324. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts1
157107. Refs: Bern’s 2423, 2425, 2427.2
- 1.
- After careful consideration reftels, we are persuaded that fresh approach to problem is highly desirable. Situation on the ground in Middle East has evolved over past several days. We strongly doubt that PFLP interlocuter with whom Boissier has been talking represents those elements actually holding hostages. Indeed, Boissier himself recognizes this probability and has proposed course of action Bern’s 2423 in order to smoke out valid negotiator on PFLP side.
- 2.
- We continue to hope that situation in Jordan will continue to improve and that Jordanian Government can play a larger role in obtaining the release of the hostages. Obviously, the GOJ must have numbers of PFLP members among prisoners currently held.
- 3.
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Boissier desires that the Bern Group powers undertake a more precise engagement. This is reasonable and we therefore propose for Group consideration a proposed letter to Boissier as set out below. In this connection we consider it essential that Israel participate and that the communication to Boissier be in the name of the five repeat five powers. Begin text:
“We have received your report on your efforts to obtain the release of the hostages held by the PFLP. The five governments are prepared to authorize you to discuss with your interlocutors on the following basis:
“(a) The United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, and Israel are prepared to release seven prisoners held in Europe plus two Algerians held by Israel in exchange for the release of all the hostages held by the PFLP.
“(b) The PFLP will gather all the hostages in a secure place so that they can be safe during the period when the modalities for their release are being arranged.”
- 4.
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With respect to the covering confidential memorandum, we believe it could be changed as indicated in the revised text which is set out below:
“For your confidential guidance: Our main objective remains to liberate all hostages in a global solution. As a first step you should aim to bring all hostages to a safe place, where their number and conditions can be verified by a representative of the ICRC. We, of course, understand your difficulties.
“You may in your oral presentation to the PFLP representative indicate that the language of point (a) indicating willingness to exchange prisoners for hostages in effect accepts the principle of exchange. You are cautioned that the governments have serious doubt about the ability of your interlocutors to deliver hostages, but have agreed to this procedure as a means of continuing the dialogue in the hope that you may discover a valid interlocutor.” End text
We recognize that Embassy Bern will have problems negotiating the above, but we consider it essential that Israel be brought on board. Furthermore, in light of fluid situation in the area, other powers should have no objection to spending some additional time in trying to arrive at reasonable negotiating position and finding those PFLP who actually control the hostages.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PS 7–6 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Beaudry (EUR/AIS); cleared by Seelye, Sisco, and Johnson; and approved by Rogers. It was sent to Bern, Bonn, London, Beirut, Amman, Tel Aviv, and Geneva.↩
- In telegram 2423 from Bern, September 23, 1611Z; telegram 2425 from Bern, September 23, 1815Z; and telegram 2427 from Bern, September 23, 2300Z, the Embassy discussed Boissier’s proposed letter to the PFLP, which sought the release all of the European and U.S. hostages not holding dual citizenship with Israel while moving the Israeli and Israeli dual citizens to a safe place. While the U.S. and Israeli Governments resisted the offer, the Swiss, West German, and British Governments considered the proposal the best opportunity to get some of the hostages out while securing the rest in a safe location during further negotiations. (Ibid.)↩