Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait¹

Washington, May 24, 1972, 2233Z.

92049. Subj: Military Equipment Sales to Gulf States. Ref: Kuwait 768.² Joint State–Defense Message.

1. State and DOD concur in observations para 4 reftel that we do not wish to stimulate sales of US military equipment in Gulf and that there is need for official monitoring insofar as possible of contacts between private American companies interested in stimulating such sales in Lower Gulf states. Problem is to find most effective and realistic method of monitoring which will on one hand serve to dampen Gulf state enthusiasm for unnecessary equipment while on other assuring that American commercial firms rather than USG are in forefront of those equipment supply relationships which may develop. A basic problem is that we cannot, nor should we, declare Gulf states off limits to American firms interested in the supply of equipment when competitors from other countries are working the territory. Moreover, when interest of Gulf states in certain types of equipment comes to USG’s attention, there are problems in contacting suitable American firms. To call in one American company to exclusion of others would amount to USG’s selection of “chosen instrument” to sell a particular type of equipment in the area. On the other hand, if interest in the type of equipment is developed by one American firm, there are inhibitions on USG’s passing the sales opportunity to the attention of its competitors.

2. Although USG cannot prevent American firms from contacting Gulf states, we can maximize use of existing controls to partially meet the problem. In cases where requests for a license to export technical data or equipment come directly to Munitions Control from American private firms, USG will exercise responsibility to approve or deny requests on a case-by-case basis in accordance with guidelines of US arms policy for Lower Gulf and, when US classified military information is involved, in accordance with our security policy. When, as in the Sullivan case,³ an American firm asks us for policy guidance prior to making unclassified presentation, USG will endeavor to discourage it from stimulating interest in equipment which under guidelines of US arms policy for Lower Gulf we would prefer not to see sold to Lower Gulf states. As general rule, in situations in which we learn second hand that Lower Gulf state may be interested in US arms we will ask diplomatic posts to check out seriousness of host government interest in equipment. We would probably not follow this procedure in cases involving insignificant amounts of items such as small arms, but would, as a general rule, follow it in all significant sales cases and in cases raising policy problems. Action on sales cases of latter type would not be taken until diplomatic post involved has confirmed that host government interest in equipment was indeed serious. Beyond above restraints, burden will fall largely on diplomatic posts in area to monitor US sales promotors.

3. In cases where Gulf states officials raise directly with area posts their interest in American equipment, Lower Gulf arms policy when finally approved, should be guideline for initial response. Formal requests through diplomatic channels should be, of course, forwarded to Washington for decision.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 UAE. Secret. Drafted by Twinam; cleared in NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, DOD/ISA, DOD/ISA/SA, MC, PM/MAS, and JCS/J5; and approved by Atherton. Also sent to Jidda, Tehran, London, and USCINCEUR.
2. In telegram 768 from Kuwait, May 1, the Embassy discussed the need for a flexible U.S. policy toward the sale of arms to the lower Persian Gulf, and suggested ways to deal with Sheikh Zayid’s desire for arms. (Ibid.)
3. Not further identified.
4. Printed from an unsigned copy.