Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972

263. Summary of Discussions¹ ²

Washington, April 23, 1971, 6 p.m.

Post-Apollo Space Cooperation

On 23 April 1971 Dr. Kissinger chaired a discussion on post-Apollo space cooperation. The meeting was held in the White House situation room and was attended by the following individuals:

• White House Staff
  • Mr. Peter Flanigan
  • Dr. Clay T. Whitehead
• NASA
  • Dr. James Fletcher
  • Dr. George Low
• OST
  • Dr. Edward David
  • Dr. Norman Neureiter
• NSC
  • Colonel Robert M. Behr

After opening the meeting Dr. Kissinger asked for a review of the past negotiations with the Europeans on post-Apollo cooperation. Dr. Low outlined the substance of the US position taken in the two meetings which have been held with Minister Lefevre and his colleagues in the European Space Conference.

Dr. Kissinger stated that the main issue is whether a program of cooperation with the Europeans is desirable. If the President wishes to have a cooperative program of some substance, the US will have to provide launch services to the Europeans. If he decides against a program of co-operation, we will hold to a hard line on the provision of such services.

Dr. David noted, and the group generally agreed, that the primary motivation of the Europeans is to acquire US aerospace technology.

Mr. Flanigan said that the benefits to the Europeans will be totally disproportionate to their contribution. Moreover, the program described by Low was nothing like what the President wants. All that we need do to fulfill the President’s wishes is to arrange a symbolic gesture like flying a European astronaut in space.

Dr. Kissinger replied that the President has not given a great deal of thought to the various likely avenues of cooperation, but he does want something done with the Europeans that goes well beyond a cosmetic gesture.

Mr. Flanigan repeated his arguments about the penalties associated with the massive transfer of technology.

Dr. Whitehead supported Flanigan’s line of reasoning by stating that the President wants cooperative ventures to result in a net foreign policy benefit to the US. Our experience with INTELSAT should have taught us a lesson. A grandiose program (joint development of a space shuttle) like the group had been discussing would probably end up in a net loss in terms of international relations.

Dr. Kissinger asked Drs. David and Fletcher what is meant by “high technology transfer”. Neither was able to provide a good answer although both admitted an answer is very much needed.

Dr. Low asked the group to recognize that NASA’s actions to date represent what they thought the President wanted. Dr. Kissinger said he understood that to be the case.

Dr. Fletcher said that NASA is not in a position to dictate programs—only to suggest program options.

Dr. Kissinger then asked Dr. Fletcher to detail the various options open to us in addition to joint development of the shuttle.

Dr. Fletcher stated his opposition to an “integrated” program wherein the Europeans would. do sub-systems of the shuttle, but favored instead a separable program where the Europeans could do a complete task such as the space tug or a space station module.

Dr. David called attention to the question of launch services. Couldn’t we give the Europeans these services and try to interest them in programs other than the shuttle?

The consensus of the group was that the US should be forthcoming with regard to launch assurances, but that this view should not interfere with or cloud the on-going INTELSAT negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger asked NASA, in cooperation with OST, to prepare a paper (1) defining technology transfer and analyzing its implications and (2) describe the various possibilities for space cooperation with the Europeans in addition to the shuttle. The group would meet in two weeks to go over the NASA paper. Under Secretary Johnson would be invited to attend.

Colonel Behr asked Dr. Kissinger what he wanted to do about Secretary Rogers’ memorandum to the President. Dr. Kissinger said that an answer would have to wait until the NASA paper had been prepared, evaluated, and a program direction had been selected by the President.

The meeting then adjourned.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 393, Subject Files, Space Programs, 1971. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.Behr prepared talking points for Kissinger for this meeting. (Ibid.)
2. Minutes of Kissinger’s meeting with officials from NASA, OST, NSC, and other White House staff on post-Apollo space cooperation with the Europeans.