Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

167. Memorandum From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow)¹

Saigon, June 1, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Training of the RVNAF (U)

1. This is in reply to your Secret memorandum dated 19 April 1960, Subject: “Anti-Guerrilla Training” (Incl #1),² which I received 26 April, with reference to my interim reply to you of 26 April 1960 (Incl #2).³

2. In the interest of clarity and objectivity, the subsequent paragraphs are identified with a short subject title. This format will facilitate appropriate response to the questions and comments outlined in the seven paragraphs of your memorandum. Other pertinent and necessary details and elaboration are presented as inclosures to this letter.

3. Reorganization of the ARVN Divisions:

a. The primary reason for reorganizing the 10 unbalanced ARVN divisions and 13 separate regiments into 7 balanced division and support services was to create major ground combat units capable of operating on the terrain of Vietnam and with the ability to carry out their mission, i.e., to offer effective initial resistance to external aggression, and with a capability of ensuring internal security if civilian security forces were unable to do so. Additionally, it was necessary to develop and get approved an organizational structure that could be supported by the Military Assistance Program.

b. The reorganized divisions represent a balance of combat, combat support and service support elements capable of conducting ground combat in the terrain of Southeast Asia against either conventional or guerrilla forces. The external and internal threats to the security of Vietnam, which are expressed militarily as enemy capabilities, as well as the elements of terrain and weather, were and are the primary and governing factors in this establishment and improvement of the new division TOE. The organization and equipping of any unit, whether it be naval, air or ground, is developed by a careful analysis of the enemy’s military units, the combat power which those enemy units can exert in terms of weapons systems, mobility, maneuverability, logistical and communications systems and the like, and the characteristics of the contemplated area(s) of operations.

c. With the above basic operational requirements determining the fundamental organization to be developed, many other desirable requirements were considered. Some of the more important ones are outlined in Inclosure 3.⁴ In all instances, the analyses and evaluations applied to the thousands of components comprising the new division were centered on the requirement to create a division which could conduct combat operations against conventional forces, or elements of it, to conduct combat operations against guerrilla-type forces in Vietnam. For example, to unbalance one element such as a transportation means, or a fire power means, too much toward the conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare to the exclusion of all else is to ignore the omnipresent requirement to have in being a force which can also delay effectively the much larger conventional force which stands ready and capable in North Vietnam. The converse is equally true.

d. Accordingly, a balanced division was evolved by a Vietamese Test Board after an exhaustive test that lasted one year. Minor changes for its improvement are made on a continuing basis. It possesses a high proportion of infantry with excellent organic fire power, as well as the inherent capability of the infantry to move anywhere on land. It has also sufficient combat support in the form of mortars, recoilless rifles, artillery, engineers, and signal units to enable it to fight conventionally, or in an anti-guerrilla role; and it possesses the necessary medical, transportation, ordnance, quartermaster, and administrative elements to support its combat operations. It is so organized as to enable it to be broken down into individual company, battalion or regimental combat teams.

e. Excellent fire power has been assured by a careful selection of various types of weapons. The individual and crew-served weapons of the division are superior to those of the Viet Cong guerrillas or those of PAVN regular forces. The 60mm and 81mm mortars are organic to the companies, battalions and regiments, and can be transported anywhere the foot soldier can move. All these smaller weapons, which the Viet Cong covets and seeks at every opportunity, are lighter and more efficient than those of PAVN or the Viet Cong. Available for heavier fire support are the 4.2 inch mortars and field artillery. While swamp and jungle are not conducive, generally, to the employment of heavy fire power means, these weapons can be and are being employed increasingly in such terrain to support combat operations.

f. The mobility of the personnel and equipment of the division has received and continues to receive maximum attention. They are not road bound as was the Colonial Army or the normal type “western” Army.

(1) The soldier of the division, contrary to much fallacious reasoning, has the same foot mobility as the Viet Cong guerrilla. His individual equipment is light, extremely durable and most effective. As his own combat experience and that of his leaders [has] increased, this superiority in equipment has become readily apparent. It is being witnessed now in the delta area which the Viet Cong after several recent defeats by ARVN elements are avoiding combat with Regular troops.

(2) Crew-served weapons such as machine guns and 60mm and 81mm mortars can be moved anywhere the soldier can move. The heavier supporting weapons, the 4.2 inch mortar and artillery pieces, offer a bigger problem. The 4.2 inch mortar, however, is being employed in the delta area in extremely difficult terrain. Hand carts have been developed to carry the 4.2 inch mortar loads and are being refined.

(3) Many fallacious opinions and conclusions have been expressed as to the mobility of the new ARVN division. Because a limited number of 1/4 Ton, 3/4 Ton, 2 1/2 Ton and larger tonnage capacity vehicles are organic to the Table of Equipment, many non-military as well as some military personnel leap to the conclusion that the division elements are “road bound.” Such conclusions ignore all the foregoing, and more importantly, the extensive experience of the U.S. Army in conducting combat operations in jungle and swamp areas in WW II. Basically, it is from this experience, now expressed in doctrine, that the organization, equipping and training of ARVN units stems. Many U.S. divisions in the Pacific fought long and arduous campaigns in jungle and swampy terrain (New Guinea, Guadalcanal, Philippines) where the rifle regiments rarely saw a vehicle other than an occasional 1/4 ton jeep. The soldiers, weapons, ammunition, food, water, and medical supplies moved by foot, as did the enemy, to the combat area. Having recognized from the beginning that such mobility was essential to the ARVN Forces designed to fight conventionally or against guerrilla-type forces in Vietnam, the means of transportation to be made organic to the division were carefully weighed. Each truck, prime mover, or weapons carrier was assessed carefully against a considered requirement. In addition a coolie Service Company was made organic for combat operations, so as to provide a foot-means of logistical support in roadless terrain. While review of the division’s mobility continues, and must continue always, the ARVN division is considered to have adequate mobility.

(4) As units of this division participate increasingly in combat operations, the resourcefulness and imagination of ARVN, as well as MAAG personnel, produce various other expedients to further mobility in difficult terrain. As a result, small craft, draft animals and many other items are tested, exploited or discarded. Expedients for stream crossings, such as rafts, floats and ropes, are the same used by the U.S. and other foreign armies.

g. The means of communication to control and direct the combat operations of the division’s units being most important, the means made organic to the new TOE are efficient, dependable and light in weight. Light weight radios available to the platoon, company, battalion and regiment provide leaders with the contact means to direct the actions of organic maneuvering and fire support elements, as well as to contact supporting aircraft. Signal equipment is expensive, and in order to achieve some balance in all types of equipment received each year, it was programmed over a period of years. As ARVN units were committed in increasing numbers against the Viet Cong, it became necessary to accelerate the delivery of this signal equipment. The programmed input levels which were considered adequate for training were not adequate for combat operations. The accelerated deliveries are now underway and signal equipment being received is being allocated to those units whose operational requirements are the greatest.

h. Lastly, the TOE’s of the Vietnamese Division have been approved, after detailed study, by my military superiors.

4. Counter Guerrilla Training:

a. In answer to questions on the subject of training, it is essential to keep in mind that MAAG officers have no command authority whatsoever over Vietnamese Forces; they may only advise and recommend as to training. If the Vietnamese commanders should not choose to follow completely the advice and suggestions of their MAAG advisor, Chief MAAG may only recommend and urge that they do so.

b. In my letter to Mr. Dung of 29 February 1960 (Incl #4),⁵ to which you have referred, it will be noted it is MAAG policy to advise the Vietnamese commanders to have well trained units capable of carrying out all types of operations, including counter-guerrilla operations; operations during day and during night and in all types of terrain, particularly in the jungle, the swamps and the mountains found in Vietnam. This policy is based on the established military fact that well trained soldiers, with good leadership and sound plans, can successfully fight any kind of enemy on any kind of terrain.

c. In the same letter to Mr. Dung, I outlined various examples of positive MAAG actions during the last two and one-half years which recommended and urged that counter-guerrilla training be included by Vietnamese officers in training programs for their troops. In addition to the outlined actions in this letter MAAG’s recommendations are included in the 6-week program of instruction (POI) for Ranger companies which was published by Headquarters RVNAF in March 1960. Also, MAAG was recently assisted in the preparation of the POI to be conducted by U.S. Special Forces trainers. Moreover, MAAG prepared the latest revision of the POI for infantry advanced individual and basic unit training which was published by Headquarters RVNAF. That document also lays stress on tough, realistic training in difficult terrain and includes a large segment of tactical training hours directed to such field exercises as ambushes, combat patrols, raids, and developing attacks. These subjects are directly related to counter-guerrilla training.

d. Many individuals do not know what counter-guerrilla training is, and do not comprehend its relationship to sound military tactical training. As stated many times by MAAG as proven doctrine, the primary combatant role in anti-guerrilla warfare operations is performed by well-trained Army units which are used when the size and scope of guerrilla operations exceed the capabilities of police and Civil Guard forces. Doctrine and experience in Malaya, the Philippines, Greece, Russia and China demonstrate conclusively that it is essential that fundamental, sound, advanced individual and basic unit training precede training in the tactics and techniques of combatting guerrillas or any other forces. To this end MAAG has devoted, and will continue to devote, every effort.

e. [Illegible] the points covered immediately above, there are many who believe, apparently, that by abandoning requisite fundamental advanced individual and unit training and rushing to some “new tactics and techniques” that the Viet Cong guerrilla can be eliminated speedily and effectively. Advanced individual and unit training teach the individuals of the squad, the platoon, the company and the battalion to function together as a smoothly integrated team combining fire power, maneuver and control to destroy the enemy. Squads, platoons and companies learn to attack, defend, delay, ambush and the like on variegated terrain, in accordance with certain various mean distances and depths dependent on the terrain, the enemy’s capabilities and their own capabilities. When this is mastered, and only when it is mastered, can these individuals and units be taught a more open and fluid type of warfare characterized by counter-guerrilla operations. As an example, if the two fire teams of a squad have not learned to advance each other by extremely well-coordinated fire and movement, with each man doing this job extremely well, over normal terrain with a frontage of 50–100 yards, they cannot be expected to perform effectively in attempting the same task with the extremely limited observation, the obstacles and the far greater control problems that characterize jungle or swamp operations against a guerrilla enemy. The same principles apply to the proficiency of the individual soldier, to the platoon, company, battalion, regiment, and division. When all have attained reasonable proficiency in learning how to fight by developing smooth and integrated use of fire power and maneuver at all levels, the next step is to extend the application of these tactical skills in more difficult terrain so as to learn and then employ additional techniques by which the elusive guerrilla bands can be destroyed.

f. Regardless of the positive actions taken by MAAG to generate interest and subsequent training emphasis on counter-guerrilla training, it was not until the Viet Cong expansion and limited successes, particularly in the delta area, that the RVNAF General Staff and others began to act more fully on this military counsel. In many ways, it could be said that they reacted. Instead of initially buckling down to an intensive training task, many sought solutions in changes of commanders, creation of new units and general handwringing. Others sought and some continue to seek the ‘solution’ in accusations of dereliction and the like. Some of this was generated by personal jealousies or friction between individuals. Training in counter-guerrilla operations was limited in some units for several reasons. Since these reasons are covered in part above, and apply as well as obstacles to all types of military training, they will be outlined in subsequent paragraphs. The primary reasons for training interruptions often flow directly from the non-military agencies of the GVN. It is now seen that counter-guerrilla as well as other military training has improved as the result of stimulation by a new sense of urgency which has been generated by initial Viet Cong successes. This training, however, will not be completely successful until responsible leadership, both in the Civil Government first, and the RVNAF second, insists that it be so.

g. As to the last sentence in your paragraph 4, I am reasonably sure that neither President Diem or Mr. Thuan have the impression that MAAG does not favor anti-guerrilla training. If they had such an impression, I feel they would have spoken to me about it in one of our frequent conferences. What ideas the Vice President and “others” may have, of course, I can’t judge, nor have I any ideas from whom they get information on MAAG policy.

5. The Commando School:

a. In paragraph 4 of your memorandum, you express uncertainty and surprise as to General Myers’ letters to General Ty (Incl #5)⁶ urging that ARVN abandon commando-type training at Nha Trang. The recommended disestablishment of the Commando School was and is in complete accord with the objectives of MAAG as to counter-guerrilla training and operations. The above discussion as to training for counter-guerrilla operations should contribute to an understanding of why a Commando School, as visualized by General Ty, was not recommended.

b. At that time, ARVN was seeking to establish a so-called Commando School whereby one company of each infantry Regiment was to be trained as a Commando Company at the Nha Trang School. This particular plan had several serious faults. It took from the Regimental Commander the responsibility of training one Company of his Regiment although he would be held responsible for its efficiency; the total period of time necessary to train one company per Regiment, throughout the army, would be excessive (it would have taken about six years) as each company course was three months; the final result would have been one unbalanced rifle battalion in each regiment; the best officers, NCO’s and soldiers would be placed in this one Company at the expense of other Companies. Other valid reasons are set forth in the two letters written by General Myers. These letters did not urge that ARVN “abandon Commando training” as you state in the first sentence of your paragraph 4. They recommend that the proposed “plan” of training one Company per Regiment at Nha Trang, as described above, not be implemented. This was in no way contradictory to my recommendation of 7 September 1958 (Incl #9)⁷ that Army, Navy, Marines, Civil Guard, Self Defense Corps and Police establish effective indoctrination and training courses in anti-guerrilla warfare. The MAAG objective was to train all officers, NCO’s and soldiers of regular units, within their own units, to be able to conduct effective counter-guerrilla operations.

c. Many young armies experiment with various organizational ideas. However, the ARVN General Staff commando concept of 1958 referred to above should not be confused with specialized offensive units organized for specific purposes by the U.S. in WW II. The U.S. Ranger battalions consisted of six line companies, and were well trained for and employed as battalion units to execute reconnaissance-in-force missions, raids, deep penetrations as a part of a large amphibious or ground attack force, and the line. Recently, the GVN has created Ranger (or Commando) companies with specially selected personnel, this at the expense of Regular units. Since operations in the delta, to date, have made it a calculated risk to employ units smaller than a battalion (companies within reinforcing distance of each other) against the Viet Cong, how to employ these separate ranger companies presents serious problems, not to their creator, but to the commanders concerned. A young ARVN battalion commander has his hands full with his five companies. His span of control to include staff, weapons support, communications and logistical support is geared to these 5 units. To plan for and control one to two additional and attached Ranger companies complicates his planning and control, and any mission given his command to execute. It would appear that one of two broad courses of action will soon have to be implemented. The companies could be grouped into battalions with resultant further diminution of the forces in being to staff and command some 10 to 15 battalions that could be formed from the 50–78 Ranger companies. Or, the entire number of companies could be scaled down to as to create one or two additional marine battalions and perhaps two or more additional airborne battalions.

d. In summary, MAAG opposed the General Staff Commando plan of 1958 for the reasons above, and in the interest of initiating a National NCO Academy. The NCO Academy has since its inception in 1958 graduated 1830 students from throughout the Army, from 7 different courses.

6. Training:

a. The total amount of training and progress that has been accomplished by the three services of the RVNAF is exemplary. Perhaps the greatest return for the MAP dollar is reflected in the overall quantity and quality produced as the result of the on-shore, third country and CONUS training programs. While there are shortfalls and critical obstacles in many areas of training at present, the total achievement of the RVNAF can only be judged by an objective observer as most commendable. In a relatively few years an Army, Navy and Air Force have been created. With a long way yet to go, as evaluated by United States military standards, it is believed that the three services acting in unison are capable of accomplishing the missions of offering initial effective resistance to external aggression, and of insuring internal stability.

b. The primary obstacles to training are heavy demands on ARVN forces for pacification operations; requirements for the static security of logistical installations, rubber plantations, and communication centers; and the requirement to do much work on the construction and maintenance of temporary housing for themselves and in particular for their families. Throughout 1959, for example, an average of 25 battalion equivalents were employed in pacification operations alone. Thus far in 1960, an average of 34 battalion equivalents have been committed against the Viet Gong. To these two yearly averages must be added an average of 20 additional battalion equivalents for static security in 1959, and an average of 18 thus far in 1960 for the same task. With such heavy demands on the troops available, the programming of progressive training for all ARVN units has been and is a difficult and complex task.

c. Compounding the problem of attempting to program the training of ARVN units has been the past and continued direct commitment of units to pacification operations without regard to the progress they have made in training. MAAG attempts since October 1959 to have Headquarters RVNAF institute a plan whereby infantry regiments of the four southern divisions would be rotated between operations and training have been fruitless. The General Staff of the RVNAF develops such programs only to see them quickly smashed by higher authority which feels the need to commit the units to operations without delay. The MAAG proposed rotation plan is outlined in detail in Embassy telegram 2799 dated 29 March 1960.⁸

d. In paragraph 6 of your memorandum reference is made to this same Embassy telegram, and the statement is made that “only 3 of the 7 divisions have been fully trained” in advanced individual and line unit training. However, on re-reading you will note the exact statement made in paragraph 2 of this telegram was “For the past year this not accomplished for 12 infantry regiments of 4 divisions generally stationed in southern third of VN.” The next sentence gave the reason for not completing advanced individual and line unit training during the past year. The 12 infantry regiments were committed to anti-guerrilla operations almost continuously and in a fragmented manner the 12 infantry regiments did accomplish limited training as time was available but they did not complete the two prescribed 8-week programs of instruction for these two phases. Furthermore, they will not do so until some form of rotation plan is implemented. However, the artillery battalions, the pioneer battalions, and the service units of these divisions were able to accomplish very effective training during 1959, and for the most part are continuing to do so in 1960.

e. This same paragraph 6 of your memorandum refers to my letter to Mr. Dung (Incl #4) and my remarks therein concerning too many cases wherein little or no training is being done. It also poses a question concerning the feasibility of organizing divisions and corps if trained cadres are not available. The statement concerning too many cases of little or no worthwhile training being accomplished was and is true. However, this one statement read by itself could give a false impression. The purpose of the statement was to acquaint Mr. Dung with facts and to point out features of the overall training status that needed attention. It did not mean that in all cases there was no worthwhile training being conducted and I’m sure a full reading of the letter will place the statement in its intended light. A great deal of effective training is being conducted as will be noted in subsequent paragraphs. As to the Corps and Division structures, there are enough personnel to staff and command these headquarters in either peace or war. While their proficiency cannot be compared favorably with that of U.S. headquarters at the same levels, they are considered as reasonably proficient and effective. Their training continues. To deactivate the Field Command, Corps and Division Headquarters and then place the resulting separate Regiments and Separate Battalions of Engineers, Armor, etc. directly under Command of the General Staff would throw the entire Armed Forces into chaos at the first hostile shot of an aggressor. Furthermore, the Vietnamese do not have a communication system that would enable the General Staff to exercise such direct control. The organization of these headquarters could not have hampered training. On the contrary they are responsible for and supervise the training of the units assigned to them.

f. In reference to your remark about “briefings” in paragraph 6, your attention is invited to the fact that in all MAAG briefings for official visitors, many of which you have attended, there is shown a chart headed “Interruptions to Training.” This chart lists the following:

• Operations Against Dissidents and VC Guerrillas
• Reorganization and Regroupment
• Lack of Training Facilities (Ranges)
• Construction of Temporary Housing

The remarks by the briefer are quoted as follows:

“The Vietnamese have accepted these ATP’s; however, there have been many interruptions in their implementations. The principal causes for interruptions in training are four in number.

• “1st. Since early 1955, some elements of the Vietnamese Armed Forces have been in actual conflict with the sect or dissident forces. The sect forces were at one time headed by war lords. The three significant groups were the Cao Dai group, the Hoa Hao group, and the Binh Xuyen group. At the present time, the major portion of all of these sect forces are aligned on the side of the government. However, certain splinter factions refused to cooperate and formed outlaw bands that are still causing trouble. In addition to the dissident outlaw bands, Viet Cong guerrilla elements have formed bands which are actively operating in South Vietnam.

  “In the south and southwestern portion of this country there are operations in progress almost continuously to clean out these bands. During 1959 an average of 25 battalion equivalents of the Vietnamese Armed Forces were constantly engaged in pacification operations. Since 1 January 1960, an average of 34 battalion equivalents have been committed against VC guerrillas.

• “2nd. The regroupment of regular forces to planned permanent stations will continue for some time.
• “3rd. The lack of completely adequate ranges and training areas hinder training. The Vietnamese have constructed 130 complete ranges in the last three years. They have 7 under construction now and 46 more programmed.
• “4th. Construction of temporary and thatched housing for the families of the Vietnamese soldiers is almost a yearly task. During the regroupment of the army this problem will continue to be great because of unit moves.

“In spite of these interruptions, the training situation is encouraging in many respects. Division exercises and maneuvers, and Corps CPX’s have been conducted with good results. We believe the Vietnamese soldier can be developed into a good soldier. The major problems are: lack of well trained combat commanders and staff officers at all echelons; specialist training; the overall shortage of officers and NCO’s and deficiencies in logistics.”

7. a. Details requested in sub-paragraphs (1), (3), (4), and (5) of paragraph 7 of your memorandum as to training of the RVNAF are outlined in detail at Inclosures 6 (VN Army); 7 (VN Air Force); and 8 (VN Navy).⁹ Close scrutiny of these training records, available from RVNAF and MAAG sources, will indicate that an enormous amount of sound, effective training has been accomplished during the past four years.

b. In addition to the above points regarding training, certain basic and very important continuing training actions have been implemented. To encourage and develop the capability of the Vietnamese soldier to march long distances over varied types of terrain, annual marching competitions were established in 1957. Since the yearly competition starts at the platoon level throughout ARVN, the vast majority of ARVN participates. Direct results have been increased stamina in the soldier and marine, and the development of a new awareness of the inherent mobility of the foot soldier in any type of terrain. In March 1959, a swimming program for RVNAF personnel was inaugurated. To date the program has proved very successful. While 100% of all personnel cannot swim 100 meters, many thousands of personnel who cannot swim at all, or swim very little, have been taught to swim. Many of these can swim the required 100 meters. This capability contributes measurably to the mobility of the soldier and his unit—squad, platoon, company and battalion.

It is particularly valuable to the conduct of operations in the delta region. Marksmanship competitions start with the lowest units and end each training year with the Annual Armed Forces Marksmanship Competition.

8. Evaluation:

a. At the present time it is considered that the RVNAF, on balance, possesses a fair state of combat readiness in the event it is required to provide initial resistance to external aggression. This evaluation takes into account the state of training of its personnel; the organization and proficiency of its Division, Corps, Field Command and General Headquarters; the organization and proficiency of its logistical headquarters and units; the amounts and deployments of its supplies; the deployments of its forces; the status of its war plans and planning, and the assumption that the political authority will permit a military commander to conduct operations. If the military establishment were given full and uninterrupted authority to train, organize and equip the forces, and conduct operations, under general GVN guidance, it is considered that the combat potential and proficiency of the RVNAF would be increased.

b. At the present time it is considered that the RVNAF, on balance, possesses an excellent state of combat readiness to combat guerrilla terrorist attacks within South Vietnam. This evaluation takes into account the factors outlined in the second sentence of the foregoing paragraph. If all military and security forces, as well as other means, were placed under a single capable military commander, who in turn was given full authority to conduct anti-Viet Cong operations, the capabilities of the RVNAF to more quickly destroy the Viet Cong could be enhanced. Additionally, a sound plan to rotate forces between training and operations could be implemented, thereby improving combat capability; all military and security forces, as well as other means, could be centrally and directly controlled without interference; operational planning could be projected over a longer period of time and on a national rather than on a regional basis; capable subordinate commands with tri-service staff representation could be established as required to facilitate joint operations; and more effective intelligence systems and psychological warfare programs could be implemented.

9. Periodic Training Briefings:

MAAG, as always, is prepared to present periodic briefings on the training status of the RVNAF, or any other pertinent information available to it, to the Ambassador as desired. It is suggested that 24 to 48 hours notice be given when a briefing is desired.

S.T. Williams¹⁰
Lt. General USA

1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Memoranda to Ambassador 1960 (77). Secret; Noforn.
2. Document 141.
3. Not printed.
4. “Operational Requirements for New Division”; not printed.
5. Document 109.
6. Document 23 and its footnote 3.
7. See footnote 2, Document 127.
8. Document 125.
9. None printed.
10. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.