Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

206. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 3, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS

• John Moreton, Minister, UK Embassy, Washington
• David Walker, UK Embassy, Washington
• William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary, ARA
• Hewson Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA
• David Lazar, ARA/CEN
• Mark J. Platt, ARA/CEN/G

SUBJECT

• Belize

REFERENCE

• Guatemala 5215

The meeting was held at Moreton’s request.

Moreton opened by stating Her Majesty’s Government’s desire to keep in close and continued contact on developments and tactics involving Belize. He mentioned that Secretary Callaghan had discussed the problem with Secretary Kissinger on September 23 and had thanked the Secretary for our decision to delay delivery of the C–47s. Callaghan had promised to inform the Secretary of the results of his September 25 meeting with Guatemalan Foreign Minister Molina. Moreton had brought to leave with us a copy of the British reporting telegram on the meeting.

Callaghan had been most frank with Molina and had emphasized British support for Belizean independence. He said a UN resolution could not be avoided. Callaghan added the UK did not want to humiliate Guatemala and suggested that a reference to “future talks” could be “coupled” with the resolution. “Britain could not force territorial cession on Belize, but other matters such as economic cooperation or a treaty covering the use of territorial seas could be considered.” Callaghan flatly rejected Molina’s arguments for “associated status” and said Britain would resist any use of force.

Moreton gave a brief rundown of Molina’s UN speech of October 3. Molina had emphasized territorial integrity as taking precedence over self-determination and had outlined Guatemala’s historical claim. UK Ambassador Richard characterized the speech as generally mild but full of “half-truths.” Richard had exercised his right of reply and had bluntly rejected the Guatemalan arguments and had stated, “The sole obstacle to the independence of Belize has been and is Guatemala’s continuing desire to assert its control, for the first time, over a people whose history, culture and way of life are, and have always been, quite different from its own.” Richard said, “The UK and the Government of Belize are both very ready . . . to discuss any constructive suggestion for economic cooperation, better communications, special access to Guatemalan goods in Belizean ports . . .” Molina replied that he believed that further negotiations were the only answer. He wanted a formula that would “conciliate” interests and did not want Guatemalan rights to be set aside “completely.”

Moreton said the UK delegation at the UN was now considering its tactics. They would certainly attempt to see that any resolution would not be humiliating and would be one that Guatemala could live with, although Assad Shoman was saying that they were not being firm enough.

Rogers asked when the issue might come up in the UN. Walker replied that a draft resolution might start circulating in ten days to two weeks with formal discussions around the end of November.

Rogers then asked if any mention had been made of the International Court of Justice. Moreton said no. He added that in the past the Guatemalans had always insisted on having the issue considered on the basis of both law and “equity.” Rogers asked whether if “equity” were considered, the British position would be weakened. Moreton agreed. Rogers pointed out, however, that given the composition of the Court today, it was quite likely to be guided by political considerations in judging such a powerful issue as independence and the British should really reconsider the utility of the Court in resolving the whole issue. Rogers added that Molina had told him the Guatemalans were willing to let the Court decide the question. He commented the ICJ looked like a good solution. Moreton took careful note of this and promised to get an up-to-date opinion from the Foreign Office.

Moreton then asked for our assessment as to the risk of war. Rogers replied that we viewed this most seriously and it was not unthinkable that the Guatemalans would feel they had been driven to the use of force. If an attack occurred, it most likely would be in the south.

Moreton asked if we thought Guatemala would then take the issue to the Security Council. Lazar answered that the OAS would probably move first, to keep it out of the UN.

Moreton asked why the Guatemalans were so interested in the maritime question. Rogers replied that if a conventional territorial sea regime were applied, Guatemala would be closed out by overlapping claims of Honduras and Belize. He outlined the “Matriarchial Sea” concept in which all the Caribbean nations would share the living resources of the sea, but not the seabed, and there would be unimpeded transit. We have suggested the idea to the Guatemalans and they are considering it.

Moreton asked if the appearance of another mini-state in the Caribbean would concern the U.S. Rogers replied that it would not.

Lazar mentioned that the Cuban threat was very real to the Guatemalans and the possibility of guerrillas operating from Belize worried them a great deal. Rogers added that the Cubans were not being at all helpful and have acted to increase Guatemalan fears. When the Guatemalans see Price loosing contact with moderates like Dudley Thompson, they are even more upset.

Moreton then raised the question of British reinforcement. He said it was a touchy issue but the UK could not wait too long. He promised to consult fully when the decision to reinforce was made. Mr. Ryan asked how long would the Royal Navy frigates be in the area. Walker replied they are always within 24 hours sailing time, but in April they would be pulled out entirely.

Rogers repeated his suggestion that in the next conversation they discuss the ICJ in more detail as it appeared to offer a great deal of promise.

Lazar closed by saying we were glad the British would continue talking to the Guatemalans to avoid a “humiliating” UN resolution. He advised them to make their calculations on this issue very carefully so as not to evoke an armed Guatemalan response.

1. Summary: During a meeting on the Belize issue, British Embassy Minister John Moreton indicated that while the British Government believed a UN resolution in support of Belizean independence could not be avoided, both the UK and Belize were willing to consider any resolution that would not be humiliating to Guatemala. When Moreton asked for the Department’s assessment of the risk of war, Assistant Secretary Rogers observed that the Guatemalans might feel compelled to use force.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, ARA/CEN Files, Lot 76D110, Belize–POL–1975. Secret. Drafted by Platt on October 6, and cleared by Lazar, Ryan, and Rogers. Telegram 5215 from Guatemala City is published as Document 205. In telegram 238755 to Guatemala City, London, Belize City, and USUN, October 7, the Department reported that during a meeting in ARA/CEN, Walker described British plans to reinforce their garrison in Belize, noting that the British “viewed the possibility of a Guatemalan attack, at least in the short run, as directly tied to UN action.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750349–0075) In telegram 670 from Belize City, October 14, Gawf reported that the British had begun reinforcing their garrison, and noted the arrival of three Puma helicopters and approximately 50 additional military personnel. (Ibid., D750356–0252)