Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972

262. Memorandum From Robert M. Behr of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹ ²

Washington, April 2, 1971.

SUBJECT:

• European Participation in Post-Apollo Space Program

Secretary Rogers has sent a memorandum (Tab B) to the President seeking guidance before proceeding further in negotiations with the European Space Conference regarding cooperation in the US Post-Apollo space program.

Following a short review of the negotiating history, the Secretary identifies the major political issue as that of the European insistence on guaranteed launch services should they give up their own launcher program in anticipation of participation in the US space shuttle development (if and when approved). He notes that, while the negotiations will be difficult, the prospects for success are such that he intends to proceed, given the President’s “go ahead”.

The reason for Mr. Roger’s apparent nervousness is not his uncertainty about the nature of Presidential guidance on space cooperation. Both State and NASA consider that the record (Tab C) of the President’s and your statements on the subject are clearly supportive of the course of action they have undertaken. Instead, Mr. Rogers’ concern stems from alleged reports that the President, Peter Flanigan and Dr. David are opposed to a program of cooperation with the Europeans that would involve joint funding and management.

The issue, therefore, is not a question of defining bargaining counters to he used in “horse-trading” with the Europeans, but whether we should, as a matter of principle, continue our efforts to involve the Europeans in large-scale, technically complex space programs.

In considering how to respond to Secretary Rogers the following factors are pertinent:

• --The development of a space shuttle is not yet an approved program within the USG.
• --The modalities of European participation have not been determined.
• --European interests tend more toward the commercial applications of space (telecommunications) than, pure scientific research.
• --There is reason to doubt that the Europeans can reconcile national differences and structure a supranational organization capable of cooperating soon on a counterpart basis with NASA.
• --The European demands, to date, reflect a dual, unreality. They want more than we would prudently offer in a cooperative venture and they ascribe our motive for cooperation to be more commercial than brotherly.

Notwithstanding the somewhat negative cost of the foregoing factors, I believe that we should continue our dialogue with the Europeans, but in a manner more systematic, unemotional and deliberate than in the past.

Essentially, the primary value of a program of cooperation with the Europeans lies in its political potential. We would approach the negotiations with our objectives oriented less toward specific hardware systems and more toward bolstering our allies technology base. In doing so we may suffer some short-term losses but insure long-term gains.

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President which conveys Secretary Rogers’ request for guidance, explains the issue, and recommends a reply (Tab A) to Mr. Rogers. The reply confirms the President’s support for international cooperation in space and establishes the following guidelines for further negotiations with the Europeans:

• -- We should make no interim agreements that would prejudice an independent decision by the US on the desirability of shuttle development.
• -- Further technical discussions on the possibilities of shuttle cooperation should be pursued to define (1) specific tasks, (2) management arrangements, (3) the degree of technology transfer, and (4) the rights of each side with respect to shuttle use.
• --- Areas for cooperation other than a space shuttle should also be examined.
• -- We should not tender either formal or informal assurances which could be construed as binding agreements until a mutually satisfactory definition of the basis for cooperation has been achieved.

Dr. David does not concur in the memorandum for Mr. Rogers at Tab A. He believes that we should at this point in time make a reversal of our past approach to the Europeans and permit the discussions to proceed only on the basis that joint management and funding options are excluded. His recommended reply to Secretary Rogers is at Tab A (1).

I do not agree with Dr. David for the following reasons:

• -- His view ignores the foreign policy implications of a strong technological partnership with our NATO allies.
• --His views on technology transfer and joint management are largely intuitive. We should not abandon a course of action pursued over two years without good analysis to prove that it’s been a mistake.
• --If avenues of cooperation other than the shuttle have promise, we should not foreclose them by a premature affront to European sensibilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

2. That, if approved by the President, you sign the memorandum to Secretary Rogers at Tab A.

Tab I
Draft Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, undated

Secretary Rogers has sent you a memorandum (Tab B) seeking your approval and guidance before proceeding further in negotiations with the Europeans on cooperation with us in the Post-Apollo space program.

The negotiations thus far have centered around the possibilities for joint development (90% US resources; 10% European) of a space shuttle, which would be a re-usable space booster having a wide variety of mission applications. Although the program has yet to be approved within the USG, the Europeans are asking for answers to specific questions regarding US “terms” for cooperation. These questions and their answers may be premature in the face of our own lack of commitment to the shuttle and the absence of a clear understanding either here or abroad of how the Europeans would interface with our program, should it progress to an approved project status.

My view is that the discussions with the Europeans have become too specifically “single system” oriented; they have been elevated to a political level before a sound technical and institutional basis for cooperation has been designed; and, finally, they stand to fall because emotion and commercialism have introduced discordant notes into what should be calm and deliberate talks seeking to define a program of lasting, mutual benefit.

There are, moreover, reasons to doubt that the Europeans can soon organize among themselves to create an effective technical agency which would serve as NASA’s counterpart. Additionally, Dr. David. believes the costs to us that might be associated with joint management and limited technology transfer could outweigh the benefits of a cooperative program. While these reservations may have substance, it is only through frank and detailed technical discussions that their validity can be ascertained.

Notwithstanding these reservations and possible deficiencies, I believe we should continue to pursue our dialogue with the Europeans because of the overriding need to strengthen our NATO ties and to help our allies achieve a technology base that can contribute to the fulfillment of our collective responsibilities. We should, however, proceed along a slightly different tack—one on which careful program definition is the absolute precursor to any formal partnership arrangements.

At Tab A is a draft response to Secretary Rogers which I will forward subject to your approval. The memorandum confirms your support for continued pursuit of opportunities for international cooperation in space and establishes the following guidelines for further negotiations with the Europeans:

• --We should make no interim agreements that would prejudice an independent decision by the US on the desirability of shuttle development.
• -- Further technical discussions on the possibilities of shuttle cooperation should be pursued to define (1) specific tasks, (2) management arrangements, (3) the degree of technology transfer, and (4) the rights of each side with respect to shuttle use.
• -- Areas for cooperation other than a space shuttle should also be examined.
• --We should not tender either formal or informal, assurances which could be construed, as binding agreements until a mutually satisfactory definition of the basis for cooperation has been achieved.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the memorandum to Secretary Rogers at Tab A which affirms your support for continued efforts to engage the Europeans in a program of space cooperation, but in a manner that does not obligate the United States until a satisfactory basis for cooperation has been reached.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

SEE ME

Tab A
Draft Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers

Washington, undated

In response to your memorandum of March 23, the President has asked me to confirm his support for continued pursuit of opportunities for international cooperation in space. Since previous discussions have not provided a basis for a final decision on European participation in space shuttle development, the following factors should guide your future efforts in continuing negotiations with the Europeans on Post-Apollo space cooperation.

1. There is no commitment on the part of this nation to development of a space shuttle system. Until such a commitment is made, there should he no agreements or assurances, stated or implied, that would prejudice an independent decision by the United States on the desirability of shuttle development.

2. Major unresolved questions about the character and degree of European participation are critical to a final decision by the United States regarding possible cooperation on a shuttle. In particular, there is a need for further technical definition including (1) specific tasks to be accomplished by each side, (2) management arrangements, (3) the degree of technology transfer, and (4) the rights of each side with respect to shuttle use. Evaluation of these technical factors would provide a basis for decision by both sides on whether to proceed with this specific cooperative program.

3. We should not tender either formal or informal assurances which can be construed as binding agreements until a mutually satisfactory definition of the basis for cooperation has been achieved.

4. Whatever the outcome regarding U.S. shuttle development, the President wishes to reaffirm his desire for increasing space cooperation with the Europeans. Accordingly, in future technical discussions, areas for cooperation other than a space shuttle should also be examined.

Henry A. Kissinger

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 393, Subject Files, Space Programs, 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Sonnefeldt. Tab B is Document 259. Tab C was attached but not published. For the guidance as sent to Rogers, see Document 270. There is no indication that Kissinger saw the memorandum. A notation on the front page of the memorandum reads: “OBE”
2. Behr described Rogers’ March 23 memorandum to the President and explained the nature of Secretary of State Rogers’ nervousness over the on-going negotiations with the European Space Conference. Behr also suggested that Kissinger provide guidance to Rogers.