Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

68. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Chief of the Plans and Regional Affairs Division, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Linebaugh)¹

Washington, February 14, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Indian Ocean Naval Limitations

REF

• Your Draft Memorandum of 2/7/72²

I believe it would be a mistake for us to go back to the Soviets now on the Indian Ocean. The Soviets are well aware of our initial expression of interest after Ambassador Beam’s follow-up with Gromyko in July. The fact that Gromyko did not raise it with the Secretary during their conversations at UNGA last fall (although the Ceylonese Peace Zone proposal had been put forward), and that Dobrynin did not raise it during a meeting with the Secretary on February 4 despite widespread publicity of Ambassador Johnson’s remarks the same week,³ suggests to me that the Soviets are not greatly interested in pursuing the subject at this time.⁴ In any event, they owe us a reply. For the US to press now could be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness in the after-math of the Indo-Pak war which they might then seek to exploit.⁵

I understand there is a reasonably good prospect for a successful conclusion to the SALT talks before the President’s trip to Moscow.⁶ Should that happen the stage would be set for consideration of the next practical step in arms limitation for discussion with the Soviets. Conceivably, one such step might be an agreement to explore mutual “restraint” in the Indian Ocean.

I suggest that we use the time remaining before the trip to consider what the President might say on the subject in Moscow should he judge that, following a SALT agreement, he might want to suggest to the Soviets the possibility of some exploratory talks on the Indian Ocean.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 IND–US. Secret. Drafted by Robert W. Chase, Regional Political Adviser, and Stanley D. Schiff, Director of NEA/RA, on February 11.
2. Attached but not printed. Linebaugh drafted a memorandum to Nixon urging a U.S.-Soviet compromise to exercise restraint in permanent naval deployments as the best means to limit Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean. In his cover letter to Davies, Linebaugh also suggested that Rogers raise the issue with Dobrynin, following the line used by Beam with Gromyko on July 28. For the Beam–Gromyko discussion, see footnote 7, Document 59.
3. The memorandum of conversation between Rogers and Gromyko, February 2, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR. On February 1, Johnson testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S. base rights in Bahrain, noting the “good will” implicit in this U.S. policy. (Department of State Bulletin, February 28, 1972, pp. 279–284)
4. According to an October 11 memorandum from Richard Nethercut (EA/RA) to John Kelley (PM/ISO), a “foreign diplomat was told by a Soviet Foreign Ministry official earlier this year that the Soviets had broached the Brezhnev proposal with Hanoi and were given a negative reaction. Hanoi reportedly stated that it was premature to effect a regional security arrangement in Asia before the Indochina question had been settled.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 IND–US)
5. A handwritten note in an unknown hand in the margin next to this sentence reads: “no longer true.”
6. Nixon was in Moscow from May 22 to 30 for the Moscow Summit. SALT I was signed on May 26.