Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

327. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 25, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Points to be made to Israeli Ambassador Rabin

Events have overtaken the need for a precise response to the Israeli Note Verbale which was received on September 22 and which was related to the possible provision of Israeli air attacks on Syrian forces in Jordan.² As you know, on the afternoon of September 23 Ambassador Rabin suggested that the matter of Israeli military action in Jordan be held in abeyance in view of the withdrawal of Syrian regular forces from Jordan.³ In order to clear the record with respect to this and prior exchanges with the Israelis, State has proposed that Assistant Secretary Sisco deliver orally to Ambassador Rabin the message at Tab A. I do not believe that paragraph 4 of the proposed State text⁴ is acceptable for the following reasons:

(1) It would raise serious questions in the minds of the Israelis as to our fundamental willingness to defend Israel against Soviet attack.

(2) It is an especially abrasive and unnecessary affront to the Government of Israel in the light of the cooperative attitude they maintained throughout the recent crisis.

(3) Most importantly it could seriously hamper future cooperation with Israel at a time when the situation in Jordan remains tense and before we can be absolutely certain that it may not be necessary to call upon Israel again to take military action in Jordan.

I am informed that paragraph 4 was written personally by the Secretary of State because he believes that paragraph 3 of our earlier Note Verbale of September 21 to the Government of Israel constituted an open-ended commitment to protect Israel against Soviet attack (Tab B).⁵ I do not agree with this interpretation.

Recommendation:

That you authorize a new and terser response to Israel which will clearly clean the slate with respect to commitments made this week but which will avoid an unnecessary irritant and would not jeopardize future cooperative action if required.

An alternate text for your approval is at Tab C.⁶

Approve alternate text.

Retain proposed State language.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 336, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President, September 9–December 1970. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. Printed from an unsigned copy. All tabs are attached but not printed.
2. See footnote 10, Document 307.
3. A summary of the meeting with Rabin was transmitted in telegram 156646 to Tel Aviv, September 23, 2215Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARAB–ISR)
4. Paragraph 4 stated that “all aspects of our exchanges with Israel with regard to the Syrian invasion of Jordan, including those relating to the problem of possible Soviet military intervention, applied only to the situation which arose from the Syrian invasion and therefore no longer apply.”
5. See Document 311.
6. No action is indicated. In a September 25 memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, Saunders sought Kissinger’s approval for an oral reply to Rabin, which included a modification to the text Kissinger objected to in paragraph 4 of the original draft. The new paragraph 4 opened with the U.S. Government’s appreciation for “the prompt and positive Israeli response to our approach.” It continued that since “circumstances will be different if there is another attack, we consider that all aspects of the exchanges between us with regard to this Syrian invasion of Jordan are no longer applicable, and we understand that Israel agrees.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–076, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/25/70)