207. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Relations Between U.S. and Guatemala

PARTICIPANTS

  • Guatemala
  • Ambassador Julio Asensio Wunderlich, Guatemala
  • United States
  • The Secretary
  • Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers, ARA
  • Country Director David Lazar, ARA/CEN (notetaker)

Ambassador Asensio had requested the meeting on instructions of his government.

Ambassador Asensio: “Let me congratulate you on the way you handled the Sinai matter. Also on the way you handled the matter of the Spanish bases. We in my country are very fond of Franco.”

The Secretary: “I can’t say that I am; but Spain is a very important country. I never yield to pressure.”

Ambassador Asensio: “I know that.”

The Secretary: “Rogers here (pointing) doesn’t know that. He keeps pressing.”

Mr. Rogers: “But always in a good cause.”

Ambassador Asensio: “We have had excellent relations with the United States for years and certainly during my time here. We have never had any trouble and there has never been any need to trouble you. But in this instance I have instructions to hand this letter to you personally.”

The Secretary: “Is there a translation?”

[Page 581]

Ambassador Asensio: “No.”

The Secretary: “What is the drift of the letter?”

Ambassador Asensio: “It’s about Belize or British Honduras. We have had a claim to this territory for over a hundred years. We have tried, off and on, to negotiate this matter out with the British. Recently, and especially since the independence of Jamaica which is the mouthpiece of Great Britain in the Caribbean, the Jamaicans have been pushing for independence for Belize. Also, since the Lima conference, Cuba has been pushing. Cuba doesn’t like Guatemala for a number of reasons.”

The Secretary: “Yes, we trained the Cuban exiles there.”

Ambassador Asensio: “Yes and other things. Now Castro has offered assistance to Belize. Belize grew through small concessions to the British. Then the United Kingdom forced us to sign a treaty. However, that treaty had a clause with which the British did not comply so we claim that the treaty was abrogated. Although we state officially that our claim is to the whole of the territory, we would settle for less. However, failure to arrive at a solution which would give us some part of the territory would shut off our access to the Atlantic. Lately we have been talking to the Belizeans. Price thinks he is a messiah who must liberate Belize.”

The Secretary: “Liberate? From whom?”

Mr. Rogers: “From the British.”

Ambassador Asensio: “Within the past few weeks Belize has become determined to declare independence unilaterally. Our constitution, since 1945 says that Belize is part of our national territory. We cannot accept a unilateral declaration of independence. The Government would fall and I don’t know what else might follow from that. We want peace. We are a peaceful country, but we could not accept unilateral independence. However, there is a way out. We are not asking you for official mediation or arbitration but informal contact, through you, telling the British what we want and what we would settle for.”

The Secretary: “What do you want?”

Ambassador Asensio: “We want the British to give us back what they took in the later concessions (pointing at map).”

The Secretary: “I don’t think they’ll give you anything. I talked to Callahan. He says they’ll fight.”

Ambassador Asensio: “We wouldn’t mind fighting the British, but we don’t want to fight the Cubans. (Pointing to the map) There is an excellent bay up here which does not show up on the map called Chetumal. You could put the whole British Navy in there.”

The Secretary: “What are things coming to? What is the population of Guatemala?”

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Ambassador Asensio: “Five and a half million people. But we are very proud.”

The Secretary: “So you want some of this? How much?”

Ambassador Asensio: “From here down (indicating on the map the Sibun River).”

The Secretary: “OK. When I get a chance, I’ll mention this to Callahan.”

Ambassador Asensio: “We notice that the Cubans are pushing a campaign on Puerto Rico.”

Mr. Rogers: “(To the Secretary) You saw the statement by Castro? It is now a test of manhood.”

Ambassador Asensio: “This whole Puerto Rico matter has been blown out of proportion in the UN. This is what has been happening with Cuba since the Lima conference. Castro now thinks he is God in the Caribbean.”

The Secretary: “He’s playing our game. We’re in no rush for relations with Cuba. The more he talks about Puerto Rico, the more he helps our political problem here.”

Ambassador Asensio: “But he keeps talking.”

The Secretary: “That’s great for us. The Cubans suffer from megalomania. Why should we care about Cuba? The only thing they might have been able to do was embarrass us in our Latin American relations, but we got past that in the OAS.”

Ambassador Asensio: “He is the Russian spokesman in Latin America.”

The Secretary: “But Cuba is not a major country like China. We want nothing from them. They might embarrass us, but they can’t bother us very much.”

Ambassador Asensio: “But this (Cuba) is why we are worried about Belize.”

The Secretary: “I’ll talk to Callaghan. That won’t be for a couple of weeks. It can wait, can’t it?”

Ambassador Asensio: “Yes. We are worried about our relations with you. They have always been very good, but we notice little things. Not at this level, but down below somewhere where some of these things get done. For example, in a letter you just sent to us in reply to our routine request for training ammunition—the sort of thing you have provided to us many times in the past—somebody eliminated two flamethrowers which we wanted for training in our military school.”

The Secretary: “Well, we still feel very cordial towards Guatemala.”

The meeting adjourned at 6:40 p.m.

  1. Summary: Ambassador Asensio requested that Secretary Kissinger informally approach the British to explain Guatemala’s demands and what they would be willing to settle for in the dispute over Belize. Kissinger indicated that he would discuss the issue with Callaghan.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820123–2223. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Lazar and approved on October 16 by Jock Covey in S. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. In a memorandum to Kissinger, October 6, Rogers noted, “We believe that Guatemalan threats to invade the British-defended colony are serious.” (Ibid., P810038–1618) In telegram 5427 from Guatemala City, October 2, the Embassy reported that during an October 1 meeting with Meloy, Lucas García “launched into a long speech on need to uphold honor and manhood of armed forces,” adding that “he knew Guatemala had no chance of winning in fight with British, he knew it would be suicide to attack, but he would leave his desk and die with his troops, with honor.” (Ibid., D750341–0277)