311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Jordan and Israel 1
155203. Ref: State 155166. Following is text of questions and answers delivered to Israeli Minister Argov at 10:30 EDT September 21: “Q. Will the U.S. agree to approach Israel formally in this matter?
A. We have indicated in our conversations our agreement in principle to the operation under discussion. If decisions are taken to conduct such an operation, they should be on the basis of those conversations and the fact that our common interests would be served.
Q. Will the King agree to request our assistance and to undertake to institute methods of communication and coordination between us?
A. We do not know the answer to this question. Israel is aware of the informal exchange of messages between Deputy Prime Minister Allon and the King which we conveyed. With respect to ground operations, the only indication we have of the Jordan attitude on this question was a statement by Zaid Rifai to our Ambassador that Israeli ‘ground operations are fine in the area as long as they are not here in Jordan.’2 We are seeking clarification on this question from the King. Israeli air strikes have been requested or approved on several occasions by the King.
Q. How will the U.S. act to prevent Soviet participation or involvement?
A. On September 20 the U.S. Government called upon the Soviet Government to take appropriate steps in Damascus to bring about withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan. Secretary Rogers made a public statement to this effect on September 20.3 We have and will continue to make clear to the Soviets our support for Israel’s security and integrity and its right to live within defensible borders. In the present crisis, the U.S. has augmented the Sixth Fleet; it has also taken other readiness measures. These clearly imply a decision not to permit Soviet intervention against Israel in the conditions under discussion. As for specific measures the U.S. may take to prevent Soviet intervention, these would depend on the circumstances and the situation that exists at the time. We have contingency plans for these eventualities.
[Page 876]Q. Is it understood that U.S. will side with us in the international political arena including the use of the veto in the Security Council on the grounds that the Syrian invasion of Jordan not only violates Jordan’s integrity but also threatens Israel’s security and therefore entitles Israel to take actions in her defense?
A. We would be prepared to take the position publicly, including in the Security Council, that such action by Israel represented legitimate self-defense since the Syrian invasion of Jordan threatened Israel’s security. While we cannot state precisely how we would vote in the Security Council on any particular resolution in the absence of precise knowledge of terms of that resolution, we would be prepared to veto a resolution which condemned Israel for this act of self-defense.
Q. Is it clear that Israel shall not be held responsible for the fate of the hostages?
A. The U.S. shall not hold Israel responsible for the fate of the hostages resulting from Israeli action against Syrian forces in Jordan.
Q. Is it understood that U.S. public statements on all matters pertaining to above questions shall be made on highest levels and not lower than Secretary of State?
A. We agree that major U.S. policy statements on this matter would be made at the highest levels.
Q. Answers to above questions should be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.
A. We believe that the oral answers to the above questions are clear and should not be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.”
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis (Treat as Nodis). Drafted on September 21 by Atherton; cleared by Kissinger; and approved by Davies. Passed to the White House.↩
- See footnote 7, Document 304.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 276 and footnote 3, Document 275, respectively.↩