Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

197. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central American Affairs (Lazar) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers)¹

Washington, July 9, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with John Moreton, UK Embassy—Thursday, July 10, at 4:45 p.m.

Mr. Moreton has requested a meeting with you to follow up on his earlier discussion regarding Belize and to discuss arms transfers to Guatemala.

Following consultations with our Missions in Guatemala and Belize, we have concluded that we should make available to the GOG five C–47s at once (of the 11 they requested) and permit the Guatemalan Air Force to trade in six other old C–47s for newer models as resources permit. We request your approval of the proposal and suggest that you take advantage of this meeting to inform Moreton of our decision.

Background

You told Mr. Moreton during lunch on June 16 that we were considering the possibility of reviewing with the Guatemalans their light air transport plans. You also promised that we would keep the UK informed as to any decisions regarding the Guatemalan request for eleven C–47s. Several factors have arisen since the luncheon, and we are now prepared to recommend a decision on the C–47s.

On June 20, Ambassador Meloy was told by Chief of Staff Lucas, (who has subsequently been named Minister of Defense), that the “long delay” in our reply to the Guatemalan request “cannot help but cool relations.” Lucas reconfirmed that the GOG has no intention of using the aircraft for an invasion of Belize. We estimate this is true at the moment, although intentions obviously can change. The Embassy believes Lucas was acting on instructions from President Laugerud. The Embassy commented that we have gotten as much as we are going to get on Guatemalan intentions, and that a “sweeping review,” of the type we suggested, would yield nothing further.

I have just returned from Central America where I spoke with U.S. and local officials in Belize and with the Ambassador and his staff in Guatemala. I believe that if the arrival of the C–47s took place without fanfare, the psychological impact on the Belize talks would be negligible. The UK Embassy has told us that the Belize garrison commander has urged a substantial increase in antiaircraft guns and troops should the Guatemalans increase their C–47 paradrop capability. C–47s aside, however, the UK must take into account the Arava purchase and the imminent departure of two frigates previously stationed in the Caribbean when considering the military threat. My impression, after talking with the local commander, was that a few additional C–47s would not greatly affect his assessment of the overall threat. Ambassador Meloy and his staff are firmly convinced that the USG needs to offer at least some C–47s to the Guatemalans to prevent a serious erosion of an already somewhat strained relationship with their military.

Our Consulate General in Belize believes that although the arrival of C–47s and Aravas in Guatemala likely will draw fire only temporarily from the opposition, the more significant impact will be on Prime Minister Price, who will not believe that we did not endorse the Arava purchase and will be convinced that we are intentionally building a credible Guatemalan paradrop capability. However, since the Consulate General believes that the Aravas and C–47s will be linked in Price’s mind, and since we cannot control the Arava purchase, holding back on transferring C–47s would not stifle Price’s reaction.

Our proposal to the Guatemalans would follow the Embassy’s suggestion:

1) We would make available immediately five C–47s previously selected for purchase by the GOG under the Peace Maya project. Any MAP or FMS credit funds previously set aside and applied toward the project could be used to prepare the aircraft for a one-time flight, but other costs would be borne by the GOG. The Guatemalans could retain all of the present inventory (10 aircraft); the earlier “swapping” understanding would no longer apply;

2) The other six aircraft previously identified by the GOG for possible purchase would remain available for exchange purposes although there are no USG funds currently available for reconditioning and delivery.

Under this proposal the in-country C–47 fleet would be 15 aircraft as opposed to 14 under the Peace Maya plan; i.e., the five proposed plus the existing ten rather than three plus the 1972 inventory of eleven.

DOD/ISA supports this proposal in principle; we foresee no problem in obtaining formal DOD concurrence.

In sum, if we do not provide at least some C–47s to Guatemala immediately, we can expect a strong negative reaction from the Guatemalan military establishment which will harmfully and seriously impact on our overall bilateral relationship. If we do provide some C–47 aircraft, no matter how few, we will earn some additional criticism from the GOB and HMG for adding to Guatemala’s airborne capability. I believe that the incremental military value of the additional C–47s would be minimal, and that the political consequences of providing them would be less disadvantageous than the consequences of not providing them or continuing to delay a final answer to the Guatemala request.

Action Requested:

That you approve the proposal making available five C–47s at this time with provision for possible future exchanges.

1. Summary: In a background memorandum, prepared for Rogers’s June 10 meeting with John Moreton of the British Embassy, Lazar recommended the Assistant Secretary approve the sale of five C–47 aircraft to Guatemala. According to Lazar, failure to sell at least some of the aircraft would incur a strong negative reaction from the Guatemalan military, while the provision thereof would have a minimal impact on Guatemala’s airborne capability.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810026–0139. Confidential. The memorandum is unsigned and there is no indication of an approval or disapproval of the recommendation. However, a memorandum of conversation, July 10, indicates that Rogers told Moreton the U.S. Government would “advise them of our decision prior to notifying the Guatemalans.” (Ibid., P810026–0137) At the meeting, Moreton gave U.S. officials a copy of his Speaking Note, which is not published. (Ibid., P810038–1722) The June 16 meeting between Rogers and Moreton is summarized in Document 196. Meloy’s June 20 discussion with Guatemalan Chief of Staff Lucas García was reported in telegram 3240 from Guatemala City, June 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750218–1202) In telegram 404 from Belize City, July 9, the consulate discussed the anticipated reaction by the Belizean Government to the proposed aircraft sale. (Ibid., D750236–0046) In telegram 170875 to Guatemala City, July 19, Rogers informed Meloy that British Foreign Secretary Callaghan had asked Kissinger to delay the C–47 delivery. (Ibid., D750250–0914)