Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V

300. Despatch From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State¹

489

Rio de Janeiro, December 13, 1960.

REF

• Deptel 686, November 28, 1960²

SUBJECT

• The Forthcoming Quadros Administration

Introduction

Reviewing its Despatch 104 of August 8³ which contained, inter alia, an estimate of the character of the next administration under Janio Quadros, the Embassy finds little therein that needs be revised in the light of subsequent events before or since the October 3 election. It can, nevertheless, add several tentative conclusions which may be drawn from activities of the President-elect since that time. Efforts to anticipate courses of action which Janio Quadros will pursue as president are complicated not only by his well-known unpredictability [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] but also by the fact that except for a bare minimum required by the circumstances he apparently confides in no one. [2 sentences (4 lines of source text) not declassified] With these reservations which indicate the difficulty in obtaining reliable information on Quadros’ intentions, the Embassy notes briefly following its conclusions on the subject reached by a careful analysis of information from a variety of sources, public and private.

New Elements

Two new facts having important bearing on the future government are (1) the near million and three quarters plurality by which Quadros won in a twelve and a half million vote, and (2) the failure of the UDN to elect its vice-presidential candidate, Milton Campos.

Quadros’ unexpectedly large vote has served to give him unanticipated strength and prestige for the early and crucial months of the new administration which will have enormous economic and some difficult political problems to meet. As a result there is little or no talk, either in leftist, nationalist or military circles, of keeping him from assuming office. Legislative opposition is bound to be less than first anticipated and, if it does develop, it will be easier to meet since it can be labeled as obstructing the will of the people. In other words, Quadros’ mandate is more secure than many feared might be the case.

The defeat of Milton Campos relieves Quadros of most of his obligations to the UDN as a party. Had the UDN been able to show more responsibility for his victory, it could have made more demands on him and could have more easily influenced or inhibited his movements; its influence is likely to be minimal under present circumstances.

Domestic Policy

The Embassy is not in a position to predict measures or courses which Quadros will take in the domestic field beyond the generalities he has himself outlined, notably in his Recife speech of September 19 (see Despatch 261, September 23)⁴ and at his press-television conference held on October 13 (see São Paulo Despatch 158, October 19, and Embassy telegram 524).⁵ The closest he came to outlining a philosophy of government was in his O Cruzeiro speech before the election (see Despatch 271, September 28).⁶ The Embassy’s information from several presumably reliable sources is that he still intends to adopt a deflationary fiscal policy.

Believing that he has the capability to put into effect valuable and much needed reforms in the Brazilian administrative structure which can benefit the country institutionally and in its economic development, the Embassy is of the opinion that he will attempt to adopt sounder fiscal and economic policies than the present administration.

Foreign Policy

The Embassy continues, however, to be concerned about his presumptive foreign policy.

[3½ lines of source text not declassified] in London (in mid-November), a number of usually very reliable Brazilian journalists⁷ reported statements (see Weeka 47, Despatch 425, November 23)⁸ indicating that Quadros was uninterested in visiting the United States; was only casually interested in talking to President-elect Kennedy; was looking forward to meeting with Tito, Nasser and Nehru; and was seeking to free Brazil of financial dependence on the United States by shifting the country’s debt to European markets, [remainder of paragraph (10 lines of source text) not declassified]

Quintanilha Ribeiro, Chief of Civil Household during the Quadros governorship of São Paulo and scheduled to hold the same job in the new national administration, the only man authorized to speak for Quadros during his absence, informed the Ambassador through the reporting officer that João Dantas’⁹ recent neutralistic statements purporting to reflect Quadros should be taken with reserve, although he admitted not knowing what may have transpired between Quadros and Dantas in Europe and was therefore uncertain of himself.¹⁰ In any event, Quintanilha Ribeiro says that Quadros is accepting no official invitations from any country at this time.

The Embassy does not believe that Quadros necessarily intends to follow the courses of action which João Dantas and other journalists attribute to him; it does believe, however, that he wants it believed that he may in order to strengthen his hand in international negotiations. It also gives considerable weight to private statements made by the editor-in-chief of Correio da Manhã that Quadros has indicated that he will be independent (of the United States), neutralistic and sometimes anti-American in order to disarm leftist, nationalist opposition to his tough domestic retrenchment program (see Despatch 423, November 23).¹¹

Relations with the United States

It is most probable that Quadros will make occasional or even numerous gestures of independence in foreign policy and show neutralistic tendencies. He will still avoid an open break with the United States if for no other reason than that he is very aware of the fact that he needs US help. For a similar reason (he believes on balance they contribute to Brazil’s development) he will cause a minimum of trouble to US enterprises in Brazil, although he may, because of pressure from nationalists, allow some restrictive legislation to pass Congress.

[2 paragraphs (22 lines of source text) not declassified]

Conclusion

Yet, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] if all goes reasonably well economically and in the foreign field, Quadros can and probably will perform well for Brazil—and over the longer period perhaps for the Western Hemisphere also, if he is able to halt the growth of Fidelism in this country and in others. He is undoubtedly conscious of Fidelism and its threat to constituted governments and Cuba can push him too hard. Better than most Latin American leaders today, he can meet Fidelism with its own weapons which he understands well. On the other hand, he was genuinely impressed by the Cuban revolution, believes that the United States has been and is economically imperialistic toward Latin America (e.g., that the Department of State has constituted itself the principal defender of American business abroad, good or bad) and probably hopes that the new US administration will change in this respect. He is also aware that the transition of Brazil from a backward, underdeveloped nation cannot be long delayed without serious danger of social explosion.

That Quadros will change the bases on which relations between the United States and Brazil were traditionally conducted, there can be little doubt.

For the Ambassador:

Philip Raine

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 732.00/12–1360. Confidential. Drafted by Raine.
2. Telegram 686 requested information on President-elect Quadros. (ibid., 732.00/ 11–2860).
3. Not printed. (ibid., 732.00/8–860)
4. Not printed. (ibid., 732.00/9–2360)
5. Neither printed. (ibid., 732.11/10–1960 and 632.00/10–1560, respectively)
6. Not printed. (ibid., 732.00/9–2860)
7. Carlos Castelo Branco of O Cruzeiro, Murilo Marroquim of the Chateaubriand chain (both accompanied Quadros on part of his round-the-world trip last year) and Joel Silveira of Diario de Noticias. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 732.00(W)/11–2360)
9. João Riberio Dantas, director of the Rio de Janeiro newspaper, Diário de Notícias.
10. Subsequently, according to another Quadros source, Quintanilha Ribeiro wrote to Quadros reporting that the neutralistic statements of João Dantas and those also attributed to him, Quadros, were having unfavorable reaction among the military. [Footnote in the source text.]
11. Despatch 423 transmitted the memorandum of a conversation between Philip Raine and Luis Alberto Bahia, editor-in-chief of Correio de Manhã, on November 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 732.00/11–2360)