Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

70. Memorandum From Chester Crocker of the National Security Council Staff to Richard Kennedy and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, March 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

• The Indian Ocean and the Moscow Summit

Background

Hal Sonnenfeldt is currently staffing a March 21 memorandum (Tab A) from Gerard Smith to HAK proposing two Presidential initiatives in Moscow, one of which would be “a declaration, perhaps in the context of working to reduce tensions in South Asia, that the two Governments intend to exercise restraint in deploying naval forces to the Indian Ocean, so as to avoid military competition there.” The Smith memo refers also to an ACDA paper on various arms control possibilities for the Moscow agenda. The Indian Ocean portion is at Tab B.² It reflects ACDA’s conclusions from the most recent interagency study entitled “Non-Strategic Naval Limitations in the Indian Ocean,” which was submitted February 15. This study (Tab C),³ responding to HAK’s October 28 memo (Tab D),⁴ has not yet been staffed.

The Problem

The problem is what to do with the various parts of this puzzle. The reflex response of our Soviet area colleagues is that this whole subject is a “No-No” and that a Presidential initiative would be “out of the question.” I do not endorse the Presidential initiative suggested by Smith. But there are at least three valid objections to simply shelving the Smith memo and ignoring the subject in our preparations for Moscow:

1. The need to have a position should the Soviets bring up this or related subjects. There is no certainty that they will do so. In fact, we initiated the last exchange on the subject last July⁵ and have made it clear publicly on several occasions since (a) that the ball is in their court and (b) that we support the principle of avoiding military competition in the area. Moreover, the Soviets may prefer exploiting their position following the Indo-Pak war to pressing us for naval limits in the area. However, it is quite possible that the subject could surface in the context of discussions on bilateral rivalry in the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and South Asian regions. It would be surprising if our respective political-military objectives in these areas were not discussed, and the President should be prepared to deal with such discussion. This is not to say he should advocate Indian Ocean naval limits, but it does suggest that he may want to:

(a) set the record straight on who initiated naval escalation in the area,

(b) place our military presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in a broader context of U.S. support for military balance and super-power restraint, or

(c) reaffirm our public and diplomatic support for the general principle that both countries have an interest in avoiding military competition in the area.

All this is merely another way of saying that our preparations for Moscow should accurately reflect the record to date:

• —The Soviets have twice brought up the subject of restraint and/or naval limitations.⁶
• —Ambassador Beam has told Gromyko we favor the principle of avoiding military competition in the area.⁷
• —State Department publications have affirmed this principle, while U. Alexis Johnson has told the SFRC ⁸ we favor restraint and are not about to get involved in naval competition there.

2. There may be South Asian arguments for the U.S. side to raise this general subject, if it is considered a political rather than an “arms control” initiative. Our studies have concluded that the primary issues, interests, and threats in the Indian Ocean are political, not military-strategic. Military presence in this area seems, more than is usually the case, to have principally a political impact and relevance. Consequently, there is little logic in dealing with a political problem, such as growing Soviet presence and influence, through arms control measures whose one clear impact is to restrict military flexibility. We clearly do not want restrictions on U.S. naval flexibility—the one aspect of overall U.S. military power which is demonstrably superior to the USSR’s and, therefore, the one military element in which we possess a potential Indian Ocean advantage.

Not surprisingly, there are few advocates of Indian Ocean arms control, even of the “non-strategic” variety. The most recent study should convince any doubters on this score. Even ACDA argues only for a “general understanding” of a few lines which would serve as a joint U.S.–USSR statement of common interest in the principle of naval restraint.

In my view a U.S. initiative in this area begins to make more sense when the arms control aspects are eliminated.

If the subject of U.S.–USSR bilateral relations in areas of rivalry is likely to arise in any event—as suggested in subhead 1 above—it may be wise for our side to raise the general point that as superpowers we have a responsibility to exercise political restraint to avoid exploiting local conflicts, and to refrain from steps which could heighten local tensions.. If discussion developed, we could say that the size and nature of super-power military activity in such areas as the Indian Ocean was an element of such restraint. Such an initiative:

• —would be wholly consistent with our public posture to date on both the Indian Ocean (including MIDEASTFOR, Bahrein, and Diego Garcia) and the Subcontinent.
• —would enable us to continue to take the public position that we oppose cold war competition for unilateral advantage in the area, and have urged Soviet acceptance of our view.
• —could, if accepted by the Soviets, help reduce present tension and polarization on the Subcontinent and focus regional attention on any future Soviet behavior incompatible with its spirit.
• —would leave us as free as we are today to take any military steps we wanted in future contingencies, since no specific arms control undertakings would be involved.

3. We need to put our Indian Ocean review to bed and it is logical to do so now. Our review of Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean has developed a life of its own. Folding it into the Summit preparations has certain obvious advantages:

• —It would enable us to “consider” both Smith’s recommendation for a naval arms control initiative and the most recent ACDA/DOD study on Indian Ocean arms control. A brief summary of the ACDA/DOD study, covered by our recommendations, could be prepared for HAK and the President as part of the staffing of Smith’s memo.
• —It would be an appropriate way of apprising HAK and the President of the Indian Ocean review and of ensuring that the regional (i.e., Persian Gulf and South Asia) political context of U.S.-Soviet relations is adequately reflected in our preparations for Moscow.
• —It could serve as a mechanism for wrapping up the review, while indicating general White House interest in the level of Soviet and U.S. naval activity in the area. Specifically, we could respond to Smith or to the agencies via a memo reflecting Presidential consideration of Smith’s memo and the ACDA/DOD study. Such a memo would stress our desire to retain flexibility, while avoiding actions which could open the U.S. to charges of military escalation in the area.

Comment

I urge that we factor the ACDA/DOD study and Smith’s memo into the South Asia/Middle East input to the Summit preparations—with the recommendation that the President raise in Moscow the desirability of superpower political restraint in the Indian Ocean area.⁹

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–178, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 110. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. All tabs, with the exception of Tab D, are attached but not printed.
2. Attached at Tab B is the suggested language for a U.S.-Soviet communiqué declaring that both nations seek to avoid naval competition and exercise restraint in deploying naval forces to the Indian Ocean. It also explained the administration’s reassessment of Indian Ocean policy.
3. Printed as Document 69.
4. Document 64.
5. See footnote 7, Document 59.
6. See Documents 55 and 59.
7. See footnote 7, Document 59.
8. See footnote 3, Document 68.
9. Neither discussions at the Moscow Summit nor the declaration issued May 29 included material on the Indian Ocean. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, for documentation on the Summit and the concluding declaration.