Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

326. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 24, 1970, 3:10–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State—
• U. Alexis Johnson
• Talcott Seelye
• Defense—
• David Packard
• Robert J. Pranger
• James H. Noyes
• CIA—
• Richard Helms
• David Blee
• [name not declassified]
• JCS—
• Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
• LTG John W. Vogt
• NSC Staff—
• Harold H. Saunders
• B/Gen. Alexander M. Haig
• Adm. R.C. Robinson
• Col. Richard T. Kennedy
• Samuel Hoskinson
• Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed:

1. to examine the availability of tanks for Jordan;

2. to review the Lebanon contingency plans.

Mr. Helms briefed from the attached notes.²

Mr. Kissinger: Have we more on the diplomatic front?

Mr. Johnson: No, not particularly. With regard to the hostages, we have sent a telegram with instructions to try to keep the five countries together and to test whether the PFLP representative in Beirut has any validity as a channel.³ We have entered a new phase now, with Jordan becoming more important since they now hold a lot of prisoners. With regard to relief for Jordan, we have a disturbing report from London of a British conversation with an ICRC representative who said that they did not want any help, military or civilian, from either the UK or the US.⁴ We are baffled by this and have asked Geneva to reconcile this report with present planning.⁵ The first evacuation plane, containing some 24 Americans and 25 others, has arrived in Beirut. There will be another flight tomorrow.

Mr. Kissinger: Has Sisco seen Rabin yet?

Mr. Johnson: We are waiting for the message to be approved.

Adm. Moorer: Would it be advisable to ease off on some of these response times for the 82nd Airborne and the forces in Europe? We could put it right back up if we had to. On the one hand, it might give the impression that we think everything is over and we are relaxing. On the other, it might be reassuring to the American public. We might also ease the alert on the aircraft in Turkey from four to six hours.

Mr. Kissinger: I think easing the response time on the aircraft is all right.

Adm. Moorer: We might also return the 82nd Airborne to its normal 22-hour time. The first brigade is now at 8 hours.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s hold that for 24 hours.

Adm. Moorer: How about the forces in Europe?

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s hold those for 24 hours, too. The planes in Turkey were originally for evacuation and I think it is all right to let them slip. I think we should look at the other elements every 24 hours.

Mr. Packard: I agree.

Mr. Johnson: You would keep the ships where they are?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, except for replacement of the Saratoga. I think we should look at this every day. Not only does it cost money but there is an effect on morale since the men are confined to their barracks and can’t go anywhere.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree—we will look at it every day.

Mr. Johnson: Frank Sieverts⁶ has been made our coordinator of emergency relief operations, working with AID. He has good contacts with the ICRC.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the hospital planes? Does the ICRC edict mean they can’t move?

Mr. Packard: They were being unloaded anyhow.

Adm. Moorer: They are on 24 hours notice.

Mr. Kissinger: How about economic assistance to Jordan?

Mr. Johnson: AID has enough money in its contingency fund for emergency relief for Jordan. The proposed supplemental package for Korea and Cambodia will include some MAP for Jordan. We have been discussing the amount and there is a good argument for $15 million, which was the amount of FMS credit which they won’t get now. I think inclusion of Jordan in this supplemental package will strengthen it. There appears to be no necessity for major economic assistance now. We have funds for emergency relief, and the Jordanian reserves are in pretty good shape. We do plan to go forward in the next budget on economic reconstruction.

Mr. Seelye: We are also weighing in with the Kuwaitis to get them to turn their support back on.

Mr. Pranger: We also have an ammunition replacement package ready to go.

Mr. Johnson: Fortuitously there is a ship arriving on October 10 which carries much of what they will need as replacement ammunition.

Mr. Pranger: Also, the first increment of the artillery package will dock soon.

Mr. Saunders: Have they asked for replacements? How could we do this?

Mr. Pranger: There are various ways: by MAP diversion requiring a Presidential Determination, or the Defense Secretary’s contingency fund. We have identified these in the resupply paper.

Mr. Johnson: If we get $15 million in the supplemental this will give us some flexibility. They will probably need replacements for the tanks they lost but these can come down the MAP road.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we do if the Syrians come back?

Adm. Moorer: We would be right back where we were on Sun-day,⁷ although the Israelis might take them on right away. It would be a question of what Iraq would do, and we should probably see how the Jordanians are handling it. They are in a better position than before. If there should be a combination of the Syrians and the Iraqis, without any outside help, we should probably start talking to the Israelis again.

Mr. Helms: I have a hard time seeing a scenario where Iraq would be off-again-on-again, too-little-too-late again. If they team up, this would be a major situation. We would be back to Sunday, only worse.

Adm. Moorer: We would not have an evacuation problem.

Mr. Kissinger: Nor would we have the evacuation pretext.

Mr. Johnson: The evacuation pretext was never very relevant to action in the north.

Mr. Packard: There would still be Americans there.

Mr. Kissinger: When you start losing more men than you are taking out you lose the pretext.

Adm. Moorer: The Ambassador was not too eager about the air evacuation. He was thinking about wheels.

Mr. Johnson: The road to Aqaba looks better.

Mr. Kissinger: If the Syrians should come back, would this be the time for a quick strike? Or should we let them come in and out every five days?

Mr. Johnson: If they should, it would be best if Jordan could bloody their noses every time.

Mr. Packard: It would be preferable to let the Jordanians do it by themselves.

Adm. Moorer: If the Syrians strike again by themselves, they probably won’t get back in. At least their losses would be much higher.

Mr. Packard: What do we know about Jordan tank losses?

Adm. Moorer: Very little—nothing like the Syrian losses.

Mr. Helms: The highest figure I have seen is 90.

Mr. Kissinger: How many were lost to breakdowns?

Mr. Helms: It’s hard to know that.

Adm. Moorer: Israeli recce indicates 75 to 90 lost all told.

Mr. Packard: Is there any way to replace these tanks in a hurry?

Mr. Johnson: They haven’t asked for anything yet. The King hasn’t had a chance to take inventory. I expect we will be hearing from him in the next few days.

Mr. Kissinger: But we are ready to replace ammunition and small arms.

Mr. Johnson: A ship arrives October 10.

Mr. Packard: Any possibility of a trade deal on tanks with Iran?

Mr. Johnson: Or Saudi Arabia?

Gen. Vogt: Israel is trying to sell tanks.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s look at the availability of tanks for Jordan.

Mr. Packard: The best way to nail this thing is to keep Jordan’s capability up. (to Pranger) Let’s get on this tank availability question.

Adm. Moorer: Rabin mentioned the oustanding performance of Jordanian tanks.

Mr. Seelye: The Israelis consider that the crucial factor was the inter-Arab pressure on Syria.

Adm. Moorer: Let’s first find out if the Jordanians need tanks. There are lots around the cities now. When they are no longer needed in the cities they could be moved north.

Mr. Johnson: Are Saudi tanks compatible with Jordanian tanks?

Mr. Pranger: Yes.

Mr. Packard, Adm. Moorer and Mr. Johnson agree to undertake a quick survey of the availability of tanks.

Mr. Kissinger: How about the Lebanese questions? What do we do if the same thing happens in Lebanon? Have we a draft cable?

Mr. Seelye: We have a cable.⁸

Adm. Moorer: What do you mean by the “same thing”?

Mr. Kissinger: If we have a civil war in Lebanon resulting from Palestinian action, and Lebanon asks for intervention, what would be our view?

Mr. Johnson: We can’t repeat 1958.

Mr. Helms: The imagination boggles. It was bad enough in 1958, but now, with the fedayeen as a complicating factor!

Mr. Kissinger: If we don’t do it, would we have the Israelis do it— or anyone do it? Let’s review the existing papers on Lebanon.

Mr. Saunders: You recall we had an Israeli option.

Mr. Kissinger: Would nothing be better than the Israelis? Let’s review these papers again.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Not attached and not found.
3. Document 324.
4. In telegram 7736 from London, September 24, 1324Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 JORDAN)
5. In telegram 157108 to Geneva, September 24, 1659Z. (Ibid.)
6. Frank Sieverts was the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for POW/MIA Affairs.
7. September 20.
8. Not further identified.