59. Editorial Note
During the first half of 1967 disaster struck both the U.S. and Soviet space programs. On January 27 Astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee died when fire engulfed their space capsule during a training exercise, and less than 3 months later Soyuz 1 cosmonaut [Page 114] Vladimir Komarov was killed during re-entry into earth orbit. These disasters and a $1 billion Congressional cut of the NASA budget prompted a reassessment of the U.S. program. On May 10 Henry Owen, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, sent a memorandum to Secretary Rusk suggesting that a third country, such as Japan, propose U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space by fixing “1971 or 1972 as the Lunar Exploration Year (i.e., as the year in which moon landings are to take place), with a view to defusing the moon race and thus ensuring that it is not prosecuted at a pace which would endanger astronauts’ lives.” (Department of State, S/PC Files: Lot 72 D 124, Science and Technological Development 1967)
In a May 13 memorandum to Humphrey, Welsh noted that agreement on these suggestions was unlikely: “Little practical possibility exists in the near future in cooperative activity with the USSR on flying spacecraft with astronauts from both countries, or particularly of a joint venture to go to the moon. The former difficulty arises from a lack of training and acquaintance with the equipment and also a dead-end argument as to whose equipment would be used for what. The latter is impractical because both countries have proceeded so far along the path of facilities and equipment that any joint venture would undoubtedly require scrapping of major investment and a total net increase in costs.” (Minnesota Historical Society, Papers of Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files, Outer Space General Files 1964–Apr 1967, 150.F.9.10 (F))
Later in May, the Department submitted a redraft of its October 1966 paper (Document 55). The revised paper, entitled “Space Goals and Foreign Policy Priorities,” was similar to the earlier version, and re-emphasized its most important points, especially in light of the conclusion of the PSAC report on interplanetary travel (see Document 58). The paper noted: “as best as we can now understand its implications, an interplanetary program—particularly a manned planetary program—will have the least direct relevance to our international needs.”
The paper pointed out that overseas interest in a U.S.-Soviet space race was diminishing and that a post-Apollo program should not be designed in that context since “it appears that space will be increasingly internationalized.” It concluded that space objectives were important, but that they must be competitive with other national goals and that the United States must embrace a broad-based approach to science because “the ‘Sputnik 1’ of the future could well occur not in space, but in some other field of science or technology” which has an “equal or greater” claim on U.S. resources. (Letter from Kohler to Rostow, May 26; Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Post-Apollo (Outer Space Goals), Box 16)
The paper raised some questions at the White House. Charles Johnson wrote to Spurgeon Keeny on July 11: “Did you get a copy of [Page 115] this directly? I don’t know what State expects this paper to do. I don’t think NASA has yet reacted.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Opportunities for Expanded International Cooperation in Outer Space Activities, July 1967)
In June the Interagency Working Group on Expanded International Cooperation in Outer Space Activities submitted its final report to the Vice President. The report sounded a note of caution on international cooperation in space, citing numerous problems of classification and control. NASA’s leaders did not believe that the possibilities for cooperation should be the prime criteria for determining national space goals. “We must be careful lest, in designing our space programs for the future, we submerge these opportunities in commitments to other objectives or projects which do not lend themselves as readily to international cooperation.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, SP 6)