168. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 2, 19601
SUBJECT
- Situation in Viet-Nam2
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Etienne M. Manac’h, Director Asian Affairs, French Ministry Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Marcel Barthelemy, First Secretary, French Embassy
- Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Mr. Daniel V. Anderson, Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
- Mr. Chalmers B. Wood, Officer in Charge, Viet-Nam Affairs
- Mr. Philip H. Valdes, French Desk Officer
Mr. Manac’h opened on the theme that President Diem was in difficulty. He referred to the serious insecurity in the delta, the fact that areas of insecurity were beginning to give the appearance of an encirclement of Saigon and the estimate of the French authorities that there were now 5,000 active guerrillas in Viet-Nam. This was a change from the time when Diem had hoped progressively to reduce the insurrection.
A liberal opposition had appeared which criticized Diem’s authoritarian methods. Such criticism was easy; there were many examples to choose from such as the two deputies who were not seated following the last election. This opposition appears to be non-Communist.
The general impression of the French Government was that Diem had good techniques against subversion, but did not have a policy (politique) against subversion. There is what appears to be an [Page 484] artificially strong government whose situation does not correspond to reality.
On the practical aspects, Mr. Manac’h said it must be confessed that the French Government does not now know what position it will take. The political system in Viet-Nam must become more supple if it is to regain the confidence of the population, but if the iron corset is removed, the situation may come apart. As a first step, certain gestures, possibly more symbolic than real, might be made. One of them might be the removal of certain members of the family from their present positions of influence with President Diem. However, the French Government realizes that this will be difficult.
Mr. Manac’h went on to say that Ambassador Lalouette had arrived in Paris today for a month of serious consultations. It is believed that as a result of these conversations the French will take a position, although they have not yet informed Diem, of continuing to support Diem. It will be explained to him that the French Government knows that he is in difficulties, and an inquiry will be made as to how the French can help him to resist Communist pressure. This transition towards liberalization will be delicate for Diem. Because of this problem, the French are less sure of what the French position should be in Viet-Nam than in Laos or Cambodia. Thus continuing consultations with the American Government in Paris and in Washington will be valuable. The French also intend to discuss the situation with the British.
Mr. Parsons replied that recent events in Korea had caused repercussions in Viet-Nam, but that the American Government did not see any true parallel. The Korean regime was much more subject to criticism, and South Korea did not have the internal problem with Communists which exists in Viet-Nam.
It is realized that the security situation in Viet-Nam is becoming more serious, but it should not be exaggerated.
It should be emphasized that the United States Government does not seek to support another group. Our Government may offer advice and suggestions to President Diem, but it continues to support him. Our representations to Diem for this purpose should therefore not be confused with any of the limited actions we took in the different Korean circumstances because, Mr. Parsons repeated, we support President Diem. With respect to Mr. Manac’h’s observation, in our opinion too, there is some validity in the view that Diem has the technique, but not the policy to deal with subversion.
Mr. Manac’h stated that his government agreed on the importance of supporting Diem. The situation was different from that in Korea; it would be much more dangerous if there were a revolt in Viet-Nam due to the internal security situation.
[Page 485]Mr. Parsons continued that in Viet-Nam there is an incipient danger of popular discontent in the countryside. It is to be hoped that Diem will see ways to become more united with his people. We would like to consult with the French Government as this situation develops. We agree that it would be useful if some of Diem’s entourage, particularly his brother Nhu, could be removed.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/6–260. Secret. Drafted by Wood.↩
- In telegram 3342 from Saigon, June 1, Durbrow reported a conversation with French Ambassador Lalouette on the situation in Vietnam. Durbrow commented that during the entire conversation Lalouette was trying to ascertain whether the United States was still backing Diem or looking for a successor. Durbrow left no doubt, he reported, that the United States was backing Diem. (Ibid., 751K.00/6–160)↩