109. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Assistant Secretary of State for National Defense of the Republic of Vietnam (Dung)1
Mr. Secretary: There has been some discussion by Vietnamese and foreign civilians and Vietnamese civilian officials, and to a lesser extent by some Vietnamese military officials concerning the lack of anti-guerrilla training conducted by the Vietnamese Armed Forces. I believe you will agree this interest is commendable provided corrective action is taken by responsible officials and action is not limited to conversation.
The comments heard usually take the form of vague statements that a “MAAG does not give the proper training to the Vietnamese Army.” b “MAAG only favors training for conventional war.” c “That MAAG does not train the Vietnamese Army for anti-guerrilla operations,” etc., etc.
As you have probably heard these remarks, also, I take this opportunity to tell you how these statements are answered when made to me or in my presence.
As to a. Under existing agreements between the GVN and GUS, MAAG officers have no command authority over Vietnamese troops, whatsoever. They may only advise and recommend as to training. If the Vietnamese Commanders do not choose to follow the advice and suggestions of the MAAG advisor, they do not do so.
As to b. It is MAAG policy to advise the Vietnamese Commanders to have well trained units capable of carrying out all types of operations, including anti-guerrilla operations, operations during day and during night, in all types of terrain, particularly in the jungle, the swamp and the mountains as found in Vietnam. As you will know, it is an established military fact that well trained soldiers, with good leadership and sound plans can successfully fight any kind of enemy on any kind of terrain.
As to c. It is true that MAAG does not train the Vietnamese Army in anti-guerrilla operations but they do and have advised, recommended and often actually urged that such training be conducted by the Vietnamese officers. For example:
- (1)
- All U.S. Field Manuals and Documents used by U.S. Forces in guerrilla and anti-guerrilla operations were translated into the Vietnamese language and added to ARVN General Staff in June and [Page 292] July 1957 with the recommendation they be made available to Vietnamese troop commanders for their use.
- (2)
- In May of 1958 it was recommended that Special School Courses in anti-guerrilla and guerrilla tactics be conducted. However, the first class was not conducted until September 1959, over one year later. A second course was conducted starting in November 1959. None are being conducted now.
- (3)
- In December 1958, MAAG furnished to ARVN Programs of Instruction (POI’s) on anti-guerrilla training. However, these were not published until June 1959, six months later.
- (4)
- In June 1959, MAAG again prepared new and revised Programs of Instruction for guerrilla and anti-guerrilla instructors and handed them to ARVN with strongest recommendations that they be used.
In addition, I’ve directed MAAG advisors on numerous occasions to urge upon their Vietnamese counterparts to conduct more realistic training in communications, in intelligence, in small unit tactics, marches, night problems, marksmanship, scouting and patrolling and many such subjects that lead to success in fight engagements between small units in daylight or night in swamps, jungle and mountains. Some Commanders listened to these recommendations and some did not.
In too many cases little or no worthwhile training of any kind is being done. The commanders explain that demands by higher authorities prevent training. Typical demands cited are for security operations, guard, housing construction, and ceremonies.
Mr. Secretary, I am well aware that most of the people who converse in public about what MAAG does or does not do are those that know least what MAAG is authorized to do and often are persons that actually do not know what guerrilla or anti-guerrilla training consists of. Nevertheless, other people equally ignorant of the facts accept these unusual statements and pass them on to others who apparently take delight in passing the blame to any shoulders other than their own.
I’m sure that now since the Viet Cong operations have been intensified and all too often with complete success against Vietnamese troops that are better armed and equipped than they are themselves that Commanders will begin to pay more attention to the training of themselves and their troops. However, I’m of the opinion this will not occur fully until GVN military and civilian officials insist that they do so.
Coupled with adequate training are three other features that need attention very badly. They are, in my opinion,
- (1)
- Greater concentration and evaluation and dissemination of military intelligence,
- (2)
- A more workable system of Chain of Command, and
- (3)
- A greater effort made to secure the cooperation of the Civil Official on the town and village level and the individual Vietnamese farmer, woodsman, fisherman and storekeeper.
Lt General USA
- Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Memoranda to Ambassador 1960 (77). This letter is enclosure 4 to Document 167.↩