Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

166. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana¹

Saigon, May 20, 1960.

Dear Senator Mansfield: This is in reply to your letter of 5 May 1960² relayed to me by wire by the Secretary of Defense on 19 May. A brief interim reply was sent to you by wire via DOD on 20 May.² I am pleased to furnish you with the following additional information, first with reference to the actual situation concerning the MAAG strength and second to the internal security situation.

With the phasing out of the French Army Training Mission in 1956, which as you know had been working with MAAG in the old organization known as TRIM, and the French Navy and Air Force Training Mission in 1957, it was recognized that additional US advisors over and above the 342 then authorized would be needed to continue the training of the Vietnamese Army, Navy and Air Force. The imminent withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Force and the general situation in Vietnam—a condition of which you had first hand knowledge as a result of your thorough study of the subject at that time—imposed a requirement that the additional US advisors be on site at the earliest possible date, particularly logistical Advisors and Advisors for the Navy and the Air Force. Consequently, to avoid certain diplomatic difficulties that would have resulted from the International Control Commission (ICC) consideration of the increase in MAAG personnel, in light of the Geneva Accords, a cover organization was established in May 1956. This was and is the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), consisting of 350 US Military technical personnel. The mission of TERM was two-fold: First, to recover, classify and dispose of thousands of tons of US supplied military equipment from the Indo-China War, and second to advise and train the Vietnamese Armed Forces in logistical and technical matters. The first mission was completely legitimate and an essential undertaking on an overt basis. A point of considerable interest is that from arrival of TERM here in 1956 until 30 April 1960, that organization has reclaimed for the United States excess property to the value of $749.8 million (requisition value). The second mission, however, has been kept classified since the inception of TERM and is still classified information.

The presence of US advisors of MAAG in Vietnam has long been the target of vitriolic propaganda blasts by Hanoi and regular complaints to ICC about an American Military alliance with Vietnam in contravention of the Geneva Accords and about US personnel “commanding” the Vietnamese Army. Radio Hanoi has for some time regularly accused us of having 2,000 US Military in Vietnam. Undoubtedly, they realize that our efforts here have hurt them. The establishment of TERM, even as to its overt mission, led to increased presence by North Vietnam to remove all US Military personnel from Vietnam. Consequently, in early 1957, the ICC began insisting on receiving periodic reports of TERM’s activities and inspections of TERM’s operations with a view to insuring that TERM leave the country at an early date and as soon as all excess equipment had been removed. Recognizing that TERM could not be maintained indefinitely, because of the transitory nature of its unclassified mission but also realizing that continued logistical training was required, I proposed about March 1957 that TERM be legitimatized as a permanent organization with unrestricted functions. This was considered politically impossible at that time, but in late 1957 and early 1958 I again pressed with the Country Team for establishment of a firm State-Defense “long-range policy” on the status of TERM. The need for the continued presence of these logistic advisors was now apparent to the members of the Country Team and many US official visitors, as well as to me. Actually, there is no doubt that without the assistance and advice of TERM personnel, the Vietnamese Armed Forces logistical system would have fallen flat on its face. This at great loss to US financial as well military interest.

In late 1958 and during 1959, diplomatic actions were finally undertaken at the instigation of the Country Team and with full concurrence of CINCPAC, DOD and the State Department, to obtain ICC acceptance of an increased number of MAAG personnel. Aside from the basic legality of the question, which was based on the presence of at least 888 US and French advisors in Vietnam in 1958, the phase-out of TERM as its overt work was completed was cited to emphasize the fact that we were not increasing our total military personnel in Vietnam above the number present at the time of the signing of the Geneva Accords.

In the meantime, Vietnamese officials had become increasingly concerned about the termination of TERM’s functions and the possibility of the loss of their logistical advisors. I am happy to say that they have, in the past few years, become fully cognizant of the importance of logistics and technical training in the successful over-all training and employment of their armed forces. Consequently, President Diem urgently requested, in view of the newness of the VN Armed Forces and their continued need of logistical advisors, that the total strength of MAAG/TERM not be decreased at this time.

After the diplomatic groundwork had been laid by the US State Department, the Vietnamese Government presented to the ICC formal request for an increase in MAAG from 342 to 685 personnel, and on 19 April 1960 the ICC took favorable action on this request. The delay in obtaining acceptance of this action by other interested countries vindicated our previous action of resorting to a cover organization at a time when delay would have been intolerable, and the final ICC action justifies our position that such an increase is, in fact, legal under the Geneva Accords. We are now in the process of assigning all newly arriving personnel to MAAG. As TERM personnel depart upon completion of their tours of duty, they will not be replaced. The total number of US military advisors will then not be increased.

It is evident, therefore, that the action taken is not an increase in MAAG strength—actually MAAG’s new strength of 685 is 7 spaces below the present combined strength of MAAG and TERM. It is, rather, an action to legalize the work which has been done by TERM for 4 years. The presentation of the case to the ICC and to friendly countries, who assisted in the diplomatic maneuvers to obtain ICC approval was made on the basis of legalizing an increase in MAAG rather than legalizing TERM’s covert mission or indicating that TERM would be added to MAAG, since this would have disclosed the fact that TERM had been partly presented to ICC as a subterfuge in the beginning. The statement in the UPI press account that a group of 350 “civilian technicians” is being phased out was in error since TERM personnel were US Military.

I would like at this time to point out to you the need for continued classification of this subject, even though favorable ICC action has been taken.

With regard to the security situation, I would like to present this as a long range problem: When the Communist forces moved to the North of the 17th parallel as result of the Geneva Accords in 1959, they left Communist cells throughout South Vietnam. They have always been a security problem to a greater or lesser degree. Sometimes they would remain quiet, other times for short periods they would become active. Never were the Vietnamese able to completely eliminate them. During the latter part of 1958 but mostly during 1956, the GVN intensified its efforts against the Cao Daist and Hoa Hao Sects. By the end of 1956, with the capture and execution of the Hoa Hao leader Ba Cut, this operation was completed. During the period the Communist cells remained largely under cover. During 1957 and 1958 they were not too active. Although trouble from them was expected by GVN during the summer of 1959 and prior to the August 11, 1959 National Assembly elections, it did not materialize seriously and the elections were held without noticeable incidents.

However, after these elections the cells gradually became more active and have become very active during the last six months. This recent activity had been on a scale too large to be effectively controlled by the civilian security forces (Civil Guard, Village Militia and Police). As you realize, Hanoi can turn such activity on or off like a spiggot whenever they see fit.

From time to time, the Communist cells have been reinforced by additional well-indoctrinated Communists from the North to replace their forces or to increase their numerical strength. This intensification is brought about by North Vietnam’s determination to undermine and destroy the government of South Vietnam which in my opinion they hesitate to attempt at this time by all out invasion although they have the capability to do so. It is characterized by increased boldness and the use of larger groups of armed Viet Cong. Undoubtedly the Viet Cong infiltration of additional cadres into southern Vietnam has been facilitated by recent unsettled conditions in Laos, and in my opinion, by the “neutralism” of Cambodia, which makes the task of Vietnamese security forces more difficult. The Civil Guard, an organization under the Department of Interior, lacks the training and equipment to maintain security under these conditions and hence a major share of pacification operations has devolved upon the military. The training efforts of the military are keeping pace with the situation and includes, as you suggested, training to fit the troops for anti-guerrilla warfare without an increase in the number of advisory personnel.

I was impressed with the expression you used last August concerning MAAG “working itself out of a job” as I had stressed this concept, without so wording it, for a long time. My purpose has been two-fold, one to reassure the Vietnamese that we had no idea of remaining here as a second Colonial Power, which I believe many VN Military thought, and secondly to get the VN Military to work harder themselves, to become more self-reliant, to realize that MAAG unquestionably would be reduced gradually and finally withdrawn at the earliest feasible date. Recently, in reply to a request for my forecast on reduction of American personnel in Vietnam I stated that in my opinion MAAG should be able to take a 15% reduction in mid-1961 and progressively reduce about 20% each year thereafter. I fully realize, of course, that it’s very difficult during recent world wide conditions to accurately forecast what the situation in South East Asia will be in mid-1961. However, for intelligent planning over a period of time some assumptions have to be made. Therefore, the recommendation could only be made on the assumption that there would be no drastic change in the general situation. With this assumption [illegible] the foreseen improvement of the VN officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Corps and especially the improvement that would come from the Military Schooling in the United States of selected officers of the Vietnamese Army, Navy and Air Force.

Trusting that the above gives you the information you desire, I remain

Very truly yours,

S.T. Williams³
Lt General, USA

1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Official Correspondence Jan–Apr 1960 (73). Personal and Confidential.
2. See Document 154.
2. See Document 154.
3. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.