Guatemala

U.S. Relations With Guatemala

Note: The parenthetical citations are to the numbered documents in the text.

The assassination of the pro-American and anti-Communist President of Guatemala, Carlos Castillo Armas, in July 1957 threatened Guatemala with political uncertainty. In fact, a relatively orderly transition emerged. An interim government arranged a new Presidential election in which Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes won a plurality but not a majority. Through popular pressure and political dealing, Ydígoras won approval of the Guatemalan Congress to which responsibility for naming the President devolved when no Presidential candidate won a majority in the popular election. An upper-class, authoritarian, former professional soldier who represented Guatemala’s traditional classes and conservative forces, Ydígoras assumed the Presidency in March 1958 without enjoying firm support in the new Congress where his political supporters made up only 16 of the 66 members. (GT–5)

Ydígoras compensated for his political vulnerability by engaging in a series of high-profile quarrels with his neighbors: with Great Britain over Guatemala’s claims to British Honduras and with Mexico over a supposed invasion and, later in 1958, over shrimp fishing. (GT–6, 7, 14) The United States disapproved of this adventurism, but continued to provide Guatemala with economic and military assistance as well as development loans. (GT–8, 9, 10, 13) In early 1959, the Embassy reported that Ydígoras’ political situation had deteriorated rapidly and his overthrow was a real possibility. (GT–15) When Ambassador Lester D. Mallory returned to Washington in June 1959 for consultations, the Department of State decided that despite Ydígoras’ volatility and his government’s apparent swing to the left, he was still worthy of U.S. support. (GT–20) The Department understood that if Ydígoras was to rule Guatemala he would have to, in effect, play to the left. The leftist traditions or Guatemalan politics established during the years of the Arevalo and Arbenz Presidencies of 1944–1954 gave such a posture considerable popular appeal. Unfortunately, Ydígoras did not make the kind of [Facsimile Page 77] economic decisions and reforms required to place his government on a sound fiscal basis. In July 1960, economic problems, labor unrest, terrorism, and an abortive military coup convinced Ydígoras to declare a “state of siege” which suspended civil liberties and established temporary military control. (GT–29)

Concern about the survivability of the Ydígoras government took on added significance given the threat that Fidel Castro’s revolutionary regime in Cuba posed to the rest of Central America. When a group of [Typeset Page LXX] dissident military officers attempted to seize power on November 13 in Guatemala City and two provincial capitals, Ydígoras charged that the revolt was Castro-inspired and asked for U.S. support in preventing possible Cuban invasion or intervention. (GT–33, 34, 35) On November 14, President Eisenhower discussed the situation with Secretary of State Christian Herter. Herter noted that the situation looked “very serious” and suggested that “the Cubans have had a hand in this.” Eisenhower agreed that the United States should be prepared to get from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica requests for U.S. military surveillance and possible assistance in the event of an overt Cuban intervention or attack. The Department of Defense was alerted to the possibility and it began discreet surveillance. (GT–36)

There was no Cuban aggression nor any proof that the Guatemalan rebels were supported by Castro, but Guatemalan forces loyal to Ydígoras were unable immediately to reestablish control. Guatemala and Nicaragua had requested surveillance, while Costa Rica had not. Herter therefore recommended to Eisenhower that the United States continue naval surveillance of the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan coasts. The only matter still to be decided was whether or not this naval surveillance force should have a U.S. Marine battalion on board. Eisenhower decided that the Marines should remain at the nearest suitable station. (GT–42) By November 16, loyal forces put down the rebellion.