Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

59. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

• August 11 SRG Meeting on the Indian Ocean²

The Purpose of the Meeting

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the two Indian Ocean follow-on studies generated by the April 22 SRG.³ You will recall that your memorandum of May 4 (at tab)⁴ called for the preparation of:

• —a paper describing a full range of possible arms control arrangements for the Indian Ocean and providing an overall assessment of this approach; and
• —a proposal for U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean for FY 72.

These papers were submitted in June. They are tabbed in your book⁵ together with our summary of them.

Your objectives in this meeting are:

1. to gain SRG approval of the interim naval presence paper;

2. to probe the need for some sort of posture (both public and diplomatic) on the Indian Ocean arms control question;

3. to examine critically whether we have any positive interest in pursuing further the arms control idea.

The Situation

The Soviets do not appear to be considering Indian Ocean arms control a matter of urgency or high priority. You recall that on March 26 Ambassador Dobrynin approached Secretary Rogers (see “Dobrynin Approach” in your book) concerning the U.S. attitude toward limitation of naval forces and bases in the region.⁶

Since then, Brezhnev has publicly criticized U.S. complaints about the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, and said the USSR was willing to solve “on an equal basis” the problem of “the navies of great powers… cruising about for long periods far from their own shores.” (See Brezhnev June 12 speech at tab in your book.)

However, as you know, Gromyko was not prepared to discuss Indian Ocean arms limitations when Ambassador Beam raised the subject in their meeting on July 28. (The reporting cable⁷ is tabbed in your book.) Although the ball is now in their court, we should probably have a position in case they surface the issue again.

Recently, the arms control issue was given fresh impetus by the decision of Ceylon’s Prime Minister Bandaranaike to campaign actively for the establishment of an “Indian Ocean Peace Zone” which would virtually bar all external military presence. (The proposal is tabbed and summarized in your book.) An important feature of the proposal is its apparent anti-Soviet flavor and its timing shortly after the Soviet-Indian treaty. State has circulated a paper (tabbed in your book) which discusses the Soviet-Indian treaty in the context of arms control options.⁸ Briefly, it notes that an arms control arrangement could help reduce U.S.–USSR polarization in the region symbolized by the treaty, and could limit specific military advantages the Soviets may have gained from the treaty; at the same time, however, an agreement limiting external military presence could free India’s hand to operate as a Soviet proxy or to undertake destabilizing activity in the area.

In any event, since Prime Minister Bandaranaike will be meeting the President after having presented her proposal to the UNGA, we have an additional reason to develop a position on Indian Ocean arms control. Embassy Colombo takes the view that Ceylon’s proposal does not offer a practical basis for resolving our Indian Ocean problems and is not at this time compatible with U.S. interests vis-à-vis the Soviets. Ambassador Strausz-Hupé states that it has been advanced partially to enhance the Prime Minister’s nonaligned image at India’s expense. He concludes that the proposal should be “decently but convincingly shelved,” while “nursing” the Prime Minister’s political objectives in taking the initiative.

Naval Presence Paper

The naval presence paper recommends a package of FY 72 proposals which closely resemble Option B of the initial NSSM 104 Study. (See pp. 7–8 of the NSSM 104 Summary⁹ in your book.) Basically, it calls for:

• —a qualitative upgrading of MIDEASTFOR by assigning a modern flagship and rotating modern destroyer types.
• —scheduling 2 task unit operations during FY 72.
• —modestly increasing the frequency of port visits stressing areas not normally visited by MIDEASTFOR.
• —increased utilization of Singapore for logistic support.
• —deployment of the existing maritime air surveillance detachment (3 planes) based at U-Tapao into the Indian Ocean as Vietnam requirements permit.

In our view, this is a modest package; the Navy’s over-stretched assets have probably been a factor in keeping it that way. The paper judges—and we concur—that the proposals keep open our future options and should not trigger significant reaction, provided they are tactfully implemented with an eye on the evolving diplomatic situation. At the same time, they achieve our purpose of not letting the Soviet naval increases go completely without U.S. response.

We nevertheless think you may want to use the SRG meeting to reemphasize the political dimension of our Indian Ocean review and to underscore the importance of not handing the Soviets or the littoral neutralists a propaganda field day.

On balance, our studies have concluded that we do not need a naval presence capable of matching the Soviets ship-for-ship, but one that signals, in the littoral state context, that our absence cannot be taken for granted. The political logic of this approach also requires that we not ignore littoral sensitivities in implementing our naval improvements. The style and timing of such measures as upgrading MIDEASTFOR should be considered in the light of possible developments in the littoral state context and in the arms control field.

You may want to underscore this point with JCS, by gently probing concerning the new flagship for MIDEASTFOR—the most permanent and, perhaps, visible naval improvement recommended. The point here is simply that there may be advantage in not delaying the replacement much longer, in view of the possibility of further diplomatic moves on arms limitation and in light of the U.K.’s impending withdrawal from the Gulf. The Navy, on the other hand, appears to be planning on replacing the present flagship towards the beginning of FY 1973. In our view it should be done as soon as possible.

Arms Control

You will recall that our initial purpose in looking at possible arms control arrangements was to discover if it might be possible to deal with the Soviet naval challenge by an agreement on mutual limitations. (You may want to refer to pp. 6–9 of the NSSM 110 Summary¹⁰ in your book.) In addition, there was concern that the Soviets might launch an arms control “offensive,” forcing us to respond or at least to think of possible responses. Although the Soviets appear to have put the issue on the back burner, we should probably not shelve the question without first:

• —deciding whether there is any positive advantage in pursuing the matter further. The issue here is whether the nature of the challenge and the level of our interests make a regional agreement more desirable than continued, low-level naval competition.
• —reaching some general consensus on what our posture should be in the event that the Soviets surface the subject again.

The ACDA/DOD Paper

There appears to be a consensus that Soviet interest in Indian Ocean arms control is focused primarily on limiting possible U.S. SSBN deployments to the area and, to a lesser extent, on limiting U.S. bases. Our interest, on the other hand, lies primarily in limiting Soviet surface deployments.

Turning first to the question of whether there is any advantage in pursuing arms limitation, the paper fails to come to grips with the issue of what, if anything, we should be prepared to sacrifice to get an agreement limiting Soviet naval presence, primarily because of sharp interagency disagreement over the merits of the exercise. Furthermore, assessment of the paper’s seven options is hampered by confusion between the criteria of negotiability and desirability.

Briefly, the seven options (spelled out in pp. 18–22 of our summary) are:

• Option I: An informal, generalized understanding to limit naval presence. (This is largely a procedural option which does not define our position on key substantive issues.)
• Option II: An agreement limiting surface combatants and existing bases, but not strategic systems such as SSBNs.
• Option III: An agreement limiting surface combatants, bases, and SSBNs.
• Option IV: An agreement limiting surface combatants less severely than the above, limiting existing bases, but not SSBNs.
• Option V: An agreement limiting surface combatants but not bases or SSBNs.
• Option VI: An agreement to freeze existing deployment and establish no new bases for one year while negotiations continue. (Like Option I, this is a procedural variant which does not spell out our substantive position.)
• Option VII: A multilateral undertaking by all outside powers to exclude all their forces from the Indian Ocean except for transits. (This is similar to the Ceylonese proposal.)

You will probably want to concentrate on Options II–V, and raise the following issues at the meeting:

Issue 1: SSBNs

The central strategic issue in the paper is our attitude toward the option of Indian Ocean SSBN deployments. The paper concludes that an agreement limiting such deployments would be “undesirable from a strategic standpoint.” (See the discussion on pp. 13–14 of our summary.) The argument here stresses asymmetry:

—We would in effect be bargaining away a strategic option— targeting the USSR, or the USSR and China simultaneously without overflight of the other—in exchange for the strictly local political benefit of limiting naval competition. Since the USSR cannot offer us a strategic quid in the Indian Ocean context, we should not accept unilateral limits on our force deployments.

We have no quarrel with this judgment. There are some, however, who would argue that SSBN deployments in the Indian Ocean are a purely hypothetical option which we should be prepared to sacrifice rather than take the blame for the failure of possible future talks with the Soviets. You may want to probe DOD and/or JCS on the likelihood of our wanting to deploy SSBNs in the area, but we doubt that anyone will argue in favor of placing our Indian Ocean interests ahead of our global strategic ones.

If one concludes that SSBN limitations are undesirable, this rules out Options III and VII in the paper. However, the argument for sacrificing SSBN deployments would become more cogent if we could get some sort of global or geographical limitation on Soviet strategic naval forces in return. You may want to raise this point at the meeting.

Issue 2: Bases

If one rules out an agreement limiting SSBNs, there is still the possibility of an agreement limiting only surface combatants and bases. (Options II and IV) The paper does not take a position on base limitations, though here again there is the problem of asymmetry since we and our allies have bases whereas the Soviets do not.

In our view, there are obvious disadvantages in an agreement requiring the dismantling of Western bases in exchange for a prohibition on future Soviet bases. However, supporters of this approach could, of course, argue that an arrangement limiting Soviet surface deployments to levels approaching our own would be a sufficiently attractive trade-off for base limitations. (Option II would do this, while Option IV which permits a higher level of Soviet deployments appears to be a non-starter.)¹¹

Issue 3: Surface Combatants

Option V confines itself to surface combatants. Though obviously the most desirable in terms of U.S. interests—or least undesirable, the JCS view—there are serious doubts about its negotiability.

A U.S. proposal along these lines could lead us straight to an impasse with the Soviets who would focus on, and perhaps, publicize, the issues of central concern to them—prohibiting SSBN deployment and limiting bases.

There is thus a risk of political embarrassment in any U.S. initiative which may outweigh the potential advantages of an agreed limit on Soviet naval forces. Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile to ask ACDA to outline a negotiating scenario designed to protect our interests on bases and SSBNs while achieving some limit on naval presence. The scenario could be submitted for review before final judgment on whether we wish to take the matter any further.

Issue 4: A U.S. Position: What you Want from this Meeting

If one concludes from the above that the U.S. does not at present find advantage in actively pursuing arms limitation in the Indian Ocean, there is still one avenue of further work that should be pursued:

To protect our public and diplomatic posture, it would be useful to direct the preparation of a U.S. position paper for possible use in handling the Ceylonese initiative or future Soviet proposals. This would have the additional advantage of having on paper an agreed government view on the subject. Such a paper would outline:

• —a U.S. counter to proposals either from the USSR or from the littoral states. This should be cast in terms of both diplomatic and public positions.
• —arguments to defend our position and deflect attention from issues which could cast it in an unfavorable light.

This paper should be produced over the next few weeks¹² so that it will be available before Mrs. Bandaranaike’s visit (October 19).

In developing such counters, you may want to consider whether there would be advantage in dealing with the Indian Ocean arms control idea by broadening the discussion to include:

• —global naval force limitations;
• —regional trade-offs in limiting strategic naval deployments near the U.S. and the USSR.

We recognize that this would take us far beyond the confines of our Indian Ocean review, and that we would not want to get into such a discussion without full consideration of the global strategic and force posture issues which are clearly involved. Hal Sonnenfeldt and Wayne Smith concur in the judgment that we should not pursue either global naval force limits or regional trade-offs in the Indian Ocean context at this time.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that we may be hard pressed to find credible and defensible counters should the pressures mount for inherently asymmetrical force cuts in the Indian Ocean or, for that matter, the Mediterranean. In time, events could develop in such a way that our interests would be best served by broadening the discussion—e.g., if the Soviet navy continues its rapid growth, or if we become especially anxious to limit Soviet strategic naval deployments near the U.S. Your talking points raise this issue, should you decide to pursue it at the meeting.

[Omitted here are a scenario for conducting the meeting and a list of the tabs of the briefing book.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71. Secret. Sent for information. A handwritten note by Kissinger reads: “I agree Smith should participate.” Above Kissinger’s comment, Haig wrote “will be there” and his initials.
2. The Senior Review Group did not meet on this topic until October 6. See Document 61.
3. See Document 58. The first of these two studies was “Indian Ocean Arms Control” prepared by ACDA, undated. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71) The second was “Report on NSSM 110 Follow-On: Proposals for a U.S. Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean for FY 1972,” prepared by an interagency working group chaired by the Department of Defense. Packard submitted it to Kissinger under a June 16 covering memorandum. (Ibid., Box H–178, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 110)
4. Attached but not printed.
5. Kissinger’s briefing book for the meeting, with its tabs, is attached but not printed.
6. See Document 55.
7. The tab is telegram 5355 from Moscow, July 28, in which Beam noted that while Gromyko was not prepared to discuss the issue, he did offer the “general observation” that the Soviets believed in the principle that “all open seas, including Indian and other oceans, should be free of military competition.”
8. The paper, entitled “Possible Soviet Gains in Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks,” concluded that “The USSR is particularly afraid and would do its utmost to prevent deployment of ballistic missile submarines on regular patrol in the Indian Ocean. The US decision, announced last December, to begin building a communications facility on Diego Garcia has probably strengthened Soviet fears that SSBN deployment is ultimately in the cards. The Soviets would probably also like to keep the Indian Ocean free of the periodic or regular US carrier or amphibious task forces which have been advocated by US proponents of a ‘blue water’ strategy in support of the evolving Nixon Doctrine.”
9. Document 46.
10. Document 57.
11. A handwritten note by Kissinger reads: “Also what procedure. How do we do it?”
12. See Document 60.