Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

199. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central American Affairs (Lazar) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers)¹

Washington, September 5, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Disturbing Guatemalan Signals re Belize

Contrary to what President Oduber told you last week, the Guatemalan position on Belize appears to be hardening rather than softening. In fact, various signals from Guatemala and recent and prospective related developments elsewhere suggest that we may be about to witness another escalation of tension over the Belize problem.

Guatemalan Signals

Guatemala Retrenchment: You will recall that the UK/Guatemala/Belize talks reached an impasse July 15 when the Guatemalans reverted to earlier inflexibility in their demands for southern Belize. The Guatemalan retrenchment has never been explained. Subsequently, the Guatemalan public stance hardened following revelations of the GOG position by Belize.

Kissinger Involvement Suggested: On August 1, during a cocktail party, Foreign Minister Molina mentioned to Ambassador Melby the desirability of the Secretary involving himself in the Belize (and/or the Salvador-Honduras) problem. He did not press when the Ambassador replied that we preferred to consider Belize a UK-Guatemala problem and not one involving us.

Belize Invasion Discussed: At the joint Defense/Foreign Ministry strategy session President Laugerud convened on August 7, it was decided to prepare plans for unconventional warfare in southern Belize should the UNGA pass a resolution damaging to the Guatemalan position. (Presumably a strong resolution would be humiliating to the Guatemalan military who would demand that the GOG make a forceful response.) It was also agreed to study how best to exploit an offer from Belizean opposition leader Philip Goldson, who had promised Molina that he would not push for independence if the Guatemalans helped him topple Premier Price.

U.S. Unofficially Advised: On August 19, a “member of a Guatemalan security service, reporting with the knowledge of his government” described [less than 1 line not declassified] Laugerud’s views. Laugerud believed that Belize would be able to obtain a UN resolution unfavorable to Guatemala; if so, Guatemala, specifically its military, would be honor-bound to react. The President thought that the U.S. was holding up requested military matériel to limit Guatemala’s military capability, but that the GOG had sufficient capability to carry out “required actions” against Belize without additional weapons and ammunition. A media campaign to explain the seriousness of the situation to the people had begun and other, unspecified steps to improve military readiness had been taken. Guatemala, however, was not moving troops closer to Belize or into position for possible military action. Laugerud, the source stressed, was eager to solve the Belize issue during his term.

The M–16 Gambit: Also in mid-August our MILGP was officially informed that the GOG would seek to buy from us 15,000 M–16 rifles and 5 million rounds of ammunition, costing $4 million (we have yet to receive a formal request). To put this in perspective, the largest single order of M–16s ever received from a Western Hemisphere nation was from Chile, for 3,000. There are approximately 14,000 men in Guatemala’s armed forces.

Politicians Like Tough Talk: Sparked by various official GOG and GOB statements, Guatemalan media and political party attention focused on the Belize question in August, and a group of PR Congressmen arranged a fact-finding mission to Belize. President Laugerud briefed the members of the group on August 21, and assured them that he would send troops to their rescue should they be detained in Belize. He also told them that U.S. delays had forced him to purchase planes from Israel and guns from Belgium (the latter point is unconfirmed). The Congressmen were impressed by Laugerud’s statement that he would “sacrifice the country if necessary” in an effort to achieve a favorable settlement. Laugerud must have known that the tone and substance of his briefing would become widely known. (The mission finally was postponed at the request of the GOB.)

Cuban-Belize Axis Revisited: On August 29 Molina called in Chargé Andrews to convey President Laugerud’s concern over Belize/Cuba ties. Molina said the GOG had information that Attorney General Shoman of Belize, on his way to Lima for the non-aligned meeting; had met with Raul Roa in Cuba. Molina repeated Guatemala’s oft-voiced fear that a weak, leftist regime in Belize would open Central America to Cuban infiltration. Were Shoman to be successful at Lima, it would presage a similar hostile resolution at New York. Such a resolution would present Guatemala with “different decisions.”

British Cooperation Requested: On August 20 special Guatemalan emissaries met with the UK’s Permanent Representative (and Belize negotiator) Richard who rejected their request for collaboration in restraining debate on Belize at the GA. Richard cautioned Guatemala not to undertake military action against Belize and expressed regret that the Guatemalans had broken off the secret talks. The Guatemalans responded that in their view the talks had merely been adjourned until the UK could suggest a counter proposal and offered to resume the meetings whenever the UK was ready. On instruction, Richard informed the Guatemalans that the UK was not prepared to resume talks at this time.

Elsewhere:

Lima: Guatemala’s fears about Belize’s ability to rally third world support were realized at the NAC. The Guatemalan representative was unable to obtain observer status at the conference, although he did manage to address the meeting as a “guest.” The final act affirmed “the territorial integrity of Belize and the right of its people to independence.” Interestingly, the conference took an opposite tack in supporting the Argentine claim to the Falklands, and this may be viewed by the GOG as a successful first effort to split previous Latin American solidarity with Guatemala.

London: After years of close U.S.–UK cooperation on the Belize problem, the UK may have decided not to share with us their most current plan of action. For the first time, they have refused to cooperate with Guatemala in preventing discussion of the Belize issue at the UNGA and, most uncharacteristically, they have passed up several opportunities to inform us of the August 20 UK–GOG meeting in New York. In the absence of some clarification, we can only assume that they intend to allow (i.e., tacitly encourage) airing of the dispute and, possibly, passage of a sternly worded resolution. [2 lines not declassified] we are not aware that they are making any unusual preparations to defend Belize. However, it should be recalled that the UK set in train the last Belize crisis in 1972 when, acting on erroneous information provided by Costa Rican Foreign Minister Facio, it reinforced the Belize garrison.

New York: John Kriendler was told on Wednesday that Assad Shoman would represent Belize in New York during the entire period of the UNGA. Shoman is viewed in Belize and Guatemala as a radical leftist with close ties to Cuba. He probably was responsible for the Belize resolution at the NAC, and we would expect him to press for a full GA discussion of the problem.

How Does It Play Out?

We are not certain what all of this adds up to other than a probable rise in tensions in the capitals and perhaps along the borders until the UNGA is ended. It is conceivable that the British and Belizeans do not really intend to allow a full airing of the issue at the GA but want to let the GOG think this is their intention. They might believe this would lead the GOG to offer to renew serious negotiations. Alternatively, they may really believe that airing of the dispute and passage of a strong resolution will make the GOG more tractable whenever negotiations are resumed. The GOG appears to feel beleaguered but it is not at all clear what they want to do other than avoid an unfavorable UNGA resolution. It is certain that the GOG is trying very hard to pass signals to us but we have not been able to read them clearly yet. It may be that they are simply seeking to “subtly” enlist our cooperation in avoiding a damaging resolution. However, it is faintly possible that they are trying to build a case that the use of force was made necessary by UK and U.S. unresponsiveness to their perceived needs. We expect the whole issue to become clearer as the situation unfolds at the UNGA and we then would hope to have some thoughts on what constructive or damage-limiting steps we might take. In the meantime, we are revising the 1973 Belize contingency paper.

1. Summary: While concluding that the outcome remained uncertain, Lazar reported that the Guatemalan Government appeared to be hardening its position on the Belize issue.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810026–0108. Secret. Sent through Hewson A. Ryan in ARA. Drafted by Clare and Kilday, September 5. An attached routing slip reads, “Contents discussed with Secretary by Amb. Asencio.” All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. Kissinger’s October 9 meeting with Asencio is Document 207. In telegram 4690 from Guatemala City, August 29, the Embassy reported allegations that while traveling to the Lima Non-Aligned Conference, Belizean officials had visited Cuba to lobby for support for Belizean independence, causing Guatemalan concerns that Belize might become a beachhead for Communist infiltration. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750300–0575) In telegram 208320 to Bogotá, Guatemala City, and Caracas, September 3, the Department reported that Oduber had told Rogers that Guatemala’s stance on Belize had become “less rigid” and suggested that the time had come for U.S. intermediation. (Ibid., D750305–0190) The 1973 Belize contingency paper was not found.