reasons.

Disadvantages:

—would saddle us with a program that USIA considered ineffective; and,

—might mislead Cuban exiles into thinking that the U.S. has settled back into implacable and undying opposition to the Castro regime per se.

3. Psychological warfare operations to convince Cuba the U.S. is planning covert operations against it. In the early 1960s Cuban exiles were used extensively for covert operations. When these operations ended, some exiles continued them on their own and probably combined them with criminal activity for their personal benefit. The operations involved would include increases in clandestine short wave radio traffic about selected economic and military targets and discussions with a Cuban exile organization leader to initiate efforts to acquire vulnerability data on selected Cuban targets.

Advantages:

—might throw Castro off balance as he evidently does not believe the U.S. Government is behind such actions as the shoot-up of two Cuban fishing vessels on April 5, the bombing of the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon and Cuban UN Mission in New York. Making it clear we were resuming covert operations by using Cuban exiles would seriously upset Castro and he would regard it as resumption of a policy of hostility irrespective of possible Cuban disengagement from Angola.

Disadvantages:

—would be difficult to control the exiles and keep them on a tight leash;

—would be exploited by criminal elements to maintain or heighten the existing psychological climate in the Miami area—where witnesses are afraid to give evidence out of fear of reprisals, where crime sometimes is committed in the name of anti-castroism; and where there is widespread belief that elements of the U.S. Government are behind these actions;

—would discourage those elements of the exile community which favor ultimate normalization of U.S. relations with Cuba;

—could lead Castro to suspend the U.S.-Cuba Hijacking Agreement as he has threatened; and,

—would make it more difficult for the Justice Department and local law enforcement authorities to solve a growing number of assassination and bombing cases.

4. Continue to withhold permission for regular Air Cubana flights to overfly U.S. territory en route to Montreal. On March 5, 1976 the Cubans requested through diplomatic channels—the Swiss—permission to conduct twice-weekly regular overflights. We have informed the Cubans through technical channels—the FAA—that we are still considering the matter. We are obligated under international air transit agreements of which both the U.S. and Cuba are parties to grant the request. Aware of this, the U.S. airline industry has urged us to authorize the overflights fearing that if we do not Cuba might interfere with the 50 or more U.S. commercial and private overflights of the island which take place daily.

Advantages:

—would signal to Havana that there is no diminution in U.S. irritation over the Angolan intervention and that we are not impressed by claimed troop withdrawals;

—would probably not lead to Cuban retaliation by denying overflight privileges to U.S. planes flying over Cuba; and,

—would not upset the Canadians who seem resigned to our denial of overflights privileges to the Cubans.

Disadvantages:

—is a violation of an international obligation;

—is regarded with apprehension by U.S. carriers; and,

—would be most difficult to defend publicly when the matter surfaces.

5. Continue to delay a decision or to refuse a license to ITT to replace outworn communications equipment in Havana. ITT together with ATT jointly own probably the only American company left in Cuba. The company maintains troposcatter and cable communication lines between Cuba and the U.S. These lines represent Cuba’s main communication link with the non-Communist world. The equipment has deteriorated badly and is in danger of breakdown. In 1966, 1969, and 1973 we licensed ITT to ship spare parts necessary for the maintenance of these facilities. ITT wishes to obtain an additional license for $150,000 worth of spare parts, urgently needed to guarantee continued operation of the communications.

Advantages:

—demonstrates to Castro the seriousness of our statements about Angola and Puerto Rico;

—could lead to serious disruption of Havana’s communications with the non-Communist world; and,

—would be consistent with our overall continuing embargo on trade with Cuba, except that through subsidiaries located abroad.

Disadvantages:

—could cut off our communication with Havana through the Swiss Embassy;

—might shut off important hurricane warning information which is received normally through this channel;

—could risk the nationalization of the ITT facility believed to be the only U.S. business not nationalized in 1960, and deprive us of an interesting argument in future negotiations on compensation;

—would be inconsistent with our previous practice in licensing replacement operations to ITT.

6. Make decision to keep open Naval Air Station Key West, scheduled for closure next year.

Advantages:

—would signal ultimately to Cuba that its Angolan venture has led us to maintain a greater force presence in the Caribbean;

—would maintain a greater capability for surveillance and, if necessary, military operations; and,

—would have broad public support.

Disadvantages:

—would be expensive and not cost-effective.

7. Increase SR–71 reconnaissance flights from the current schedule of 1 every 7 to 8 weeks to 1 every other week. Until one year ago such flights were conducted monthly. The frequency was reduced as a signal to Castro in the summer of 1975. While satellite photography renders the overflights less important and we could now do without them, they do provide useful additional information.

Advantages:

—would provide marginally increased coverage of Cuban military activity, possibly even including information about Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola;

—would signal to the Cuban military establishment, as well as to the top leaders, our suspicions about Cuban intentions;

—would probably remain outside the domain of U.S. public interest unless Castro chose to disclose them, which he probably would not in order not to publicize his impotency to interdict the flights; and,

—would show the Soviets we are not satisfied with performance on Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

Disadvantages:

—would triple the miniscule possibility that a SR–71 might be brought down by a lucky hit if, as deemed unlikely, a serious effort were made to shoot a plane down; and,

—create an embarrassment of major proportions for the Administration if the fluke occured and a SR–71 was shot down;

—could strengthen popular support for Castro in Cuba and stiffen resentment of U.S. as result of the slightly audible sonic boom which sweeps the island with each overflight.

1. Summary: Low transmitted an updated draft of a National Security Council study outlining measures that might be taken to punish Cuba for its involvement in Angola.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Institutional Files, Box 25, Miscellaneous Meeting Materials—Cuba 7. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten note reads: “Brent [Scowcroft]: This is about all that is left of Cuban contingency study; do we circulate it?” Next to this, a note reads: “No circulation.” The draft was returned to Low and Brownell under an undated note from Hyland that stated, “This is now OBE, kept it dormant for now.” (Ibid., Box 110, Folder 3) For the U.S.-Cuba Hijacking Agreement, see Document 271.