Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972

261. Memorandum for the Record¹ ²

Washington, March 26, 1971.

SUBJECT:

• Meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Dr. David, March 24, 1971

Dr. Kissinger met in his office with Dr. David, OST, at 1830 on 24 March 1971 to discuss matters of mutual interest. Colonel Robert M. Behr, NSC Staff, was also present.

The notes below reflect the substance of the matters discussed. They are grouped subjectively in accordance with a previously agreed agenda.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to cooperation in space.]

Post-Apollo Cooperation with Western Europe

Dr. Kissinger cautioned that one should not attempt to deduce Presidential decisions from casual conversation. The President makes program decisions only after careful consideration of memoranda addressed to specific issues. In the case of space cooperation, Dr. Kissinger said that he did not recall the President making any firm commitments to any particular program, other than a broadly conceptual observation to Dr. Paine at the time of the Apollo XI recovery that “international cooperation” would be a good thing.

Colonel Behr provided a brief compendium of the President’s and Dr. Kissinger’s public statements on post-Apollo cooperation.

Dr. David expressed concern about the vector of the current post-Apollo negotiations. His main reservation was that the Europeans could acquire high value-low cost (relatively speaking) technology and then, through US beneficence, achieve a competitive position that could damage U.S. industry. Peter Flanigan and John Ehrlichman were said to agree with this view.

Dr. Kissinger said that we should not lose sight of the foreign policy benefits to be derived from international cooperation in space, but he agreed that we shouldn’t advocate a program we really don’t want.

His view was that we would be better off to give the Europeans beneficial access to our launchers rather than tying them into a program where they pay for technology transfer. We should not be dependent upon them for financial support of our programs.

What is needed is an intelligent program that we both want—one in which we can cooperate in the extension of knowledge.

Both agreed that we should not break off negotiations with the Europeans but instead to slow the pace and to devise a program which can be defended on a cost/benefit basis. We should not, however, soften our present negotiations position. Further study is required and no program decision should be made at this time.

Dr. Kissinger asked for a NSSM to be prepared calling for a technical cost/benefit analysis of the various alternative ways of cooperating in space with Europe. The study should be done by a Working Group chaired by Dr. David for ultimate consideration by the Senior Review Group, who would then apply political judgments to the technical analysis. The study should be done within the Executive Office of the President and circulated to the bureaucracy before consideration by the SRG.

Dr. David agreed. The details are to be worked out by the NSC and OST Staffs.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to cooperation in space.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 270, Agency Files, OST, Vol. III. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.
2. Extract of a memorandum of a discussion between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and the President’s Science Adviser David on post-Apollo program cooperation with the Europeans.