Office of the Historian

258. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s Chief of Staff (Haldeman)1

Washington, September 17, 1970, 9:35 a.m.

K: I have been with the President2 and everything seems to be OK. I have had a good talk with Bill and no problems.3 He knows that [we have to be strong.] I think it is a good break if we do it in a tough manly way. Of course, if we fall on our face … but we won’t because we won’t let it fail.

H: How is the President tracking on this? Is he all right?

K: The President is in good shape. He talked about the course he mentioned yesterday morning. I think he is softening though. After he has heard everybody [I think things will be fine.] I am having full plans made to implement it if he orders it—we can do it.

H: You know he is going to that newspaper at 11 o’clock.

K: That should be very low key.

H: Did you tell him that?

K: No, but I have a call in to him and I will. The Viet Cong have made a new peace proposal. It is still not acceptable but they are softening.

H: [omission in the original] move.

K: I am delighted with it. If we can do it and we will do it.

H: Bill is along with you on it? No problem there?

K: He is dead without it.

H: But you do not know if he knows that.

K: No, he knows. He does not want to be out in front on this. [He knows that we have to be firm on this. He knows if the King falls then this will be the biggest [omission in the original] in diplomatic history.] In fact he is urging us on. If it fails—no worse than before. But it cannot fail. We will not let it fail.

H: Will you need the President today?

K: Just make damn sure I can get to him on the telephone— wherever he is. You probably do that anyway but will you double check? We have a 3 p.m. meeting this afternoon.4

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. All brackets, except those that indicate an omission in the original transcript, are in the original.↩
  2. See Document 256.↩
  3. See Document 257.↩
  4. See Document 260.↩