Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

141. Memorandum From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams)¹

Saigon, April 19, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Anti-Guerrilla Training

Pursuant to the conversation I had with you and Colonel Comstock on April 12th about the matters brought up by Colonel Khoi and your strong reaction to this development in our telephone conversation April 13th, I have given considerable thought to the question of ARVN training in general and anti-guerrilla training in particular, in order to try to reconcile what seems to be conflicting information. In this review I have recalled and have noted the following:

1. It was my understanding that the reorganization of the ARVN divisions from 10 to 7 was done primarily for the following reasons:

(a) To create uniform sized divisions which would be less dependent upon motor transport;

(b) To provide them with equipment which would be of such a nature that it could be broken down into components and carried by coolies so that the division could operate effectively off roads; and

(c) To develop a divisional structure which would be more suited to the terrain in Viet-Nam and be able to fight more or less as guerrillas.

2. That in June 1959 I asked you about the types of guerrilla training being given ARVN and you informed me that you had made available the latest US guerrilla and anti-guerrilla manuals for the use of ARVN in training troops for this sort of operations. You furnished me these manuals which I read with interest although you stated they could “mean little to other than an Army Officer”. On the basis of this information and the briefings on the new type of division I understood that considerable efforts were being made to give ARVN units fairly intensive guerrilla and anti-guerrilla training.

3. I noted from your memorandum of April 4, 1960 to all MAAG advisers that you enclosed a paper you issued on September 7, 1958, entitled “Notes on Anti-Guerrilla Operations”, which I assume was issued at that time in order that DOD officers and all MAAG advisers should step up anti-guerrilla training. I also assume that the manuals I read over a year ago were the ones you stated in your September 7, 1958 “Notes” had been translated by ARVN some time after January and February 1957.

4. In view of the above, I was therefore somewhat surprised to learn, for the first time, about the two letters General Myers sent to General Ty, one on July 14, 1958 and the other on November 10, 1958, urging that ARVN abandon Commando-type training. It is not clear to me why General Myers sent these letters in July and November of 1958 when you issued your “Notes on Anti-Guerrilla Operations” on September 7, 1958, which seem to urge more training of this sort. I am not certain whether it was because of these letters or from other indications they may have had, but in the past two months or so Diem, the Vice President, Thuan and others have made a particular point to urge me see that MAAG change its training emphasis from conventional to anti-guerrilla training. These officials, as well as Colonel Khoi, seem to have had the impression that MAAG did not favor anti-guerrilla training.

5. I have reread carefully your letter to Dung of February 29, 1960² outlining not only the role of MAAG in Viet-Nam but citing MAAG efforts to induce their VN counterparts to give better and more realistic training to their units. I note particularly on page 2, numbered paragraph (2) of this letter, that in May 1958 MAAG recommended “that special school courses in anti-guerrilla and guerrilla tactics be conducted”, etc., but again I find it difficult to reconcile this with General Myers’ letters of July and November 1958.

6. Furthermore, I was somewhat surprised to learn from my telegram 2799, March 29, 1960,³ which was basically drafted by MAAG, that despite the fact that fundamental U.S. doctrine holds that the dispensable basis for all anti-guerrilla training is (a) sound fundamental advanced individual training and (b) basic unit training, only 3 of the 7 divisions have been fully trained in both these matters. I realize of course that a considerable percentage of the ARVN units have been used on pacification duties, etc., but I did not realize that the proportion which has received full advanced individual training and full basic unit training was only 3 to 7. In this connection I was quite surprised to note in your letter to Mr. Dung of February 29, 1960, that you state on page 4, “In too many cases little or no worthwhile training of any kind is being done, etc.” In all the briefings I have attended and our many discussions in the Country Team, as well as in the private briefings I have had, I have always understood and have so testified in the Congressional hearings, that all training was going along quite well although I realized more had to be done. If in “too many cases little or no training” has been done, this should have been made known to me at least well before I read it in the letter to Dung. If this is the state of ARVN developments I wonder why we have gone ahead to organize Divisions and Corps if there are not cadres sufficiently trained to fill the slots?

7. In our conversation of April 12th when I asked why General Myers had sent the two letters in 1958, you stated, as I recall, that it was a very complicated matter which would require detailed explanations but added that these letters had been sent basically because it was then deemed essential to stop commando or anti-guerrilla training in order to train more NCO’s and give other troops conventional-type training. You added that if ACSI desired any further explanation of these letters they could talk to General Myers who is in the Pentagon.

Since the entire question of the best type of training for the RVNAF has been raised by Diem and others over the past few months, it is essential that I have a full and clear understanding about these matters. I should appreciate it, therefore, if you would furnish me a full and detailed briefing on the following points as well as any other information which would permit me to have a clear understanding of the type of training already given the RVNAF and future training planned so that I can be in a position to evaluate the present effectiveness of the RVNAF:

(1) Details of the type of training given to the RVNAF for the past four years.

(2) An explanation as to why too many units received little or no worthwhile training of any kind.

(3) What percentage of RVNAF forces have received full fundamental advanced individual training and basic unit training?

(4) How far advanced are the remaining RVNAF forces in fundamental advanced individual training and basic unit training?

(5) How much guerrilla or anti-guerrilla type training has been given all RVNAF forces during the past two or three years? In covering this point I should appreciate an explanation as to why it was deemed advisable in July and November 1958 to send letters to General Ty urging the RVNAF to stop commando training and how this can be reconciled with the issuance of the “Notes on Anti-Guerrilla Operations” issued by MAAG on September 7, 1958. Incidentally, the last paragraph of these “Notes” seems to decry the fact that very little anti-guerrilla training was given at the Nha Trang Commando School, as well as other schools, while General Myers’ letters urged that such training at Nha Trang be stopped.

(6) Your evaluation of the present state of efficiency of the RVNAF to counter (a) possible conventional aggression from NVN and (b) guerrilla-terrorist attacks within SVN.

(7) In order, in the future, that I may have a full understanding of the status of RVNAF training and its potential, arrangement must be made to give me periodic and frank briefings on these matters and any other pertinent information available to MAAG.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Durbrow Files: Lot 68 D 404, Vietnam. Secret; Eyes Only.
2. Document 109.
3. Document 125.
4. For General Williams’s reply, see Document 167.