201. Telegram 595 From the Consulate General in Belize to the Department of State1
595. Subject: U.S. Policy Re UK-Guatemala Dispute on Belize. Ref: Guatemala 4943.
1. Purpose of this cable is to suggest Department give urgent consideration to adequacy of existing policy re Belize dispute in the light of recent developments.
2. An important assumption upon which the FY 1976–FY 1977 CASP was predicated was that GOG would not seek to implement its claim to Belize by force unless Belize were to make some dramatic move toward independence or unless the GOG were to become convinced that such a move were imminent. At the time CASP was being written possibility of Guatemalan military incursions into southern Belize was not viewed as likely and consequently was not taken into account in the CASP policy judgment which was that U.S. interests would be best served by support for the status quo. Thus, if these incursions have actually taken place as reftel indicates or even if such incursions are now seen as likely, Department may wish to consider whether Belize CASP can still be regarded as a relevant or useful policy document.
3. My impression based on comments made to me in strictest confidence by British garrison commander (please protect) is that HMG approval of additional UK troops to be stationed in south near Punta [Page 565] Gorda is likely if not already a fact. Any chance there might be of averting this and possible escalatory response by Guatemala may hinge on our being able to persuade GOG to desist from further military incursions into Belize if these have, in fact, occurred. Difficulty of applying the kind of pressure it would take to accomplish this without appearing to take sides in the dispute itself is recognized. Thus, policy question this situation may eventually pose for us is whether continued non-involvement in Belize dispute will adequately serve our interests if Guatemala military incursions continue. Would we, for example, be able to make an acceptable case for U.S. non-involvement to HMG if Guatemalan troops with advantages derived from U.S. training and equipment were to establish themselves in southern Belize?
4. A further impression gained from conversations with British garrison commander here is that if Guatemalan military forces were to establish themselves in southern Belize, British forces would have no alternative but to mount an operation aimed at dislodging them.
5. Chances of getting either GOB or HMG to accept cession of some Belizean territory in south to Guatemala in exchange for permanent settlement of dispute appear negligible judging from public and private statements I have heard recently from GOB and British officials here.
6. Question of how U.S. would vote on UN resolution endorsing independence for Belize is another aspect of problem which may eventually require basic policy examination.
7. As a preliminary step to any re-examination of existing policy deemed desirable, or even if such re-examination is determined to be unnecessary, I submit that it would be of considerable value to the Department to arrive at its own opinion concerning the relative merits of the juridical arguments advanced by the two protagonists. I have the impression the prevailing, but unresearched, assumption within the Department is that neither side has a compelling case in international law, but my own research, admittedly incomplete, suggests that this assumption may not be valid. Granted our policy must take into account factors other than international legal considerations, but if one side or the other clearly has the law on its side, this is something we should know. I suggest, therefore, that the Department’s Legal Adviser be asked to render an opinion on the relative merits of the Guatemalan claim to suzerainty over Belize vs U.K. case against it and that this opinion be taken into account in future policy deliberations on the subject.
-
Summary: In light of information that the UK might be increasing troop levels in southern Belize, combined with concerns that the Guatemalan military might respond in kind, Consul General Gawf recommended the Department reassess its stand on Belize, particularly from a juridical standpoint.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750318–0813. Secret. Repeated to RUDTC London, USUN, and Guatemala City. Telegram 4943 from Guatemala City, is dated September 12. (Ibid., D750316–1005) The FY 1976–1977 CASP was sent as an enclosure to airgram A–9 from Belize City, April 1, 1975, which is not published. (Ibid., P750062–0383)
↩