259. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon1 2

Subject:

  • European Participationin Post-Apollo Space Program

As you know, since late 1969 Dr. Paine and subsequently Dr. Low, on the staff of NASA, have been exploring with Western Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia the possibility of their substantial participation in the post-Apollo Space Transportation System Program. The Western European countries have expressed considerable interest. Consequently, there have been two political-level meetings with the European Space Conference represented by Theo Lefevre (former Belgian Prime Minister) and the delegation headed by Alex Johnson on our side. The last meeting was held on February 11 and 12 here in Washington, and we are now in the process of preparing a written statement of our views for transmittal within the next ten days or so to the European Space Conference

The most difficult political issue that has emerged from these discussions is the European insistence that if they give up their own launcher program to participate in our post-Apollo program they require an assurance that we will launch regional telecommunication satellites of interest to them. On our side the problem is how to do so without derogating our responsibility to our other partners and to ourselves for the success of the single global INTELSAT system,

Much hard bargaining will be required before a basis for the resolution of this issue is reached [Page 2] and we do not underestimate the difficulties. We have felt that prospects for success are reasonable and plan to continue our efforts to engage European participation in the program. However, before entering the next phase of the negotiations, I have felt it prudent to check with you to ensure our efforts continue to be in accord with your views.

William P. Rogers
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SP 10 US. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the letter. A typed notation on the memorandum reads: “Guidance provided in memo from Mr. Kissinger to Secretary dated August 18, 1971.” In a March 18 memorandum to Pollack, Rein objected to a draft of this memorandum on the grounds that it did not adequately frame the issues for the President. “The real question,” Rein stated, “is the extent to which the President is willing to permit our negotiating position in any Qseries negotiations’ on launch guarantees to threaten conflict with out Intelsat obligations or endanger the economic viability of the Intelsat system.” (Ibid.)
  2. Rogers highlighted the political issue of European insistence on assurances for launching of their regional telecommunications satellites if they gave up their own launcher program. Rogers asked Nixon if the basic Department of State position to engage the Europeans in the U.S. program was in accordance with his views.