Summary of Print Volume
Note: The parenthetical citations are to the numbered documents in the text of the print volume.
The print volume presents documentation on U.S. relations with the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean during the last 3 years of the Eisenhower administration. The volume first focuses upon general U.S. policy toward Latin America during the period and U.S. policy regarding hemispheric defense and military assistance to the American republics. Also included are principal records regarding the visits by Vice President Richard M. Nixon to South America in April and May 1958, Dr. Milton Eisenhower to Central America later that August, and President Eisenhower to South America in February and March 1960. The volume covers the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics held in Santiago, Chile in August 1959 as well as U.S. policy in the Caribbean from 1958–1960. Finally the volume presents documents on the main line of the bilateral relations of the United States and Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Documentation on U.S. relations with Cuba and U.S. policy toward the Castro regime is presented in Volume VI, Cuba.
By the spring of 1958, the Eisenhower administration had become greatly concerned with the rising tide of social unrest in Latin America due to the political instability and intensified economic difficulties experienced by the region. It also noted with alarm the activities of indigenous communist groups in the area and the attention being given Latin America by the Soviet bloc.
On May 21, the National Security Council considered a “Report on Latin America” prepared by its Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) which outlined these challenges to U.S. policymakers (2). One week later, it adopted an “Operations Plan for Latin America” in which were enumerated a set of principles to which U.S. policymakers should adhere in conducting policies toward the region. These included the principles of non-intervention, provision of individual and collective aid (both economic and security related), and the elimination of Soviet and communist influence in the area (3).
On February 16, 1959, the National Security Council adopted a new “Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America” [Facsimile Page 48] which incorporated the principles set down in May 1958. The new policy had as its goals the elimination of communism in the Western Hemisphere, improvement of the economic lot of the Latin American peoples, and the cooling of ultranationalist sentiment in the region which threatened U.S. interests (11). This policy remained valid for more than a year.
[Typeset Page XLIV]In January and February 1960, the administration moved to reevaluate its Latin American policy in the wake of the Cuban Revolution and the intensification of Soviet and communist propaganda and political activities in the region. Accordingly, the National Security Council discussed the need to discourage Latin American governments from pursuing relations with the Soviet bloc (13) and to provide them with increased economic support (14).
The nature of U.S. military policy toward Latin America was actively discussed during the period 1958–1960. In July 1958, officials within the Department of State’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs recognized the need to reevaluate and rationalize this relationship (17).
On July 18, 1958, the Congress passed Public Law 85–532 providing for the lease of U.S. naval vessels to certain Latin American nations on the basis of a series of 5-year renewable loans. The receiving nations were to pay the cost of modernizing and activating the ships. The measure, policymakers believed, would promote Latin American participation in hemispheric defense and in training exercises with U.S. naval forces (20). By April 1959, it had become apparent that the financially troubled Latin American nations could not afford the cost of operating the vessels. On April 19, Acting Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William P. Snow wrote to Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Richard B. Russell requesting that the loan of the ships be continued on a “non-reimburseable” basis (23). Russell reproached the Department for not having foreseen the inability of the receiving nations to maintain the vessels but agreed to the request (24).
In January 1960, the Department of State turned its attention to the formulation of a “new concept” of U.S.-Latin American military relations according to which the United States was to assume the primary burden for hemispheric and continental defense. The armed forces of the Latin American nations were to be used almost exclusively to maintain their own internal security and intra-hemispheric peace (30).
[Facsimile Page 49]The Department of Defense rejected the “new concept” stating bluntly that “at this time there is no justification from a military point of view for a major reorientation of U.S. military policy toward Latin America or for a change in the U.S. strategic concept of the Western Hemisphere” (31). Ultimately, the two departments agreed to explore the matter further together (32).
The volume turns next to the trip of Vice President Richard Nixon to South America in April and May 1958. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles raised the possibility of such a trip with the Vice President in a letter dated March 6 of that year (42) suggesting an itinerary which was later expanded considerably.
The trip itself was marked by violent demonstrations in Lima, Peru and Caracas, Venezuela against Nixon’s presence and U.S. policies in [Typeset Page XLV] the region (46). The violence was attributed by U.S. officials who accompanied the Vice President to be orchestrated by communist agents. The demonstrations prevented Nixon from carrying out many of his scheduled activities in Venezuela.
An analysis of the Vice President’s trip made by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on May 15, the day of his return to Washington, concluded that the visit had essentially been a success from the United States’ standpoint, even in Peru and Venezuela. It argued that the confrontations had been directed primarily by communist-led organizations and that the revulsion that the violence caused among the peoples of the countries visited by the official party would benefit the United States in Latin America (54).
On May 22, the Vice President himself reported on his trip to the National Security Council indicating that the dangers of communism in Latin America were greater than at any time before. He was concerned that few of the democratically-elected political figures with whom he had met properly understood the insidious nature of the threat in their countries. The people themselves, he believed, were more wary of the return of traditional right-wing dictatorships than of the threat of communist-led revolution (56).
In view of the difficulties experienced by the Vice President’s official party in May, precautions were taken to ensure the safety of the President’s brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, during his subsequent goodwill trip to Central America that year. His trip was delayed from June to July 1958 while detailed reports from the Central Intelligence Agency and the appropriate [Facsimile Page 50] embassies were prepared to assess the likelihood of anti-U.S. demonstrations during the visit (61, 64). The President, the Secretary of State, and the Director of Central Intelligence were all involved in the decision-making process leading to the successful and peaceful trip of July 12–August 1 (66).
In December 1959, Secretary of State Christian Herter and the National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs urged President Eisenhower to visit South America to underscore U.S. interest in the region (68). On January 6, 1960, the White House announced that the President would visit Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay between February 23 and March 3. The trip was successful. President Eisenhower was greeted warmly and received favorable treatment in the local media (77).
The volume turns next to the events surrounding the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics held in August 1959. Tensions in the Caribbean between the new revolutionary government of Cuba and its neighbors had risen in the spring of 1959 and climaxed with the armed incursions into Panama and the Dominican Republic by political dissidents operating from Cuba. [Typeset Page XLVI] Tensions between Rafael Trujillo’s Dominican Republic and Cuba as well as newly-democratic Venezuela were near the boiling point. The U.S. Government, although reluctant to back the autocratic Trujillo against his neighbors, was nevertheless determined to uphold the principles of non-intervention and non-aggression in the hemisphere. It suggested that tensions in the region be reduced through a meeting of the Western Hemisphere’s Foreign Ministers (81). The Council of the Organization of American States approved the proposal on July 13 (82).
The meeting opened in Santiago, Chile, on August 12. Secretary Herter addressed its second plenary session the following day and called for a new declaration of principles of the inter-American system, formation of a special temporary committee to study the Caribbean situation, and authorization for a permanent committee, such as the Peace Committee, to make a study of the problems underlying the tensions in the Caribbean (94). Herter cabled the President on August 17 that the meeting had been a success and that the U.S. proposals had been “reduced to concrete, satisfactory resolutions” (98). The conference ended the next day.
The political situation in the Caribbean remained volatile, however, and continued to concern U.S. policymakers The [Facsimile Page 51] Eisenhower administration feared that the numerous revolutionary movements in the region, inspired and supported by the Castro regime, were communist influenced and anti-American in character (112). The U.S. Government decided to pursue a policy of opposing foreign-based revolutionary movements (118).
Of particular concern to the United States was the security of its military facilities in the Caribbean and the continuation of its military assistance programs in the region. A Special National Intelligence Estimate of March 10, 1959 concluded that the United States would be able to retain access to its military facilities but would probably be met with local demands to alter the terms of agreements governing them (111). In April 1959, the U.S. Government distributed an Aide-Mémoire to its European Allies which stated that because of unsettled conditions in the region the United States had adopted a practice of examining carefully on a case-by-case basis requests for military assistance to the Caribbean (117).
As British power declined in the Caribbean, U.S. policymakers agreed on the need for the United States to play a larger role in defending its interests in the region traditionally protected by the United Kingdom. The emerging nations of the area, such as those within the nascent West Indies Federation, it was recognized, would present new foreign policy challenges to the United States. On March 21, 1960, the National Security Council adopted a “Statement of U.S. Policy Toward the West Indies” to help define and address these challenges (129). On [Typeset Page XLVII] June 22, the OCB presented the Council an “Operations Plan for the West Indies” to guide U.S. policy in the region (140).
U.S. relations with Argentina between 1958 and 1960 remained friendly. The Eisenhower administration welcomed the election in February 1958 of Dr. Arturo Frondizi as Argentina’s President after a period of military rule (140).
Argentina’s economy was a shambles in early 1958, and U.S. policymakers recognized the role that wisely administered economic aid could play in securing the Frondizi government’s friendship. Argentina might otherwise be tempted to seek assistance from the Soviet bloc (154, 155).
Frondizi made an official visit to Washington in January 1959 during which President Eisenhower congratulated him on his efforts to restore his country’s democracy and rejuvenate its economy (167). Frondizi used the occasion to request more economic aid and to ask for credits with which to purchase U.S. [Facsimile Page 52] military equipment (168). The question of military credits to Argentina occupied policymakers for much of the first half of 1959. $10 million in credits was finally approved (177).
President Eisenhower visited Argentina during his four-nation tour of South America in early 1960 (204). He met with President Frondizi in Buenos Aires and the resorts of Mar del Plata and San Carlos Bariloche. They discussed U.S.-Argentine economic and political relations as well as larger global issues.
By August 1960, the Frondizi government had survived two attempted military uprisings and was beset by political pressures from both the left and the right. Argentina’s economy was still ailing. On August 9, Frondizi wrote personally to President Eisenhower to request more financial aid (218). The President replied that he would welcome the opportunity for U.S. officials to discuss the matter further with their Argentine counterparts (221).
U.S.-Brazilian relations in the last 3 years of the Eisenhower era were driven largely by Brazil’s requests to the United States for help to remedy its terrible domestic economic situation and external debt. The ability of the United States to satisfy these requests only partially, conditioned upon stringent Brazilian austerity measures, strained relations between the two nations. Further tensions resulted from the Brazilian perceptions that U.S. policymakers had become obsessed with Cuba at the expense of its relations with other Latin American nations and that they did not accord Brazil its proper respect on the global stage.
On June 20, 1958, Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek proposed “Operation Pan America,” an ambitious plan to reaffirm hemispheric solidarity and remedy the chronic underdevelopment which plagued Latin America (247). U.S. policymakers, including Secretary of [Typeset Page XLVIII] State Dulles, viewed the plan as laudible in its intention yet unrealistic and potentially divisive in its reliance on American funding (254, 261).
Despite tensions between the nations, President Eisenhower’s visit to Brazil in February 1960 was very successful. Eisenhower’s personal popularity with the Brazilian people was credited with having contributed to a more positive tone in U.S.-Brazilian relations, although nothing concrete resulted from his visit (282–286).
As 1960 ended, the Kubitschek government was replaced with that of Janio da Silva Quadros (296). U.S. policymakers were concerned that the Quadros government, though not likely to upset dramatically the course of U.S.-Brazilian relations, [Facsimile Page 53] would pursue a more willful and neutralistic foreign policy than his predecessor (300).
The Eisenhower administration assigned a high priority to cultivating good relations with Mexico. Eisenhower himself corresponded regularly with Presidents Adolfo Ruíz Cortines and Adolfo López Mateos. He met three times with López Mateos during 1959 and 1960. Numerous contacts at the ministerial level were maintained.
U.S. policymakers welcomed the inauguration of López Mateos on December 1, 1958, believing him to be more realistic in his views on Mexico’s domestic economy and economic relations with the United States than Ruíz Cortines. Senate majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson, who had met with López Mateos in November, however, found him to be “reserved and somewhat prejudiced” against the United States, particularly American business interests (320). U.S.-Mexican relations continued to be characterized by an air of outward friendliness coupled with a traditional suspicion, on Mexico’s part, of U.S. intentions and power (334).
Economic questions, particularly on trade, dominated the U.S.-Mexican agenda during the late 1950s. U.S. tariffs on Mexican lead and zinc troubled the Mexican Government and Eisenhower administration alike. Discussions of the coffee and cotton trade, of the promotion of tourism, and about territorial waters and fishing rights were pursued in this period.
Politically, the Eisenhower administration tried to impress upon the Mexican Government the dangers posed to the hemisphere by the Cuban revolution and Fidel Castro. The López Mateos government, however, was sympathetic to the aspirations of the Cubans in overthrowing the Batista dictatorship (345).