Guatemala and Belize


195. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: In a meeting with David Walker, First Secretary of the British Embassy, on the Belize issue, Director of Central American Affairs David Lazar and Guatemala Desk Officer Daniel Clare raised the proposed sale of C–47 aircraft to Guatemala. Walker indicated concern over possible Belizean reactions to the sale.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810038–1707. Confidential. Drafted by Clare on May 28. No record was found of the British Ambassador’s report to EUR regarding the Secretary’s conversation with Prime Minister Wilson. In telegram 734 from Guatemala City, February 7, the Embassy indicated that it understood the Guatemalan Embassy in Washington had initiated paperwork for the purchase of five patrol boats. (Ibid., D750046–0297) In telegram 2748 from Guatemala City, May 28, the Embassy reported that the Guatemalan Government had committed to purchase Israeli “Arava” aircraft, but that it remained interested in acquiring C–47s. (Ibid., D750186–1109) Defense Intelligence Notice DIADIN 1348A–75, June 4, indicated that Guatemala planned to take delivery of 10 of the Israeli aircraft. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78 A 0058, Guatemala 452 4 JUN 75)


196. Telegram 146420 From the Department of State to the Embassy in London

Summary: During a June 16 discussion on the Belize issue, Assistant Secretary Rogers informed Walker that the Department would reconsider the sale of C–47 aircraft to Guatemala, given the latter’s decision to purchase Israeli Arava aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750217–0187. Confidential. Repeated to Belize City and Guatemala City. In telegram 138417 to Guatemala City, June 13, the Department expressed its concern that the Guatemalan Government had attempted to mislead U.S. officials in its acquisition of Israeli aircraft, noting that the deal, combined with the proposed purchase of C–47s from the United States, would increase Guatemala’s ability to invade Belize. (Ibid., D750206–0904) In telegram 3217 from Guatemala City, June 20, the Embassy suggested that British sensitivities over Guatemala’s military capabilities and intentions might be exaggerated. (Ibid., D750218–0672) The memorandum of conversation mentioned in the last sentence of the text was not found.


197. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central American Affairs (Lazar) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers)

Summary: In a background memorandum, prepared for Rogers’s June 10 meeting with John Moreton of the British Embassy, Lazar recommended the Assistant Secretary approve the sale of five C–47 aircraft to Guatemala. According to Lazar, failure to sell at least some of the aircraft would incur a strong negative reaction from the Guatemalan military, while the provision thereof would have a minimal impact on Guatemala’s airborne capability.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810026–0139. Confidential. The memorandum is unsigned and there is no indication of an approval or disapproval of the recommendation. However, a memorandum of conversation, July 10, indicates that Rogers told Moreton the U.S. Government would “advise them of our decision prior to notifying the Guatemalans.” (Ibid., P810026–0137) At the meeting, Moreton gave U.S. officials a copy of his Speaking Note, which is not published. (Ibid., P810038–1722) The June 16 meeting between Rogers and Moreton is summarized in Document 196. Meloy’s June 20 discussion with Guatemalan Chief of Staff Lucas García was reported in telegram 3240 from Guatemala City, June 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750218–1202) In telegram 404 from Belize City, July 9, the consulate discussed the anticipated reaction by the Belizean Government to the proposed aircraft sale. (Ibid., D750236–0046) In telegram 170875 to Guatemala City, July 19, Rogers informed Meloy that British Foreign Secretary Callaghan had asked Kissinger to delay the C–47 delivery. (Ibid., D750250–0914)


198. Telegram 3587 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

Summary: The mission reported that Belizean Premier Price planned to seek help from Caribbean friends to submit a resolution on Belize to the United Nations in an effort to exert pressure on Guatemala.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750324–0072. Confidential. Repeated to Belize City, Guatemala City, London, and Mexico City. In telegram 518 from Belize City, August 19, the consulate reported that there was no indication whether the United Kingdom planned to support an initiative on Belize at the United Nations General Assembly. (Ibid., D750285–0703) In telegram 4462 from Guatemala City, August 20, the Embassy recommended “that we keep our options open on C–47 sale until after GOG’s reaction to UNGA Belize deliberations becomes clearly known.” (Ibid., [no film number]) In telegram 204251 to Guatemala City, August 27, the Department accepted Guatemala City’s recommendation “that USG announce no decision on C–47 transaction until after UNGA.” (Ibid., D750297–0998) In a memorandum of conversation, September 9, the Department observed that Moreton told Meloy “that the UK was relieved to learn we had delayed a decision on the C–47s.” (Ibid., P810026–0107)


199. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central American Affairs (Lazar) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers)

Summary: While concluding that the outcome remained uncertain, Lazar reported that the Guatemalan Government appeared to be hardening its position on the Belize issue.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810026–0108. Secret. Sent through Hewson A. Ryan in ARA. Drafted by Clare and Kilday, September 5. An attached routing slip reads, “Contents discussed with Secretary by Amb. Asencio.” All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. Kissinger’s October 9 meeting with Asencio is Document 207. In telegram 4690 from Guatemala City, August 29, the Embassy reported allegations that while traveling to the Lima Non-Aligned Conference, Belizean officials had visited Cuba to lobby for support for Belizean independence, causing Guatemalan concerns that Belize might become a beachhead for Communist infiltration. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750300–0575) In telegram 208320 to Bogotá, Guatemala City, and Caracas, September 3, the Department reported that Oduber had told Rogers that Guatemala’s stance on Belize had become “less rigid” and suggested that the time had come for U.S. intermediation. (Ibid., D750305–0190) The 1973 Belize contingency paper was not found.


200. Telegram 4060 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

Summary: British U.N. mission officer Richardson informed the U.S. mission that Belize felt encouraged by support for its independence at the Lima Non-Aligned Conference. Although noting that a United Nations resolution in favor of Belize might demonstrate the level of support for independence, Richardson expressed concern that it might lead to “rash action” by the Guatemalan Government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750309–0375. Confidential. Repeated to Belize City, Guatemala City, and London. Telegram 4000 from USUN, September 4, is ibid., D750305–0107. Telegram 3587 from USUN is published as Document 198. In a last minute note attached to a covering memorandum to Rogers, September 12, Lazar reported that at a September 11 dinner in Washington, British Minister Moreton had told Ambassador Meloy “that the U.K. was attempting to exercise restraint over the Belizeans and allies at New York.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P8100380–1610)


201. Telegram 595 From the Consulate General in Belize to the Department of State

Summary: In light of information that the UK might be increasing troop levels in southern Belize, combined with concerns that the Guatemalan military might respond in kind, Consul General Gawf recommended the Department reassess its stand on Belize, particularly from a juridical standpoint.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750318–0813. Secret. Repeated to RUDTC London, USUN, and Guatemala City. Telegram 4943 from Guatemala City, is dated September 12. (Ibid., D750316–1005) The FY 1976–1977 CASP was sent as an enclosure to airgram A–9 from Belize City, April 1, 1975, which is not published. (Ibid., P750062–0383)


202. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Rogers reported that the Guatemalan Government had indicated that a UN resolution favoring Belizean independence would force military action, and noted that Ambassador Meloy had been given instructions to meet with President Laugerud to elicit a clearer view of Guatemala’s intentions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA/CEN Files, Lot 78D110, Guatemala 1975, Sept., Territory, Boundaries. Secret. Drafted September 12 by Clare. The August 22 memorandum was not found. In telegram 220343 to Guatemala City, September 16, the Department instructed Meloy to meet with Laugerud to obtain his views on the Belize situation, while making clear to him that the U.S. Government opposed the use of force and did “not believe that a resolution passed by the United Nations is justifiable provocation for resort to force.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D750321–0747) A report of Meloy’s meeting with Laugerud is Document 204.


203. Telegram 5067 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State

Summary: Foreign Minister Molina told Ambassador Meloy that the Guatemalan Government was willing to submit the Belize dispute to the International Court of Justice for a binding decision, despite his belief that Guatemala had little hope for a favorable ruling. When Molina asked if the United States Government would consider mediating, Meloy responded that such mediation might not favor Guatemala, and that the U.S. sought to remain impartial and uninvolved in the dispute.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750322–1116. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belize City, USUN, London, Mexico City, and USCINCSO. Telegram 4436 from Guatemala City is dated August 20. (Ibid., D750288–0449) Meloy’s September 19 meeting with Laugerud is Document 204. In telegram 14513 from London, September 19, the Embassy reported that the British had indicated they would not be willing to submit the dispute to ICJ adjudication. When asked how far the United States was willing to go to prevent hostilities, the Embassy replied that the U.S. was “prepared to use all diplomatic means to prevent the use of force.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750325–0790)


204. Telegram 5152 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State

Summary: In a September 19 conversation on the Belize problem, Ambassador Meloy told President Laugerud that the United States Government was opposed to the use of force to resolve the dispute. Laugerud indicated that Guatemala had no intention of resorting to force and requested U.S. mediation. Turning to the request for C–47 aircraft, Meloy noted that as long as there were any doubts about Guatemala’s intentions towards Belize the United States could not sell the aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, Central Foreign Policy File, D750326–0453. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Mexico City, London, Belize City, USUN, and USCINCSO. All brackets are in the original except “[use]”, added for clarity. Telegram 220343 to Guatemala City is dated September 16. (Ibid., D750321–0747) In telegram 614 from Belize City, September 20, 1700Z, the consulate reported that Premier Price had information that Guatemalan forces at Melchor de Mencos and Pólvera had grown from 80 to 400. (Ibid., D750327–0411) In telegram 14632 from London, September 22, the Embassy reported that British officials were “heartened that Laugerud had so freely discussed the concept of Belizean independence” and indicated that the UK would work with Belizean officials at the UNGA to avoid a resolution that the Guatemalans might consider humiliating. (Ibid., D750328–0549) In telegram 5203 from Guatemala City, September 23, the Embassy forwarded the text of a September 19 letter from the Guatemalan Defense Minister requesting information on the status of the sale of eleven C–47s. (Ibid., D750330–0552)


205. Telegram 5215 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State

Summary: The Embassy reported that the Guatemalan Government had virtually decided to invade Belize should the United Nations General Assembly adopt a resolution in favor of Belizean independence without providing for a continuation of negotiations over Guatemala’s territorial claims, and recommended greater U.S. involvement in the dispute behind the scenes.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750330–0178. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Belize City, London, and USUN. Telegram 595 from Belize City is dated September 12. (Ibid., D750318–0813) Telegram 222582 to Guatemala City is dated September 18. (Ibid., D750324–0876) Telegram 14513 from London is dated September 19. (Ibid., D750325–0790) Telegram 4344 from USUN is dated September 18. (Ibid., D750324–0072) Telegram 5152 from Guatemala City is published as Document 204. Telegrams 613 and 614 from Belize City are both dated September 20. (Ibid., D750327–0409 and D750327–0411) In telegram 5203 from Guatemala City, September 23, the Embassy reported that Defense Minister Lucas García had cancelled the C–47 transaction. (Ibid., D750330–0552) In a briefing memorandum to Rogers through Ryan, October 3, Lazar verified the cancellation and noted that “President Laugerud reportedly stopped the sale of a civilian airport radar from a U.S. firm because he does not want to get involved in another USG-controlled export.” Lazar also noted a “bizarre conversation” among Meloy, Lucas García, and Acting Foreign Minister Obiols, in which the Guatemalan officials had invoked “emotionalism, repeated appeals for U.S. mediation and support and statements of ‘dying with honor on the battlefield.’” (Ibid., ARA/CEN Files, Lot 78D110, Guatemala 1975 Oct., Territory, Boundaries)


206. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: During a meeting on the Belize issue, British Embassy Minister John Moreton indicated that while the British Government believed a UN resolution in support of Belizean independence could not be avoided, both the UK and Belize were willing to consider any resolution that would not be humiliating to Guatemala. When Moreton asked for the Department’s assessment of the risk of war, Assistant Secretary Rogers observed that the Guatemalans might feel compelled to use force.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA/CEN Files, Lot 76D110, Belize–POL–1975. Secret. Drafted by Platt on October 6, and cleared by Lazar, Ryan, and Rogers. Telegram 5215 from Guatemala City is published as Document 205. In telegram 238755 to Guatemala City, London, Belize City, and USUN, October 7, the Department reported that during a meeting in ARA/CEN, Walker described British plans to reinforce their garrison in Belize, noting that the British “viewed the possibility of a Guatemalan attack, at least in the short run, as directly tied to UN action.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750349–0075) In telegram 670 from Belize City, October 14, Gawf reported that the British had begun reinforcing their garrison, and noted the arrival of three Puma helicopters and approximately 50 additional military personnel. (Ibid., D750356–0252)


207. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: Ambassador Asensio requested that Secretary Kissinger informally approach the British to explain Guatemala’s demands and what they would be willing to settle for in the dispute over Belize. Kissinger indicated that he would discuss the issue with Callaghan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820123–2223. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Lazar and approved on October 16 by Jock Covey in S. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. In a memorandum to Kissinger, October 6, Rogers noted, “We believe that Guatemalan threats to invade the British-defended colony are serious.” (Ibid., P810038–1618) In telegram 5427 from Guatemala City, October 2, the Embassy reported that during an October 1 meeting with Meloy, Lucas García “launched into a long speech on need to uphold honor and manhood of armed forces,” adding that “he knew Guatemala had no chance of winning in fight with British, he knew it would be suicide to attack, but he would leave his desk and die with his troops, with honor.” (Ibid., D750341–0277)


208. Telegram 15823 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

Summary: In a conversation on Belize, Foreign Secretary Callaghan explained to Ambassador Richardson that the British Government planned to work with Belize to achieve its independence through measured steps, while staving off a Guatemalan invasion through low-key reinforcement of British forces.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750357–0730. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the USUN, Guatemala City, and Belize City. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. In a memorandum to Kissinger, October 10, marked “OBE,” Rogers observed that with regards to Belize, “The British just want out.” (Ibid., P810028–0068) In telegram 1722 from Nassau, October 14, the consulate reported “that six or seven UK RAF Hercules aircraft staged through Nassau International Airport on 12 October 1975 loaded with troops and equipment destined to reenforce the British garrison in British Honduras (Belize).” (Ibid., D750356–0486)


209. Telegram 5673 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State

Summary: During a meeting, President Laugerud and Foreign Minister Molina complained to Ambassador Meloy about Callaghan’s “arrogant, insulting, overbearing” attitude on the Belize issue. Laugerud argued that although he wished to avoid a military conflict over Belize, if the United Kingdom persisted with this attitude, it would leave the Guatemalan Government no alternative but to use force.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750337–0921. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Belize City, London, USUN, and USCINCSO. All brackets appear in the original except those indicating garbled text and “[not?]” and “[4]”, added for clarity. Telegram 670 from Belize City is dated October 14. (Ibid., D750356–0252) In telegram 246825 to London, October 17, the Department requested that Richardson communicate the substance of Laugerud’s comments to Callaghan and ask, “Is this the impression the British want the Guatemalans to have about their willingness to negotiate and their overall intentions on the Belize issue?” (Ibid., D750359–0953) In telegram 247553 to London, October 17, the Department reported that Walker had indicated to ARA/CEN that “Callaghan had indeed been quite tough with Guatemalan Foreign Minister Molina in their Sept 25 meeting, and deliberately so. Callaghan feels that Belizean independence has been delayed too long already and should not be held up any longer over Guatemalan intransigence.” (Ibid., D750361–0594) In telegram 16038 from London, October 20, the Embassy reported that British officials “suggested GOG may have deliberately misinterpreted FonSec’s remarks to build case for military action.” (Ibid., D750363–0389) The memorandum of conversation prepared by Skinner-Klee is not further identified.


210. Defense Intelligence Notice DIADIN 2703–75

Summary: The Notice reported that British officials had drafted a United Nations resolution on Belizean independence which would likely be unacceptable to the Guatemalan Government.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files: FRC 330–78–0058, Box 60, B 1975. Confidential; Noforn. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. Telegrams 5259 and 5262 from USUN are both dated October 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750367–0786 and D750368–0134) Telegram 5845 from Guatemala City is dated October 22. (Ibid., D750368–0040) According to telegram 5934 from Guatemala City, October 25, Molina told Meloy on October 24 that “it was not possible to accept draft as it stood,” and added that although the Guatemalan Government wanted to negotiate, it believed that the resolution’s paragraphs on Belizean self-determination and preservation of Belize’s territorial integrity effectively tied Guatemala’s hands. (Ibid., D750372–0537)


211. Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Summary: Secretary Kissinger, Assistant Secretary Rogers, and Assistant Secretary Hartman discussed the draft United Nations resolution on Belizean independence and the possibility that Guatemalan forces might move into Belize.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 9, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, October 28, 1975. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. In telegram 16479 from London, October 28, the Embassy reported that during an October 27 meeting Callaghan told Sonnenfeldt he had sent his Permanent Representative to the United Nations to Guatemala to discuss a resolution that the Guatemalans could accept. According to the Embassy, Callaghan noted that he was unwilling to let the issue drag out indefinitely and that the Guatemalan Government would have to accept the principle of Belizean self-determination. Regarding Guatemalan charges of aggressive British behavior, Callaghan stated that the “British will not let Guatemalans ‘overrun’ Belize, and, in response to his request, UK MOD had now worked out arrangements whereby British troops could be gotten to Belize within 24 hours.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D750373–0910)


212. Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Summary: Assistant Secretary Rogers provided Secretary Kissinger with an update on the Belize situation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 9, Secretary’s Staff Meeting. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. All brackets except those indicating text omitted by the editors and “[Meloy]”, added for clarity. In telegram 6086 from Guatemala City, November 2, Meloy had noted that the Guatemalan Government and “the informed public” would consider passage of the draft resolution a “humiliating defeat,” and warned that passage would “increase the odds of a Guatemalan military move into Belize.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D750380–0663) Meloy communicated his suggestions in telegram 6088 from Guatemala City, November 2. (Ibid., D750173–1554) In a conversation with the President, November 3, 9:20–10:13 a.m., Kissinger commented that “Callaghan gets emotionally involved in these things. He wants British Honduras independent and he has a resolution in the U.N. But the British can only send 200 troops in and Guatemala can defeat that. I think we should try to get a compromise out of it. I think we can.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 16, November 3, 1975—Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft)


213. Telegram 260729 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala

Summary: British Ambassador Ramsbotham advised Counselor Sonnenfeldt that the British Government was reinforcing its garrison in Belize.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750382–0846. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Belize City, USUN, London, and USCINCSO. In telegram 6147 from Guatemala City, November 4, the Embassy reported that McQuillan planned to deliver an aide mémoire to the Guatemalan Government on 4:30 p.m. that day. (Ibid., D750383–0203) In telegram 6124 from Guatemala City, November 4, the Embassy noted that the press had quoted Laugerud as stating, “We will not accept, we cannot tolerate a British rape or humiliation. As Guatemalans we will respond like men in [the] face of a situation in which the British wish to corner us . . . If they want to humiliate us, the matter could become more serious than they expect.” (Ibid., D750382–1014)


214. Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting

Summary: Secretary Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Rogers discussed the escalation of forces in Belize and Guatemala and the implications for resolving the dispute over Belize.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 9, Secretary’s Staff Meeting. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. All brackets appear in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. The draft telegram to Callaghan was sent to Kissinger’s office on November 3. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, P810026–0079) According to a routing slip, the telegram was revised and approved by Kissinger on November 4. (Ibid., P830114–0644) It was sent as telegram 262111, November 5, which is Document 215.


215. Telegram 262111 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Guatemala and the United Kingdom

Summary: Secretary Kissinger noted that despite U.S. efforts to encourage a peaceful resolution to the Belize issue, the likelihood of an attack by the Guatemalans was increasing. While applauding British meetings with the Guatemalan Government, the Secretary suggested two possible approaches to defusing the situation: arbitration through the International Court of Justice or security and economic guarantees to build confidence between the negotiating parties.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–77, Country Files, Box 4, Guatemala, State Department Telegrams, From SECSTATE—EXDIS. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Belize City and USUN. Drafted by Lazar; cleared by Vine in EUR, Buffum in IO, Cutter in C, Ortiz in S/S, and Rogers and approved by Kissinger. On November 4, a copy of Ramsbotham’s aide mémoire was sent to Kissinger as an attachment to the draft telegram. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830114–0644)


216. Telegram 6190 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State

Summary: During a discussion on Guatemala’s deployment of troops to the Petén, President Laugerud assured Ambassador Meloy that he would not order any military action against Belize as long as the slightest possibility of a negotiated solution to the dispute still existed.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–77, Country Files, Box 4, Guatemala—State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE—EXDIS. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated Niact Immediate to Belize City, London, and USUN. Telegram 261984 to guatemala City is dated November 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750384–0693) Telegram 262111 to Guatemala City and London is dated November 5 and is Document 215. On November 7, Rambsotham passed a message from Callaghan to Kissinger, in which the Foreign Secretary indicated, “We shall of course do everything we can to avoid any kind of military confrontation and to strengthen the hands of such moderates as there are in Guatemala.” (Ibid., P810038–1714)


217. Letter From British Foreign Secretary Callaghan to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Foreign Secretary Callaghan responded to Secretary Kissinger’s suggestions on how to peacefully resolve the dispute over Belize.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810038–1718. Secret. Sent as an enclosure to a November 13 forwarding letter from Ramsbotham to Kissinger, and Callaghan’s message to Molina, not published. Kissinger’s initials appear on Rathsbottom’s covering letter. In telegram 6703 from Guatemala City, November 28, the Embassy reported that the Laugerud “welcomed Rowlands visit as a positive gesture,” and despite “pressure from many quarters for intemperate action,” reiterated his assurances that his government would not initiate any aggression. (Ibid., D750414–0588)


218. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: In a report on the state of play on Belize, Assistant Secretary Rogers noted that the danger of war had receded somewhat as both the British and the Guatemalans moved to re-open negotiations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA/CEN Files, Lot 78D110, Guatemala 1975, Briefing Papers. Secret. Drafted by Platt in ARA/CEN. Kissinger initialed the memorandum. The Embassy reported on Echeverría’s visit in telegram 6406 from Guatemala City, November 14. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D750397–0651) Defense Intelligence Note DIADIN 3125B–75, December 1, noted that although the Rowlands visit had resulted in a commitment by both governments to resume negotiations over Belize in February, “the positions of both parties remain far apart.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78 A 0058, B 1975)


219. Telegram 6960 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State

Summary: Ambassador Meloy and President Laugerud discussed the Belize issue and Vice President Sandoval’s suggestions that Guatemala withdraw from the United Nations, cut off trade with Britain, and seize all property belonging to British nationals.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–77, Country Files, Box 4, Guatemala—State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE—NODIS. Confidential; Nodis; Eyes Only. All brackets are in the original except “[treason],” added for clarity. Defense Intelligence Notice DIADIN 3199–75, December 8, noted that under pressure following Guatemala’s defeat at the United Nations, President Laugerud had “authorized contingency planning and training for guerrilla operations in Belize to appease hardliners in his government,” but concluded that he would not authorize the execution of such operations unless all other avenues for a peaceful resolution had been exhausted. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–78 A 0058, B 1975)


220. Telegram 62 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State

Summary: During a meeting with Embassy officials, British Consul McQuillan indicated that he was unaware of any plans for even a partial drawdown of troops in Belize, despite the Guatemala’s Foreign Minister’s public request that the British Government withdraw its troops from Belize.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760005–0669. Confidential. Repeated Priority to Belize City, London, San Salvador, Managua, San José, Tegucigalpa, Panama City, and USCINCSO. In telegram 28 from Belize City, January 13, Gawf reported that Premier Price had told him he had traveled to London “to discuss the defense and economic development of Belize, i.e., how to give effect to the terms of the UNGA resolution.” (Ibid., D760012–0650) In telegram 384 from Guatemala City, January 20, the Embassy reported that McQuillan had told the Guatemalan Foreign Minister that the UK would agree to give “early and favorable consideration” to reduce its forces in Belize only if Guatemala agreed to a definite date for resuming negotiations. (Ibid., D760022–0453) In telegram 593 from Guatemala City, January 29, the Embassy reported that the Guatemalan Government indicated it had agreed with the UK to resume negotiations on February 9. (Ibid., D760034–0896) In airgram A–14 from Guatemala City, February 3, the Embassy reported that under pressure from the MLN, the Guatemalan Government had reluctantly agreed to permit an officially sanctioned demonstration by a group in favor of reincorporating Belize into Guatemala. (Ibid., P760018–2097)


221. Memorandum From the President’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance (Parker) to President Ford

Summary: Parker reported on a major earthquake in Guatemala.

Source: Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, DI 2/CO 58, 8/9/74–3/31/76. No classification marking. An attached routing sheet initialed by Low on February 7 reads, “Handled in Parker oral briefing of the President 2/6/76.” The Embassy in Guatemala City reported the earthquake in telegram 704, February 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760042–0272) In a February 6 report to the President, Parker estimated 6,000 deaths and 40,000 injuries due to the earthquake. (Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, DI 2/CO 58, 8/9/74–3/31/76)


222. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Hewson A. Ryan and Governor General-designate for Belize P.D. McEntee discussed the Belize issue and the impact that the earthquake in Guatemala City would have on reaching a negotiated settlement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850183–2460. Secret. Drafted by George A. Gowen in ARA/CEN on February 13, and cleared by Marvin Weissman, Director of ARA/CEN. In telegram 1334 from Guatemala City, February 18, the Embassy reported that Laugerud had advised Meloy that he planned to raise the Belize issue with Kissinger during his scheduled February 24 visit to Guatemala. Laugerud complained that the British had yet to reduce their military forces in Belize, which was “not helping the cause of peaceful settlement.” (Ibid., D760060–1101) In telegram Tosec 40130, February 20, the Department reported that the British had agreed to withdraw one company of troops from Belize in mid-March, “solely as a gesture of good faith,” noted that “the Guatemalans were informed of this decision on February 2,” and added that the British hoped the Secretary would encourage the Guatemalan Government to take the negotiations “most seriously.” (Ford Library, White House Central Files, Trip Briefing Books, Cables to HAK, 2/16–25/76, Latin America (4) TOSEC)


223. Telegram 1614 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State

Summary: During a February 24 meeting in Guatemala City, Secretary Kissinger, President Laugerud, Assistant Secretary Rogers, and Ambassador Meloy discussed the Belize dispute.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–77, Country Files, Guatemala—State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE—NODIS. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. In telegram 1628 from Guatemala City, February 26, 1910Z, the Embassy reported that in an earlier discussion with Molina Orantes en route from the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in San José, Kissinger had indicated that the U.S. would not mediate the dispute, but would “speak to the British and urge them to seek a solution that would be mutually acceptable.” (Ibid.) In telegram 2423 from Guatemala City, March 26, the Embassy reported that McQuillan had informed them that the British and Guatemalan Governments had agreed to resume talks on the Belize issue on April 26 and 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760115–0082)


224. Telegram 2009 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State

Summary: In a report on internal security following the earthquake, the Embassy noted that although there had been little or no looting, the Guatemalan Government had effectively endorsed the formation of neighborhood vigilante committees to patrol streets. On a more serious level, government security forces had apparently decided to take advantage of the confusion following the earthquake to eliminate elements deemed undesirable.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760093–0007. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Noforn. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. In telegram 62030 to Guatemala City, March 13, Rogers instructed Meloy to “approach President Laugerud and express our deep concern on press reports of the appearance of a number of bodies which show evidence of torture and execution,” and added, “You should stress the strong concern of the USG and of the American people for respect of human rights and abhorrence of political assassination.” (Ibid., D760095–1073) In airgram A–51 from Guatemala City, the Embassy reported, “Incidents of possible political violence during April shot up to the highest point since September 1974,” and added that “The only bright spot in an otherwise bleak picture was the apparent tapering off of Escuadron de la Muerte (Death Squad) or Escuadron-like killings which were rampant in February and March.” (Ibid., P760075–0300)