Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

134. Memorandum of Discussion at the 333d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 1, 1957¹

Washington, August 1, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Definition of the Term “Mobilization Base” (NSC Action No. 1522–h; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base”, dated March 1, 1957; NSC 5707/8; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Definition of the Term ‘Mobilization Base’”, dated July 24 and 26, 1957)²

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this project (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting).³ He added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the Planning Board recommendation, and called on the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, for comment.

Mr. Gray said that the proposed Planning Board definition⁴ was satisfactory to ODM.

Mr. Brundage felt that the illustrations in the second paragraph of the definition were restrictive and subject to change from year to year. Since U.S. policy with respect to the mobilization base was already set forth in the Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5707/8), he felt it was unnecessary to add illustrative material to the definition.⁵

Mr. Gray pointed out that the proposed definition contained a new element which had never before appeared in a definition of the mobilization base—namely, the services required for survival activities. He said this element appeared in the illustrative material in the second paragraph of the definition. Mr. Brundage said that some other new element might be thought of next year.

The President said perhaps we will think of something new next year. He felt the concept of survival must be an essential part of the definition of the mobilization base. He pointed out that global war could be divided into two stages: first, survival of the initial blows, and second, going on to win the war.

Mr. Cutler asked whether Budget would object if the illustrative material were placed in a footnote. The President said the illustrations in the second paragraph of the proposed definition were valuable. The elements affecting the state of readiness of essential military, civilian and survival activities must include everything. It seemed to the President that the Planning Board’s proposed definition was satisfactory as it was.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Noted and discussed the proposed definition of the term “mobilization base” prepared by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1522–h and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 24, 1957, and the proposed revision of that definition prepared by the NSC Planning Board: and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 26, 1957; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.

b. Adopted the revision of the definition prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July

Note: The definition referred to in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all interested departments and agencies.

[Here follow agenda items 2 and 3. Item 3, “U.S. Policy on Indonesia,” is printed in volume XXII, page 400.]

4. Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development (NSC Actions Nos. 1430–p, 1448, 1502 and 1665; NIE 100–4–57; NIE 100–6–57; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 29, June 19, and July 22, 1957)⁷

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this project, and added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the draft NSC Action proposed by the Planning Board. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note⁸ is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

Governor Hoegh⁹ said FCDA concurred in Governor Peterson’s report¹⁰ and in the draft Action proposed by the Planning Board. Governor Hoegh felt that this was not the solution, but a solution, to be strengthened and supplemented in the future. He felt it was an admirable grass-roots approach.

The President also thought this was a good approach. He said if we attempted to inform the public on the human effects of nuclear weapons by dramatic actions, we would create hysteria instead of spreading information. Working through the Foreign Policy Association and the American Assembly was a sound method. He favored the gradual approach. He wondered whether we had sounded out the Foreign Policy Association and the American Assembly. Mr. Cutler reported that FCDA had already been in touch with these organizations.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that there was a difference of opinion in the Planning Board as to the appropriate official to make the initial contacts with the Foreign Policy Association, the American Assembly, and other organizations. The President said this was a job for FCDA in the long run. Mr. Cutler said that many of the topics listed for group discussion fell in the State Department’s field, and suggested that the Secretary of State might be asked to collaborate with the Federal Civil Defense Administration in making the necessary contacts. The President and Secretary Herter agreed with this suggestion.

The National Security Council:¹¹

a. Discussed the proposed program of group discussions of national security issues and related matters detailed in paragraph 7 of the report on the subject prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator pursuant to NSC Action No. 1665–b and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 19, 1957, and the draft NSC Action thereon prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 22, 1957; in the light of the intelligence estimates prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1665–d (NIE 100–4–57 and NIE 100–6–57) and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.

b. Agreed that:

(1) In lieu of earlier recommendations for joint governmental-private sponsorship of such group discussions (reference memorandum of January 29, 1957), efforts should be made to stimulate such group discussions under private auspices.

(2) A gradual, developmental approach should be favored over a dramatic, nationwide approach.

(3) The Foreign Policy Association, the American Assembly, and other appropriate organizations should be encouraged to take the lead in the matter.

(4) The Federal Government should not be responsible for developing materials to facilitate the group discussions referred to in (1) above, but the cognizant agencies of the Federal Government should continue to make available, as part of normal information material, unclassified information designed to facilitate such group discussions.

c. Noted that the President designated the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, to make the initial contacts referred to in b–(3) above.

Note: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator and the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow agenda items 5–9. Regarding item 6, “Relation of Port Security Policy Toward Poland,” see Document 141. Item 8, “U.S. Policy Toward Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute,” is printed in volume XXIV, page 488.]

10. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Programs (NSC Actions Nos. 1433, 1484, 1690 and 1743)¹²

Mr. Cutler noted that after the Defense presentation on the missile programs on July 8,¹³ the President had asked the Secretary of Defense to recommend, not later than August 15, any missile programs which could be eliminated before October 1, 1957 (in addition to the missile programs which, as stated in the presentation, were scheduled to be phased out).¹⁴ Mr. Cutler invited attention to NSC Action No 1484–c and the President’s directive issued in lieu of approval of NSC Action No. 1484–d (December 21, 1955). Mr. Cutler then called upon Secretary Wilson.

Secretary Wilson read a memorandum addressed to the President under date of July 31, 1957 (copy¹⁵ filed in the minutes of the meeting), as follows:

“The present dual approach to the IRBM development program with its resultant excessive cost is no longer justified. I recommend that the Thor and Jupiter development programs be combined into a single missile program.

“I propose to establish a committee composed of three members, one each from the Department of Defense, the Air Force and the Army to consider both the Jupiter and Thor programs with the purpose of properly evaluating the engineering and scientific information provided by the work to date. This committee will be asked to recommend a final program which, when adopted, will be under the management of the Air Force. The advisability of a new name for the program will be considered at that time.

“I propose in the meantime to suspend or cancel the production of additional missiles and missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program. I further propose that overtime be eliminated except that necessary in conjunction with flight testing and for the small amount necessary to take care of emergencies. This applies to both contractors’ operations as well as those under our supervision.

“I conceive the new program as costing substantially less than the present dual approach.

“These changes may cause some delay in the program. While this cannot be definitely evaluated at this time, I believe it will not be great enough to be important in the light of the time it will take to work out operational use and deployment of the perfected missile.

“In respect to the ICBM programs, I propose to continue the Atlas at the highest priority. We are re-examining the facilities and schedules for experimental production, including a careful study of the overtime problem, to see if acceptable economies can be made.

“In respect to the Titan program, I believe that by reducing the pressures on this program we can make substantial economies in this alternative development.

“I would like to make it clear that the actions we are proposing at this time might be considered to depart from the directions that we received as a result of National Security Council Action 1433 on 8 September 1955 under which we were instructed to pursue these programs at highest priority and to explore promising alternative avenues of development. I should therefore like your approval for this proposed course of action.”

Secretary Wilson asked that the President approve the recommendations in this letter.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the President had previously laid great stress on developing guided missiles rapidly for their psychological effect. The President asked whether Deputy Secretary Quarles and Mr. Holaday agreed with Secretary Wilson’s recommendations, and Secretary Wilson replied in the affirmative.

[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Cutler wondered how long the committee referred to in Secretary Wilson’s letter would require for its deliberations. Secretary Wilson said he didn’t know.

The President asked why Secretary Wilson wished to put the single missile program, which would result from a combination of the Thor and Jupiter programs, under the management of the Air Force. Secretary Wilson said that the Air Force was responsible in accordance with its roles and missions, and that originally Jupiter had been put under the Army because of its Redstone experience. The President said that when he had agreed to the dual approach, he had also agreed that the force developing the missile need not be the one to utilize it. He still wondered why there should be an advance decision that the Air Force would manage the single missile program. Secretary Wilson said the Air Force would be responsible for installation and operational use, and that the Air Force had sufficient money in its 1958 budget, whereas the Army did not. The President said he wasn’t objecting too strongly to Air Force management, but he wondered what would happen to morale if a group of technicians in a service worked for a long time on a missile and then had it taken away from them. He thought Secretary Wilson had adopted the correct approach in general, but still wondered about this advance decision on management by the Air Force.

The President added that the part of Secretary Wilson’s letter dealing with canceling the production of missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program, made him smile, because he had suggested this some time ago. He had made the point that we should not approve components of production models unless we were sure the missiles would work. Secretary Wilson said that the United States had a “mess” of Jupiter and Thor missiles. The President said these missiles wouldn’t be a mess if they worked. Secretary Wilson said we had a missile that went 1500 miles, but it had no guidance and the re-entry problem was not solved. He said we had two versions of an ICBM, one a year behind the other. We were replacing the first before we were sure it would work. Secretary Wilson thought that if Atlas did not work, neither would Titan. The President said he agreed with what Secretary Wilson was proposing.

With reference to overtime, the President thought the real bottleneck in missile programs was not overtime, but thinking out the problems. Mr. Dulles said that he had no evidence of anything new or dramatic in the Soviet missiles program. The President said he thought Secretary Wilson’s plan was satisfactory.

Mr. Cutler said he understood that Atlas was continued at the highest priority, and that the priority of Titan was reduced. Secretary Wilson asked whether Admiral Strauss agreed with the recommendations in his letter, and Admiral Strauss replied in the affirmative.

The National Security Council:¹⁶

Noted the President’s approval of the following recommendations by the Secretary of Defense presented at the meeting:

a. That the Thor and Jupiter development programs be combined into a single missile program.

b. That a committee composed of one member each from the Departments of Defense, the Air Force and the Army consider both the Thor and Jupiter programs and, after evaluating the engineering and scientific information available to date, recommend such final single missile program, to be under the management of the Air Force; with a report thereon by the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Council not later than October 1, 1957.¹⁷

c. Meanwhile, as to the Thor and Jupiter programs:

(1) Suspend or cancel the production of additional missiles and missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program; and

(2) Eliminate overtime except that necessary in connection with flight testing and to take care of emergencies.

d. Recognize that, while the actions in a, b and c above may cause some delay in the IRBM development program, such delay is not expected to be significant in the light of the time required to accomplish operational use and deployment of a perfected missile.

e. Continue the Atlas program at the highest priority; reexamining the facilities and schedules for experimental production, including a careful study of the overtime problem, to see if acceptable economies can be made.

f. Reduce the priorities on the Titan program in an effort to make substantial economies in this alternative development.

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

Marion W. Boggs¹⁸

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on August 2.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1522, see footnote 10, Document 62. The March 1 memorandum is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series) NSC 5707/8 is printed as Document 120. The July 24 and 26 memoranda are not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)
3. The briefing note is not filed in the minutes.
4. The proposed Planning Board definition, transmitted in the memorandum from the Executive Secretary to the NSC, dated July 26, cited in footnote 2 above, reads as follows:

   ‘For planning purposes the mobilization base is defined as the total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs.

   “Such resources include the manpower and material resources and services required for the support of essential military, civilian, and survival activities; as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as (but not limited to) the following: manning levels; state of training; modernization of equipment; mobilization of material reserves and facilities; continuity of government; civil defense plans and preparedness measures; psychological preparedness of the people; international agreements; planning with industry; dispersion; and stand-by legislation and controls.”

5. A footnote to the definition proposed by the NSC Planning Board reads: “The Bureau of the Budget agrees with only the first paragraph of the above definition.”
6. Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1756, approved by the President on August 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
7. For references to NSC Actions No. 1430, 1448, and 1502 and the January 29 memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 108. Regarding NSC Action No. 1655, see footnote 6, Document 105.NIE 100–4–57, “Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World,” and NIE 100–6–57, “Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries,” are not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) The June 19 and July 22 memoranda are not printed. (Ibid.,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development)
8. The briefing note is not filed in the minutes.
9. Leo A. Hoegh, Governor of Iowa, 1954–1957, became Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration in late June 1957.
10. Reference is to the report by the Panel on the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development chaired by Val Peterson; see Document 96.
11. Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1759, approved by the President on August 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
12. Regarding NSC Action No. 1433, see footnote 9, Document 34. Regarding NSC Action No. 1484, see footnote 8, Document 45. Regarding NSC Action No. 1690, see footnote 12, Document 112. Regarding NSC Action No. 1743, see footnote 7, Document 126.
13. The Defense presentation took place on July 3, not July 8. See Document 126.
14. See Document 138.
15. The memorandum is filed in the minutes, and is also quoted in full below.
16. Paragraphs a–f and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1765, approved by the President on August 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
17. The report, given by William M. Holaday, is summarized in Document 146.
18. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.