Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

264. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 18, 1970, 8:35–9:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State—
• U. Alexis Johnson
• Rodger P. Davies
• Defense—
• David Packard
• Robert J. Pranger
• CIA—
• Richard Helms
• David Blee
• JCS—
• Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
• Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
• Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais
• NSC Staff—
• Harold H. Saunders
• Col. Richard T. Kennedy
• Adm. R.C. Robinson
• Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

1. CIA, with State, will do a paper on the foreseeable outcomes of the Jordan situation, their impact in the area and their consequences for the US.²

2. Defense will do a paper spelling out what would be required by way of base rights, overflight rights, supplies, etc., if a decision should be made to use US aircraft based in Europe (as opposed to carrier aircraft) in support of Hussein.³

3. It would be better to let the airborne battalion in Europe move to the training area tomorrow at a cost of an additional six hours of alert time (from four to ten hours) than to convey an alerting signal by holding them.

Mr. Helms gave a briefing on the current situation, using a map, from the attached text.⁴ He noted also that Pravda has begun to take a harder line on US military movements and the possibility of US intervention. Cairo press (Haikal) is also warning against US movement and saying the Soviets will not retreat but will be in the area for generations.

Mr. Kissinger: Any movement on the diplomatic side?

Mr. Johnson: Nothing. We are a little disappointed that Nasser has not made any statement in support of Hussein.

Mr. Davies: The Egyptians are being very cautious, giving straight news. I anticipate before too long they will call for a stand-down by all parties and suggest a new effort at mediation. In Bern, all parties are beginning to feel that Israel should agree to accept part of the package in order to obtain release of the hostages. They are looking to Washington to convince Golda Meir of the necessity for this.

Mr. Kissinger: What is in it for Israel? Most of the passengers are Americans.

Mr. Johnson: They are American supporters of Israel.

Mr. Kissinger: But they are American citizens.

Mr. Packard: There is nothing in it for Israel.

Mr. Helms: [3 lines not declassified]

Mr. Kissinger: In this circumstance guerrillas could grab any airliner with Jews on it.

Mr. Johnson: The Jewish community is beginning to pressure Israel.

Mr. Kissinger: Of course the guerrillas haven’t said what they want.

Mr. Davies: No—they have made no specific demands.

Mr. Johnson: I am somewhat sympathetic to the Israelis in this. It is very hard for them to accept the principle of hostages in the absence of any specifics.

Mr. Davies: In discussion with Argov yesterday I agreed that Israel could not accept the principle of exchange in the abstract, but said they might be able to look at a specific package of names and numbers. He did not disagree.

Mr. Johnson: We might have a completely different situation if the fedayeen are defeated, assuming the hostages survive.

Mr. Davies: We also have a TASS report speculating that either US or Israeli forces might intervene and warning that the US should not inject itself into the situation in the guise of protecting American citizens.

Mr. Johnson: That was to be expected—I see nothing unusual in this. We have made no approach to the Russians and we have heard nothing from them.

Mr. Packard: This might be a signal as to Iraqi intentions.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t think the Russians are that well informed on the Iraqi.

Mr. Davies: I think this was more a reaction to the President’s Chicago statements.⁵

Mr. Kissinger: So we believe the fighting is likely to continue; we don’t expect it to deteriorate?

Mr. Helms: I think it will be slow.

Mr. Johnson: This street fighting is tough going.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we speculate on the possible outcomes? What probability is there that Hussein will win an unambiguous victory?

Mr. Packard: There is high probability unless he is pressured by other Arab states.

Mr. Kissinger: How long will it take?

Mr. Davies: Yesterday the Jordanians said it would be over today. I think this is overly sanguine. They will have a tough job mopping up.

Mr. Johnson: I would say ten days to two weeks.

Mr. Davies: They can probably get control of central Amman in 24 hours.

Mr. Packard: It will be longer if the Iraqis and Syrians come in.

Adm. Moorer: I think there will be conflict for several weeks.

Mr. Kissinger: Would the fedayeen then be broken for the time being?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, they would have expended most of their ammunition and equipment.

Mr. Johnson: The fedayeen are apparently fighting desperately. We have a report that the Jordanians are not taking any prisoners.

Mr. Helms: It depends to some extent on your judgment of Hussein. If he cleans out the fedayeen headquarters in Amman things will be quiet. He hasn’t done that yet. In the past, he has moved to a certain point against the fedayeen and then, on the basis of a cease-fire or an agreement with the fedayeen, has stopped. I think this time, too, he will stop short of an unambiguous victory.

Mr. Kissinger: If he stops short of victory, either on his own initiative or under pressure from other Arab countries, then what?

Adm. Moorer: We then may face the problem all over again later.

Mr. Kissinger: What would be the relative positions of Hussein and the fedayeen?

Mr. Johnson: The King’s position would be somewhat improved.

Mr. Packard: The King’s position would be improved. He would have done enough damage to the fedayeen to slow them down for some time.

Mr. Kissinger: But he can’t stop short of quelling the fedayeen and still maintain the morale and effectiveness of his troops.

Mr. Davies: It is significant that there have been no indications of Jordanian troops being anything but loyal and disciplined.

Mr. Kissinger: If the King persists, he is all right; if he doesn’t persist, he is dead?

Mr. Davies: Not dead, but he is only buying time. In the long term he will lose control.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) Will you and State do a paper for us on the foreseeable outcomes and how they would affect the situation in Jordan and in the Middle East generally; their impact on the peace initiative; what actions any of these might impose on us? Could we have the paper by tomorrow so that we could discuss it when we meet?

Mr. Helms: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: What is our military situation?

Adm. Moorer: We have two carriers, a cruiser, 14 destroyers, an ammunition ship and an oiler at the 33–33 location south of Cyprus. We have Task Force 61 with an embarked Marine battalion near Crete. The Springfield, the Sixth Fleet flagship, will join the Force on the 19th. We have issued orders to the amphibious group to sail on schedule. Once out of sight of land, the Guam will move on ahead and will enter the Gibraltar Straits on Saturday, September 26th. The Kennedy has been ordered to proceed to the Mediterranean and is on its way fully equipped with ammunition, although we may need to augment the Sparrow missiles. It will arrive in the Gibraltar Straits on Friday, September 25. It will be well into the Mediterranean when the President arrives.

Mr. Johnson: How big is the amphibious group?

Adm. Moorer: 1500 men, with a total of 16 helicopters, 4 of them the big ones.

Mr. Kissinger: The President has indicated that if air support becomes necessary, he does not want it to come only from the carriers.

He wants to see what we could do from Europe.

Adm. Moorer: This would depend on the base situation.

Mr. Kissinger: Where?

Adm. Moorer: Preferably in Turkey.

Mr. Kissinger: But the Turkey won’t let us do it.

Adm. Moorer: Or in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Kissinger: The Saudis won’t do it either.

Mr. Packard: We have some F–111s with a longer range. If we could carry in logistical supplies (bombs, fuel, etc.) we could operate from Cyprus.

Mr. Kissinger: (To Mr. Packard) Could you give us a paper on what would be involved if we should operate from Europe? I owe the President a response on this. The paper should indicate what the problems are; what would be needed if it were to be done.

Adm. Moorer: The problem is the base.

Mr. Kissinger: You could start by saying you need a base, outline what you would have to haul in to a base. I have had three requests from the President for this and have still not responded.

Mr. Packard: Turkey would be the only place for such an operation. Turkey (Incirlik) is the only place where things are already available.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) You should include in your think piece the various contingencies of a Hussein victory, some sort of withdrawal, or a reverse. We don’t expect a reverse, do we?

Mr. Helms: Not now. What you want is a reasonable bet as to the outcome.

Mr. Kissinger: And the consequences for us.

On press guidance, will we begin to get some stories on the sailing of the Kennedy?

Adm. Moorer: Not now.

Mr. Johnson: Only when it reaches Gibraltar a week from today.

Adm. Moorer: It will be evident in a day or two that she has changed her schedule, but the real impact will be when she enters the Straits.

Mr. Kissinger: We should have suggestions for press guidance before Friday.

Mr. Packard: As of this moment it should be reasonably low key.

Mr. Johnson: I think Bob McCloskey, Henkin and Ziegler should talk and we should give them contingency guidance today.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. We should all say the same thing. I think any statements should come from Defense.

Adm. Moorer: I have one question pertaining to the readiness of the airborne battalion in Europe. They are scheduled to go to the training area today. If we hold them back, this will be a readiness indicator. If we let them go, it will cost us six hours. I think this six hours is acceptable.

Mr. Johnson: I agree. I think changing the time from four to six hours is acceptable.

Mr. Kissinger: They were primarily designated for an evacuation of Amman.

Adm. Moorer: They would be an advance element for whatever we do.

Mr. Kissinger: It would take us ten hours to make up our minds.

Mr. Packard: We have no indication on the status of Jordanian Army ammunition supplies.

Mr. Johnson: Hussein has been advised that we are ready to help them if they need help, but we have heard nothing from him.

Mr. Kissinger: And we have the standby air capability to move it, haven’t we?

Mr. Pranger: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we need any more communication with the Israelis?

Mr. Davies: We have had good exchanges.

Mr. Helms: [1 line not declassified] They are looking to the President’s meeting with Golda Meir today.

Adm. Moorer: We have also readjusted our C–130s. We have moved the five from Turkey, are holding five in Germany and will have five more in the UK by midnight—a total increase of 15 aircraft.

Mr. Kissinger: We will meet tomorrow morning. We will let you know as to time. (It was subsequently agreed to meet at 9:00 a.m., Saturday, September 19.)⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. The CIA/State Department paper on possible outcomes and implications of the Jordan situation, received in the White House on September 18, is ibid., Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/19/70.
3. Not found.
4. Not attached and not found.
5. See footnote 2, Document 261.
6. See Document 267.