Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues

55. Department of State Policy Paper¹

Washington, October 1966.

SPACE GOALS AFTER THE LUNAR LANDING

Summary

Even before the outcome of the moon race has been decided, we face the question of whether to commit ourselves to still more ambitious programs—proceeding with manned exploration of the moon after the initial landing; mounting large-scale scientific investigations with unmanned planetary and solar probes; projecting man through space to the planets.

These are challenging goals. There are probably good reasons for pursuing them in due course, and achieving them might enhance our international position. For example, efforts directed toward manned lunar exploration and toward conducting scientific observations from the moon’s surface would be useful for advancing scientific knowledge and could demonstrate that the moon race was not an end in itself.

However, from the standpoint of our foreign policy interests, we see no compelling reasons for early, major commitments to such goals, or for pursuing them at the pace that has characterized the race to the moon. Moreover, if we can de-emphasize or stretch out additional costly programs aimed at the moon and beyond, resources may to some extent be released for other objectives—foreign aid, domestic needs, scientific efforts in other areas—which might serve more immediate, higher priority U.S. interests.

A Twofold International Objective

Instead of indefinitely extending the space race, it would be preferable to work toward a twofold objective:

—“De-fusing” the space race between the U.S. and Soviets. This would mean working toward arrangements for conducting major future ventures jointly, or at least coordinating national efforts with a view to limiting pressures for racing toward new goalposts deep in space. We probably can’t expect the Soviets to be seriously interested in tapering off before (and unless) the moon race itself convinces them that cooperation—or the more deliberate pacing of space exploration achievable through coordination—is more advantageous than wasteful national competition. For our own part, we can proceed now to examine ways and means of working with them when and if they are ready, and we can seek to engage them in additional cooperative efforts in near space.

—Bridging the gap between the space powers and others. While continuing efforts to ameliorate the political and economic effects of the widening technological gap, we can and should work harder to bridge the gap in awareness and understanding of the changes just emerging, for example, from the new tools of communication, the deepening knowledge of weather and climate, the increasing openness of the earth to the view from space. Although our own grasp of the potentialities of these changes is still limited, that of technically unsophisticated countries is far less. Greater awareness and understanding will be needed to ensure an international adjustment consistent with our own interests. This means using our program more effectively to engage the interests of others, partly through broadening the base of cooperation, searching out and resolving potential problem areas; and demonstrating responsible leadership in the process.

Implications for our Space Effort

Given the uncertainties that will continue to persist in space as well as on earth, we will need a vigorous and imaginative space effort. In order to support the foregoing twofold objective while ensuring flexibility to meet unforeseeable needs, we might most usefully emphasize programs serving the following purposes:

• —Advancing our defense/arms control/peacekeeping interests. On the one hand, we will need to continue using capabilities in support of our defense programs, and to avoid future technological and psychological surprises affecting our security. On the other hand, we should be ready to use space technology for arms control and peacekeeping if and as political conditions permit.
• —Utilizing space as a resource for man. This would involve placing added emphasis on practical applications (for example, communications, meteorology, earth resources survey satellites) which serve to “bring space down to earth” and make space useful and meaningful to “haves” and “have nots” alike.
• —Extending options for cooperation. While the preceding programs offer a number of opportunities for cooperating, it may also be desirable to open new doors. For example, a Manned Orbital Research Laboratory could serve scientific purposes and provide a vehicle for cooperation in manned spaceflight.
• —Extending technical options. On a selective basis, we should move ahead with capabilities necessary for advanced manned and unmanned spaceflight. This should enhance our flexibility and help keep our knowledge and skills at the “cutting edge of technology.”

This kind of program emphasis would not be cheap, but it would be less costly than an indefinite expansion of the scope and pace of the space race. If we pursue this kind of program vigorously and imaginatively, we will have a firm footing for our foreign policy interests as they are affected by space.

The decisions now confronting us will, of course, be influenced by a broader range of considerations, and foreign policy needs must be properly related to other national interests. For present purposes, the main question is whether the thrust of the approach outlined above is in the right direction.

[Here follow Sections A. The Problem; B. Basic Considerations: 1. Changing International Attitudes, 2. Continuity of Soviet Objectives, 3. Security and Uncertainty in Space, 4. Factors Bearing on Decisions; C. Programmatic Goals: 1. Priority Programs, 2. Bonus Program; D. International Framework: 1. A Twofold International Objective, 2. De-fusing the Space Race, 3. Bridging the Gap Between the Space Powers and Others; and E. Pro’s and Con’s.]

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 1 US. Secret. Prepared by the Policy Planning Council. A typed note on the cover page reads: “The Secretary of State believes the attached paper may be of interest to Members of the Space Council. The Secretary, however, reserves his own position pending discussion in the Council.” Only the summary (pages i-iii) of the 23-page report is printed here.