Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

125. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, March 29, 1960—noon.

2799. Following are military matters (other than those already covered our 2784²) which may be raised during Thuan visit³ to Washington and our recommendations for U.S. position:

1. Commando Forces.

A. Concept. Diem has talked of commando force with as many as 20,000 men but appears to have limited his present objective to maximum 10,000 men for financial reasons and number may actually be kept to about 5,000. He apparently originally conceived of command force as being in excess of 150,000 MAP-supported force goal on ground latter required for certain period at least for mission of resistance against external aggression. But if commandos kept to 5,000 will remain within MAP force level because of slippages.

According to MAAG information, instructions issued by GVN Dept of Defense and Vietnamese armed forces on [February] 18 and 24 provided for organization of commando forces. These forces are to perform commando, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla missions for maintenance of territorial security pursuant to pacification plans of various military regions. Military regions and infantry divisions were directed to organize 75 15-man commando companies and 3 administrative companies two phases; 50 companies by March 6 and 28 companies and individual replacements by June 1. Personnel to come from regular army, retired servicemen and the Civil Guard. (However, Director General Civil Guard told USOM March 18 that Diem as of that time did not intend to use Civil Guard as source commando recruitment and apparently most “volunteers” so far have been chosen from existing ARVN units. Gen Ty told me March 28 about 3,000 have “volunteered” from ARVN.) Training period to be two months, but units formed by divisions may go right into operations without special training. (Comment: As far as we can find out no training these forces has been carried out as yet.)

Divisions OC furnish supplies to units formed by divisions. Supplies for other units to come from depot stocks. Each commando unit to be equipped with following major items of equipment:

1/7 ton truck 4 x 4	1
3/4 ton 4 x 4 or 1–1/2 ton 6x7 truck	1
Cal 45 pistol	1
Carbine	35
M1 Rifle	29
Submachine gun	57
BAR	9
AN/PRC 9 or SCR 694	1
AN/PRC 10 or SCR 300	4
AN/PRC 6 or SCR 536	4

Commando units to be employed as follows after training is completed:

NH	Immediately	Ultimately
Capital Military Region	3	5
First Military Region	10	20
Fifth Military Region	35	50

B. Recommended position. While commando force may offer advantage of elite corps of dedicated volunteers, disadvantages far outweigh advantages. Procedure for meeting its personnel requirements will adversely affect ARVN capabilities. It will decrease already critically short officer and potential leader strength of ARVN, will tend decrease confidence armed forces in their [garble] command structure and have bad effect on morale regular units, will deny regular units benefits of operational training, and will lead shift equipment from regular units to commandos. Moreover it will take considerable time to equip and train commando units and also raises serious question eligibility commando forces for MAP equipment, particularly if force level exceeded.

I have already made many of these arguments to Diem (Saigon’s 2622⁴) and repeated most of them to Gen Ty March 28.⁵

1 [sic]. Training and Use Regular Forces.

Recommended position: Primary combatant role in anti-guerrilla warfare operations is performed by well-trained army if size and scope such guerrilla operations exceeds capabilities of police and home-guard type forces. This is situation here since ill-trained and organized Civil Guard counted on as first line has been unable to effectively prevent expansion VC forces from former small groups to organized squad, platoon and company size units operating from bases outside country or from areas deep in forests or in extremely large and bayou-swamp-like terrain comprising Delta. MAAG of firm conviction indispensable and primary training for all army (and Civil Guard) forces to combat guerrillas is sound fundamental advanced individual and basic unit training. For past year this not accomplished for 12 infantry regiments of 4 divisions generally stationed in southern third of VN. Reason is these 12 regiments committed to anti-guerrilla operations almost continuously and in fragmented manner. When this required training mastered, then training in guerrilla tactics and techniques peculiar to anti-guerrilla operations in given area of operations is undertaken and mastered. To attempt learn guerrilla tactics and techniques without mastering basic unit training is to invite failure or limited success. Foregoing is proven doctrine and experience Malaya and other areas.

Special forces personnel should be used to train selected ARVN and Civil Guard officers and NCO’s as to how to conduct training in anti-guerrilla tactics and techniques. Impossible that special forces conduct training themselves for all personnel in regiment or division. Early initiation of training of these cadres by special forces would provide lead time as regular units accomplished necessary preliminary advanced individual and basic unit training.

As indicated above, problem is to free in particular the 12 regiments of the 4 divisions for both types training. MAAG has pushed hard a plan to rotate approximately equal halves of this force of 4 divisions plus between anti-VC operations and intensive tough training as described. Specifically the six infantry regiments of 2 divisions plus some marine and airborne battalions would conduct anti-VC operations for a 60–90 day period and then be relieved by an equal force which had completed tough realistic and required training during same period. Relieved force would take brief respite, refit, and undertake the same training. Cycle would continue indefinitely.

Another possibility is rotation of 2 divisions of remaining 3 divisions now stationed respectively one north of Hue, another at Danang and a third on the northern plateau in Kontum/Dakto area with one regiment this division at Qui Nhon on coast. This rotation plan would involve shifting 2 of these better trained divisions to anti-Viet Cong operations in south, and replacing them with two divisions from southern area. The two replaced divisions from the southern area would then have opportunity to accomplish necessary training as outlined above. Before committing two northern divisions to anti-VC operations, they would be provided opportunity to conduct some special anti-guerrilla training preferably in upper part of Mekong delta area. Rotation would have to be effected by exchanging a regiment for a regiment, followed by other key elements (artillery, transport, engineers, medics, etc.) Still on one for one basis, due to critical requirements to maintain a two-division plus force in northern area, and one division on northern plateau.

After Diem ordered 5th regiment from Danang area (2nd div) to Delta area by Feb 27, MAAG recommended on March 1 that it be replaced by regiment from southern area. Gen Williams letter to ARVN⁶ which indicated primary reason for recommendation was always present threat of PAVN forces, and in particular unsettled situation in Laos, received firm no.

MAAG has considered possibility rotating two northern divisions for two southern divisions on gradual regiment-by-regiment basis (followed by other key elements) but has not recommended this to ARVN for following reasons:

A. Well trained force required in northern area and northern plateau vis-à-vis improbably but always present capability of PAVN forces, and in particular most unsettled situation in Laos.

B. All units which would be exchanged would have to learn new plans, and become familiar with new terrain which would require estimated one month for thorough knowledge.

C. Cost of transportation and time required to accomplish rotation.

D. Probably costly requirement to shift dependents of 4 concerned divisions.

E. Political and military importance of good relationship established between key personnel of these plateau and northern divisions with montagnards.

Major advantage of this rotation plan would be availability of better trained divisions to undertake special anti-guerrilla training now, and thereby possibly save time which will be required to train the two divisions selected under the first plan.

FYI. Movement all units so far has been made more or less arbitrarily by Diem who makes most decisions without conferring either with ARVN general staff or with MAAG. It may be most difficult to implement either plan. End FYI.

3. Centralized Command.

Suggest this be stressed with Thuan along following lines: We pleased note authority given new commander fifth military region. Hoped that this portends implementation of some form national plan whereby all security forces placed under single capable military commander responding directly to control of superior emergency council or body formed by Diem. It is essential that this council [be] comprised of representatives of concerned departments and agencies such as interior, information, defense, public works and communication and justice for example, provide means, direction and authority to designated single individual. All means must be integrated which not case now. Basic and interrelated means for centralized employment are sound intelligence system, carefully composed and implemented psywar plan, would [?] political, economic and social programs, well trained military, police and home guard type forces and integrated communications system linking all levels and echelons of operation. Again this is doctrine and experience of Malaya and other areas.

4. Centralized Intelligence.

Suggest this also be raised with Thuan as very important aspect of entire problem. It is major element as discussed para 3 above, and major weakness in current security situation. Intelligence available to all the various agencies is not systematically collected, evaluated and distributed. Tendency and practice are to distribute separate items to various recipients who may or may not make it available to military or other elements being employed and needing it critically. On military side and adding to difficulty is fact that ARVN developing combat intelligence structure slowly with essential training of key personnel requiring long lead time. Compounding entire problem is communication equipment shortage. Minimum capabilities of modern telecommunications system for VN will not be available until estimated end calendar 1961 when ICA–GVN project is completed. This part of interregional and national telecommunications system for SE Asia, which will provide modern voice and teletype channels to major cities and areas throughout Viet-Nam, since available civilian communications facilities are few and limited as to amount of traffic which can be handled, and with particular regard for traffic generated by internal security situation. Many military nets and sets are utilized to supplement capabilities available. Intelligence traffic accounts for major and essential part of current communications load.

Military communications equipment not at top level but programmed over period of years. To alleviate shortage, MAP signal equipment as revalidated for FY’s 1950–59 and certain items in FY 61 program have been requested on accelerated delivery basis. This should contribute measurably to more effective intelligence system.

FY 1. Contributing to shortage of communications equipment is long delay by GVN in availing itself of large amounts communications equipment (and other types) which could now be in hand for use of Civil Guard and Sûreté. Delay pivots on failure GVN to complete detailed plan required by USOM before programming contracts can be signed. End FY 1.⁷

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.51K11/3–2960. Secret. Repeated for information to CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC.
2. In telegram 2784, the Embassy summarized four main positions which it expected Nguyen Dinh Thuan to raise in Washington during his upcoming visit: Vietnam’s financial contributions to its military budget; its need for signal and communications equipment; air force requirements; and navy augmentation. (Ibid., 033.51K11/3–2760)
3. Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Vietnam’s Secretary of State for the Presidency, and Vu Van Thai, Director General of the Budget and Foreign Aid, arrived in Washington on April 3 and remained until April 8. In a briefing memorandum from Parsons to Dillon, April 7, Parsons described Thuan as “the most important man in Diem’s cabinet” and Thai as “a most able sub-cabinet level official”. (Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 12 VN.1960—Thuan and Thai Visit)
4. Document 114.
5. No additional record of this meeting has been found.
6. Not found.
7. In MAGCH–CH 461 to CINCPAC, April 4 (040245Z), General Williams stated that much of this telegram had been prepared in the MAAG. (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, TWXs 1960 (71))